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IS THE MIND A COHERER



J. M. Wells

IS THE MIND A COHERER

BY
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IS THE MIND A COHERER

AN IMPASSE IN SCIENCE

SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS

Do you ever go out of your mind, reader?

What a question to ask a modern descendant of Socrates!

But I think Socrates himself, if he were here, would have asked it, and, moreover, would have shown how highly necessary it was to be asked. I mean in cognizing, discussing, handling anything, can you possibly treat of anything except what is in your mind? Can you treat of anything, for instance, which is outside your mind by means of what is not in your mind? Can you ever get in this way outside of your mind, or, in other words, can you go out of your mind?

In the way that you mean I agree that we can never go out of our mind.

If we can treat of nothing that our mind does not treat of, and if, in treating of anything

and everything we have to treat of it and can only treat of it to the precise extent to which it is present in our minds, in that sense you would agree that no man can ever go out of his mind.

Certainly, no one can, in that sense.

Then every man who remains thus at all times in his mind and has only at all times his mind to fall back upon, whether he pays attention to the fact or not, is a metaphysician, for all things begin and end for him in a region '*μετα τα φυσικα*'—in some region, that is to say, beyond a physical, save as they invented. They begin for him in mind, they continue for him in mind, if the postulate is that he cannot go out of his mind.

I would assent also to this.

Yet there are men nowadays who claim to be out of their mind. They habitually talk as if they could and do overstep the limits of their minds, as if they had stepped off that base—their own mind—on to some other reality beyond it, whereon they repose. They talk and write habitually as if they could and do treat of things without the least regard that it is and can be only in their mind that they treat of them; and that it is only as these things are in their minds that they exist to them at all. For they claim to give utterance to things in which mind has no part. If it be

true of them that they do actually go beyond their own minds, and that in what is reported by them mind has no part, these men have ceased, whatever else they may have become, to be those metaphysicians who are limited, as we say, to being men, as long as they are unable at any time to get beyond their own mind, and as long, therefore, as they remain in it ever in a state, by virtue of that necessity, in some way 'μετα τα φυσικα,' or beyond a raw (non-mental) physical. But these men, unable to remain metaphysician and therefore even men in the way we have stated, claim super-human power, in that they assert a power denied to ordinary men of going out of their mind. Do you not think that Socrates would have had something to say on this point of their ceasing to be metaphysicians. Can you picture to yourself Socrates compelled to follow these men in their argument, going out of his mind?

Socrates, go out of his mind! O labour of Hercules! Is it possible?

It is abominably possible—

What! To go out of one's mind?

No, but that there be men who assert this power. I myself have heard them. And the names of these men?

They are styled Scientists, and that which they utter, when they have a mind to it, but

no mind in it, is peculiarly modern Physical Science.

But take care what you say! These same men, beyond all others, are believed by the citizens to be in possession of information whose veracity self-evidences itself. Their information is believed to be informed with a degree of certainty in no other quarter to be attained, and in none other so to be depended upon. Since when have these men been, and this science?

I do not say that these men are out of their minds, or that this Science is out of its mind, I affirm the exact opposite, they never can go out of their minds. But these men habitually talk as if they were out of their minds, and as if they had a right to be; and what is uttered by them as science is asserted as if, being entirely beyond the mind, it had no meta-physical base, and as if, accordingly, whatever else it was, it was not also entirely a transaction in metaphysics, a transaction in the *‘μετα τα φυσικα’* or in a something more than really physical. It was one of their own party who brought the matter to a head the other day when he publicly stated that he perceived he had been trying to go out of his mind.

It must have been an interesting occasion.

Hear, if you like, the whole matter. But it is a disquisition rather than a narrative.

Have we ever had displayed to us in the history of English Science, an *impasse* more conspicuous than that reached in the question as to how in the relation of the physical molecular to the mental, matter becomes mind? The *impasse* is stated as consisting in the fact that no one can ever understand how matter becomes mind. Dozens of quotations can be inserted here from scientific writers of all degrees of eminence acknowledging an *impasse*, a chasm, a vast vacuity in our understanding of how the molecular can become the mental, how in fact matter becomes mind.

All I propose to assert is that unless we can go out of our mind this *impasse* in our own understanding, this vast vacuity in our own mind cannot exist. It is only by claiming to go out of our mind that we place upon ourselves the necessity of thinking that we have to ask such a question as to the molecular becoming the mental at all.

DOES MATTER BECOME MIND

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THIS QUESTION AT ALL

How did scientists ever come to invent such a bothersome and gratuitous problem as is evidently asserted as existing in the following :

"I know nothing and never hope to know anything of the steps by which the passage from the molecular movement to states of consciousness is effected." (Huxley).

"It is utterly inconceivable how consciousness should arise from their (atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, etc.) joint action." (Du Bois-Reymond).

"The two things are on utterly different platforms. The physical facts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves." (Clifford).

This is the peculiar *impasse* we want to scrutinize. There is a problem, these men agree, but it is insoluble. There is a question as to the matter becoming mind which must be asked and cannot be answered.

Must be asked! The truth is it can only

be asked if we can go out of our minds. It cannot be asked unless we assert a claim to be able to go out of our minds. Do these men claim to be out of their minds? Is modern science out of its mind?

Modern Science is out of its mind every time it asks such a question. This is specifically alleged by no less a personage than Professor Huxley. It is only by claiming to be able to go out of its mind that it can assert its right to have any question to ask at all.

Huxley, in his Essay on the "Physical Basis of Life," depicts the great spectre of materialism rising in this connection of the molecular with the mind. "As surely," he says, "as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law until it is coextensive with knowledge, with feeling and with action." "The consciousness of this great truth," he adds, "lies like a nightmare, I believe, upon many of the best minds of the day."

But he is careful to explain that it is only the spectre that can be thus conjured up. He entirely declines a materialistic philosophy as he declines an idealist, preferring to remain an agnostic or a man claiming to be unable to decide. He decides that he is an agnostic by positively declining, from some source of trust in himself, a materialistic position.

His reason for refusing materialism is the same as ours. He found he had been trying to go out of his mind and he could not do it. We cannot go out of our minds is his reason for refusal.

"For," he writes, "after all what do we know of this terrible 'matter' except as a name for the unknown and hypothecated cause of states of our own consciousness." (That is, we cannot go out of our mind.) "But," (since he is an agnostic) "what do we know of 'spirit' for whose threatened extinction by 'matter,' so great a lamentation is arising like that which was heard at the death of Pan, except that it is an unknown and hypothecated cause or condition of states of consciousness. In other words Professor Huxley trusts his mind when, refusing to go out of itself it declines to give him materialism. He trusts his mind and remains in it here, declaiming against an unknown and hypothecated or extra-mental informant as to both "matter" and "spirit"—but yet we have to go on and say he does not trust his mind, fully and entirely that is to say, after it has declaimed against these hypothecated externals and been reduced so to speak into itself.

"After all what do we know of 'matter,' " etc. What is this but an assertion that no man can go beyond his mind, that he begins with mind,

continues with mind and must be in some way by reason of mind in some way 'μετα τα φυσικα' or beyond any physical but what is given him as mind by mind? Every man is thus always a metaphysician who cannot go out of his mind.

Go out of your mind, the Professor seems to say, and you will have materialism. But you cannot go out of your mind, and so you only have it when you claim a right to be out of your mind. Science may be as physical as it likes when it is out of its mind; it must be metaphysical when it is in its mind.

Stop, therefore, in your mind and you only have the molecular as a form of mind, and what becomes then of the *impasse* which states itself as a question which must be asked and cannot be answered as to how the molecular becomes the mental? What becomes of the chasm, the vast vacuity in our understanding when it depicts itself now as a question how the mental becomes the mental? The question in its first form cannot be answered because it cannot be asked till we have gone out of our minds. In its second form it is a gratuitous insult to our identity, claiming its right to exist contemporaneously at all points and by all forms of our mind.

For instance, unless I believe—which I cannot—that I have as many separate bodies as I have molecules, and own as many separate

I's or Me's, I should never think it necessary to ask how in that body the head becomes the contemporaneous heart. I should think myself mocking my identity by asking any such question, for what is the essence of my identity but that there be differentiations of it to assert it to identity. And if my bodily identity mocks such a question, what a mock as to any question of it as matter becoming it as mind must that identity make, which, if we cannot go out of our mind, has to retain in it as mind the portion or differentiation of itself styled by it physical, which physical is only by its invention physical? What a mock must that identity make of any such *impasse*, such vast vacuity in itself as constitutes the typical 19th century *impasse* of Science? Bits of an identity believed to be lost though we cannot go out of our mind? Let us be satisfied, as we must, with what remains and must be an identity.

Professor Huxley, apparently, did not admit identity or the arguments arising from its presence to enter his argument. His inquiries ceased just when the identity had so far pleaded its presence as to affirm that Huxley's "matter" must after all and could only be as some part of a mental identity. He never got so far as to let it speak in full for itself, and so he had his fit of the *impasse*, the *impasse* how the molecular can become the mental. Yet his

identity was speaking in its primal categorical necessity (the only way identities have of speaking) when it said in him, "I cannot go out of my mind," and the fit of the *impasse* that Huxley allowed to arise in himself when he reasoned in disregard of this its plea, the vast vacuity that does not exist, only occurs when Science forgets (as it can do) to remember to be always in its mind. It invented the instructive history in its unity of its fit of the *impasse* in betokenment of its own method of development.

SCIENCE AND GREATER SCIENCE

OUR OWN TRUSTWORTHINESS

Science has a right to be out of its mind. That is to say, I do not expect or desire modern Physical Science to load itself up all the time it is handling what to it is 'τα φυσικα' with a consideration whether it is in its mind or not that it is handling what to it is 'τα φυσικα.' By special prerogative modern Physical Science now stands to do its work independently of this ever-present further consideration. It has a right in this sense to be out of its mind. It has a right to be Godless. If the vast pageant in the mind that constitutes for us the 'τα φυσικα' is easiest work by a mind detaching itself from and unconcerning itself at the same time with these further considerations as to itself; if, by the thus division of labour more work can be done with the most benefit to mankind in general, let us concede to science for all time the right the special prerogative to be out of its mind and to continue so, to be Godless and to continue so.

But when an *impasse* obtained, on special prerogative is flung by one specialist at his brother specialists in triumphant proof that he has done the special work for the doing of which he was on that special prerogative established, in proof, that he, good and faithful servant, has manufactured the *impasse* he was bound to manufacture, it is time for Greater Science to reinvade his province from such a standpoint now, and with such considerations now as were not conveyed in that former special charter of prerogative as shall remove the illusory *impasse* by doing away with it in a heightened and aggrandised degree of itself as Greater Science.

Life is short. It is the work of many men's lives to build up even one good sound honest *impasse*. Honour to the man who builds up one such and leaves it established a certainty at his death. He thought all he could? he thought right—he could not I believe but think right. His sole task, to which no measure of blame need attach was that he did not think enough. For life is short, passed now to the world in books, which are the collected and and stored minds of men. It is a swifter and an easier task and a pleasanter one for the Greater Science by reinvading the specialists' province with considerations not conveyed in its former charter of prerogative to upraise

itself by that self-assimilation of these its own *impasses*, in that process of the continual reconstitution of itself by these means, which Hegel well knew, whose wise man, he bade us know, continually transcends his own importance. In the creation of these *impasses* in itself and in the reassimulating of them in itself progresses and attains to grander being of itself in certainty that Greater Science, for ever metaphysical, which, by reinvading special quarters of itself with considerations not at first necessary to be exploited there can and does so with reassimilation of *impasses* promote its own growth. Science and Greater Science ; Science and a more than Science ; the consideration arbitrarily delineated as scientific and the considerations that pass as not that Science—both these are necessary to carry on the process, growth. But ultimately no unity or identity can obtain in a mind or in knowledge—a mind or all knowledge can be no unified or unifiable thing—there can be no unit or identic as the individual mind, or as unifiable knowledge, but what is *that* unit and *that* identity that can throw up in itself in its own life, in its own existence (as that existence is granted to it) considerations (which are forms of its own existence) that can come into that real conflict of those *impasses* that in their reassimilability can raise *that* identity as Greater

Science on to higher planes of its own existence. If we begin and end with mind, as we said at the commencement of our essay, we begin as well and end in an identity, and as an identity. But such an identity! Necessary to itself at all points as itself.

WHAT MUST I THINK

CAN I EVER BE CERTAIN

WHAT necessity moved in Huxley to declare itself in the conviction that registers itself in that implied assertion of his that a man cannot go out of his mind ("after all what do we know of 'matter'" etc., save as keeping within our mind we know it.) Where did this categorical imperative, this necessity, exerting itself in his mind as to mind being ever self-contained in its mental estate derive itself from? From what possible quarter in a self-contained mind can this question as to its self-continency spring from? Why did Huxley trust it when by reason of it he discarded that materialism which was impossible to him when he asserted this self-continency of his mind? Must he have thought this? Could he be certain of this?

This necessity in Huxley's mind of his thinking so about itself sprang, I find myself having to think, from his own identity, which is charged throughout in every quarter with this kind of inherent necessity in itself to state itself

and to view itself as a unit or identic mind. When Descartes sought for something of which he must be certain he hit upon the Latin word "*cogito*" "I think." Here, he said, is something I must think and believe. Here, I cannot but be certain, and this cannot but be an as certain I. And all that springs along with this in an equal certainty is as equally certain. Here then in "I think" is a self-contained mind seeking no assurance save itself; unable to find any assurance but itself; unable, so far at any rate, to be agnostic about itself; manufactured, in fact, as a fact of practical omniscience to itself and as to itself.

"With this 'I' and this 'think' begins," says Descartes, "that self-contained and self-containing fact, knowing its self-contineny, which is, in its governings and decidings of itself, a practical omniscient." With this "I" begins that identity in a self-contained and self-containing mind, certified to itself and certain of itself, which itself demands as requisite to it as an identity at all; certified, moreover, as to itself, and certain of itself as all those ways in thinking, and of thinking which are the methods by which it must certify itself to itself, when existing, as existing only in what scheme is (*i.e.* stands) with eliciting and satisfaction of them in present establishment or for future

development. With this "cogito," I think, it becomes; to trust fully hereafter whatever information as to its way in becoming is satisfactory to itself; with an *ergo sum* "therefore I am" it proceeds at once to let this categorical statement of itself develop itself in its further necessary self-promptings and promotions of itself as a self-contained omniscient. And so it goes on, and cannot but go on, till it has outflowed as itself in all those promptings and promotions of itself, according to those promptings, which result in its survey of itself under those micro-cosmic aspectings, that scheme to itself which is also as far as the categorical is present everywhere itself in scheme which ranges through many aspects, as here a *τα φυσικα*, where dropping consideration of itself as a self-contingency, it can expatiate liberated, as it were, in an externality, and so far, by dropping those considerations, go out of its mind, and as here again, lastly and not less wonderfully, that very power in which as in all elsewhere an omniscient, it conveys an ineluctable instruction to itself that it is to its necessity as to its ways in thinking and for thinking being what they are is chargeable the necessity of the scheme in which it is being what it is; the necessity of those aspectings of itself as "Thought" or "The Thoughten" being what they are. Nor can it fail from such a

beginning of coming to its full achievement, *i.e.*, consciousness, confident of itself as the only possible Realism since confident of itself establishing its only possible Realism to itself, and as to itself. This is what we must gain by keeping within our mind—Realism free as Realism itself from any spectre. This is the final charter of the always self-containing mind. To the question "What must I think?" we answer to all time, "What I must think," for it is real, and in this and this only lies Reality. To the further question "Can I ever be certain?" "I cannot but ever be certain." All men, we may come in the end to see, are right and must be right. The *impasses* that separate men, and in which as in "errors" they abut on one another, these *impasses* now, and these in the past, as succeeding one another as the historical errors of men continually in error abutting on one another, these errors, be they given expression to in morality, Sociology, or Science, do not denote disqualifications laid upon men of not thinking right—they do not imply that men in what they then had to think did not, as having to think, have to think right—but they are progress stages of the right thinking, and of the right in thinking in its right development of itself in and as

"The one Divine event"
Which as the thus Creation moves.

If this is true of the intellect and the progress of the intellectual as the growth of knowledge—and it can certainly be detected here—we may believe it to be true and uniform in the progress of the moral and all sociological elements. That spirit which we call justice, for instance, which has continually evolved on earth those past laws in which it successively marked off its temporary *impasses* against itself as injustice—these past laws and the *impasses* they thus exhibit, become all erroneous now in a greater justice and a finer existency of that spirit, cannot imply that what justice then was on earth that justice which so gave expression of itself, and so only came to sentiency of itself—no sentiency without a knowing to an opposition and hence an *impasse*—was not then in itself right justice. These erroneous laws, as those errors of the intellect, only betoken now that what is now greater justice grew then, as it must continue to grow now with creation and mere imitation in itself as right of these successive *impasses*, which do not exist now except as that (former) justice is now less right. How men so unjust, as they seem now, could at that time seem to themselves to be just at all, is now only explicable if the more just justice as it now is, in these progress stages of itself in growth, could and did throw up these *impasses*, as exhibited in

the laws now discardable, precisely, and only when and as it did so with greater definition and attainment and conquest of itself over itself as injustice and the discardable.

We have spoken of this particular nineteenth century *impasse*, as to the molecular becoming the mental, as illusory, and as if, being an "error" (though it was also the thought that had to be thought, and thus a mere progress growth-stage in greater science, and one of the progress-stages by which greater science grows, only detecting "error" and wrong as it is discardable, as "error" (in the activity of disknowing it), becomes incorporable in the new, which cannot be without this activity of disknowing—the rule of life being to be only able to have anything by means of an opposite *actively disknown*—it were no harm. Hence philosophers, men say, deny the existence of evil.

As I sit, apart from men, in active self-contemplating, building up in my mind this "error," this *impasse*, as that which had to be thought, and redissolving it, added as an activity of disknowing, in that greater thought and greater science which only wins, which only retrieves itself at that very moment of triumph in which it wins by winning that "error," (how profound may come to be the application of this truth in religion), and

comes into sentiency of itself as knowing and disknowing with and through that "error," which in fact wins as it (greater science), in having to think itself, only then composes to an "error" what it appropriates as right thought, and part of itself in doing so—there being right errors and no others, with activity of disknowing them—can any man say what harm, what pain, what evil, is this right error to me? Evil in error, error in evil, here is not, as a pure, necessary, intellectual process. It is all progress-stages of a right.

But to men and to me, who cannot pass an entire life thus self-contemplating myself apart from men (who have to go abroad, *i.e.*, to drop this self-musing and live in, and up to, and, as world members, according to what thought they have had time, in this often neglected direction of self-musing, to acquire), that limitation in the greater right is actual, and hard, and painful, and bitter, as is always actual and hard, and painful and bitter, what is now not a process only, but a conflict between agnosticism, (placing others in "error" towards themselves by that very "error" which marks their own limitation in right), and other worthy people, similarly self-positioning themselves in right towards agnosticism, or by them positioned. Here a process is turned into a conflict, and questions of justice and right and wrong, and

of greater justice and greater right and wrong, are marked in moods of pleasures and pains, with accompaniment of political and social abilities and disabilities, enactments and penalties. Here there is no philosopher denies the existence of evil, or denies that evil can attach to an "error." But when self-contemplating alone, and not stirring in moods of sensory pleasure and pain, in such a movement as this and in such a mood as this in each does the self-contemplating identity, the transcendent intellect, our identity of stated practical omniscience as to itself, cast its mental eye on an Eden for a beginning, where could become, and can in future become (in this activity of disknowing), only a fall from Eden as (since one must fall from a greater height), in Eden was opened this gate to greater Edens, as, with "error" realised as "error," a once right is as now discardable (except as an activity of disknowing), and as with "error" goes the discardable, and can be discharged a dischargeable. At such a moment this strange identity of ours, this transcendent intellect that cannot but ordain to itself what it must think, appears to be on the track of solving the question of the origin of evil, not by doing away with it, or by making it less actual than it is, but by seeing from what greater right it is continually given birth to; and thus, by

opining that evil, as serving toward a continual betterment and necessary thereto, may only be the good "gone bad" because "gone to better," and is so far from being proof of an author inimical to his creatures. A right theory of errors will have to deal only with the right "errors;" those we mean on which that activity of disknowing places itself, which, while it is of evil, and always exerted thereanent, who, in view of the possibilities in the future that it opens, can affirm to be evil, or the creation of an evil-minded Creator or creature.

When the wonder-making work of Kant re-discovered for us the mind as a self-contained, self-containing identity, when he found it acting as an omniscient to itself, in certain necessary pronouncements of itself (his categories of Causation, Eventuation, mutual Determination, etc.), which cannot possibly be won from any point of regard when it is but in partial-portion itself, as *τα φυσικα* (of which pronouncements Huxley's positive conviction that he cannot go out of his mind, and so cannot attain a matter outside mind, is but an offshoot), he opened to us the most momentous and wonderful vista conceivable—a self-scheming consciousness—a consciousness, i.e., with certain ways in thinking, and for thinking, which it cannot

get rid of, necessitating to itself whatever scheme as to itself as consciousness it can compose, his specific categories in which are not external instruments but internal modes of and for its own adjustment and growth, and a consciousness whose scheme cannot but be worlds—the scheme in which cannot but be the worlds. When he commanded us to cut the painter and “let loose the categorical,” he knew that the categorical swallows up the world in its maw ; he bade us see that there is only one point in our mind from which we can possibly proceed to rightly survey all. Let the categorical speak, and you have all, and all is yours. But you try and speak first to the categorical and—by jiminy ! If you never let the categorical speak from those quarters in itself from which it can and cannot but promulgate decisiveness as to itself throughout all such assertions, for instance, as “I, as an identity, cannot go out of my mind,” you will obtain only positions as mind, and as the science synonymous thereof, which exist only on special license. On special license you cannot get a world theory. No one could do any better in your position—but why take out a special license ?

THE FATE OF THE WORD "BECOMES"

THE GATEWAY TO THE FUTURE

When Huxley found himself inevitably compelled to ask himself this question how the molecular becomes the mental, and then how matter becomes mind, he acknowledged the same common impulsion we all of us find ourselves under, of continually asking ourselves how things "become." We all have this impulsion in ourselves, and it springs up in us from the categorical. But asking this question from partial portions of his mind and his identity, he brought about an *impasse*, which *impasse*, it also follows, was in some way rightly brought about by that identity in himself on its way to winning with concomitant activity of disknowing greater truth by winning once truth as "error."

For his question, as we can perceive and as he himself partly perceived was peculiarly asked. Accepting as he could not but do, the partial portion of his mind as *τα φυσικα*, which partial portion, stripped of self-questionings as

to his own identity, as it is in that sense outside the mind and can stand as a *τα φυσικα* outside the mind—starting with this prompting in himself as to a matter outside mind, and on the basis of this prompting as to matter being outside mind building up a theory to bring it within his mind by means of sensations which, whatever they are, only then conceived as the only effects of matter in his mind by which mind can acknowledge to matter; and all this so prompted to rear itself and accordingly so rearing itself on the fatal conversionary basis that at least in the *τα φυσικα*, matter if it becomes and can become by conversion matter, can only become such an equally portioned matter as, preventing increase, lands us for ever in another of these great *impasses*, the *impasse* which states itself in the fact that in the necessity of thinking of increase as categorically or really real we come on the stumbling block that a matter which can only become by conversion an equal quantity of itself in another form can never be increased; and so can not be the “matter” of that categoricity that in its conception of increase demands a categorical real. Traversing this ground he asked a question that obviously can be asked in the way he did it. When the mind thus partial-ports itself as Science, and he built up, by doing so, what all acknowledged to be a true,

because a necessary *impasse*, or, as it becomes afterwards, a true error. But if to partial-portion the mind thus, and to build up thus a question of external matter is one thing—if to obey the categorical impulsion so far as to ask this question, must result as we ask it thus, in our asking ourselves into an *impasse*, what is it which renders the question erroneous as thus askable but the admission of the further full in categorical specifically charged to promulgate decisiveness of itself as to itself throughout the whole mind? What brought about the *impasse* but the presence of at least a partial-portion of the categorical asking questions about a matter which it (stripped of self-consideration) viewed as outside and outside mind, and what at once reveals and corrects the *impasse* but the further categorical in its further exhibition of itself at work in the belief that he could not go out of his mind. Between these portions of his categorical equally categorical and forcible Huxley becomes an agnostic. Why? For what, if not the further categorical, converts this *impasse* into an “error,” though a right one, and one that it is (in the necessity of the activity of disknowing it) a necessity to acknowledge. Huxley, we think, acknowledged not the necessity of the activity of disknowing in his mind, and that is why he was an agnostic.

The question can be asked it will be seen, by the full categorical and by the partial-portional. As asked by the partial-portional, without consideration as to mental identity, τα φυσικά can stand as τα φυσικά outside the mind; and to satisfy its being thus outside it is inevitable Science should pay tribute to its being outside with some theory or other of sensation to bring it within, and should still, handling even that theory on a base exposed to it as in immediate (and so scientific) τα φυσικά, at least *seek* to handle it on the only phenomena of becoming presenting themselves there immediately (the becoming of matter in one form of itself into another form of itself—though only in an equal quantity by conversion)—though this again is an offence against the categorical in our conception of increase—which can never as we know be obtained by conversion. But rooting so, Science must grow so, and so it does grow as Science. Matter, it decides, can become matter, and matter *must* become mind in a scheme that cannot extend and which is an outrage against any categorical plea for increase; which contains not only the *impasse* of matter becoming mind but also the greatest *impasse* against increase, materially, mentally, or anyhow else. As it thus stands the question is asked as to an external matter, and it ends in an *impasse* and a series of *impasses*.

There is nothing erroneous in this (the categoricity of all this sufficing the mind and the mind in its categoricity thus sufficing itself of all this) but the same question can be and is asked by the full categorical invading the same ground with a recognition that if we cannot go out of our mind *τα φυσικα* is a consciousness limit of a consciousness that must as a mind-identity range as an identical and as an identity as its own furthest extensions of itself as matter-mind. To ask any question of this "matter-mind" as to its becomings from matter to mind is as possible now but as silly and futile as it would be possible but silly and futile for us to ask how if you drop a stone in a tub of water and a ripple grows in an ever wider circle, one portion of that ripple becomes (in the sense of stands to be), at that same moment another. The identity exhibiting itself as this matter-mind charges itself, with all its extensions, and of any correlated aspect-changes of it, whatever, as the molecular-mental, it alone can be the only correlator.

What—though it was an *impasse*—was not formerly erroneous and could not be detected as an error is now become so, and the movement whereby error in this case is detected and established bespeaks to us the necessity of the continual information of Science with metaphysics; for it decides that Science can only

be the proper Science and not a mere chartered libertine when it is the proper metaphysics. For the reason—division of labour—even of thought labour—Science will remain for all time a chartered libertine, but once it is recognised as such and we see from what quarter the corrective is applied, we shall soon see that the wonder-making gateway to the future will lie in the conflict and reconciliation in the identity of the categorical and the scientific. Science will go on building up *impasses* it cannot solve. The categorical extended as metaphysics can solve the *impasses*, but only when itself approves that they are there. This is the stabilizing note in modern metaphysics, that it cannot itself proceed on its right track unless—the *impasses* of Science being rightly approved by the categorical and Science as right—it (the categorical) now with categorical necessity can expose precisely how, in a greater body of itself as knowledge, those *impasses* came to be composable to be correct parts of itself, building itself as knowledge which exists with precise knowledge of error.

What then is the ultimate fate of the word “becomes.”

As asked by Science in the question as to how the molecular becomes the mental it peters out meaninglessly as soon as considerations of

identity phase the question into one as to how now "mind" becomes "mind". For we acknowledge to no categorical necessity to ask this question now as to how mind becomes mind in the way we were asking it formerly. It seems to have lost its former applicability. We have thrown its former yoke off our necks entirely in exchange for another which we now enthrone as active in its disknowing of that former. We are under as irresistible a necessity as ever of retaining this word in our vocabulary. As long as with our categories of Causation, Eventuation, Becoming and so on is determined at each moment what we each of us have to think and so talk of—the scheme, that we, unable to go beyond our minds, have as being to think and as thinking to talk—for there is no thinking or talking without a scheme—so long continue we under an irresistible necessity of letting our categories have a scheme to think and of having one as thought by them, whether with conscious revision of its parts or not, to talk of. We can only talk, as we think, designfully. No matter what we think we utter these designs of the categorical. These categories of Causation, Eventuation, Mutual Determination, and so on, streak and innucleate in and infiltrate our words to render them approximable to one another in Reason; and do so keep them from being a senseless jumble,

or a mere joy-jumble as let us suppose a bird's song is. What has happened then is that we have liberated certain applicabilities of ourselves as categorical as couched in the word "becomes," and broken up a certain infiltration of the categorical in that and other words in favour of new categorical necessities and certainties in ourselves and our words and in favour of a new infiltration of the categorical in the words we give birth to as to our ways of becoming, causing, eventuating, etc., and it is only from the point of view of the new, that can only arise as it can detect old inadequacies, and as the new in that point of view, that must stand certain in its detection of them, we can at all stand. We cannot destroy and not upbuild. Try it. We can only destroy as we upbuild. It is the hardest thing in the world to be an agnostic.

To hark back a little. Science obviously is metaphysics, but it is metaphysics constructing itself as far as possible to leave out of consideration the full question of our identity and of our being always required to be within our mind. Starting in the absence of this consideration we have a *τα φυσικα* immediately so as matter outside mind. What wonder if our categories of Causation, Eventuation, Becoming, and so on, find their first immediate playground there in deciding that matter—

an indestructible—*becomes* matter—though but in an equal quantity—and utter this their opinion to us in terms of a chemistry of the conversion of this equi-proportionably convertible. What wonder then if our categoricity so infiltrating in these words disposes our words approximably to one another as a universe scheme on a conversionary design. For we have to speak chain-words—we have to use designed speech—such speech as is with categories designed and with infiltration of the categorical rendered designful, and no other. We cannot use detached words. And the only thing that can speak chain-words is this categorical necessity infusing itself throughout our speech as Causation, Eventuation, Becoming, etc., are a necessary ingredient therein. Even if there were no such thing as chemistry we should have to talk as if there were, so designfully must we speak. And in other words too, as in that coindicant one, Increase, which plays so important a part here (Increase can never be proved save of the categorical) we believe that there is that residence of the categorical and enough of that categorical in residence to decide the fate of this philosophical battle.

What wonder if from such a beginning outside the mind, before the fuller consideration of the question of Identity and of our

always being within our mind, and as being within our minds, being an Identity, has begun, we have for our science a metaphysics which might have been given expression to by Mr. Alfred Jingle in his terse, descriptive style as follows :—Matter, outside mind, can apparently become matter, though but in such equiquantitated proportions as prevent Increase and Growth—bad *impasse* here—Growth and Increase impossible—matter *must* become mind, though no one knows how—true scientific *impasse* here—to get it back into mind *must* have theory of sensation to bring matter back into mind—all this necessary because necessary to speak chain words or words descriptive of Causation, Eventuation, Becoming—no plainer speech inventible. Oh for plain speech in which to hang another word round our necks. As wondrous a word with its infiltration of the categorical as a dewdrop—never seen alone.

All this in order to enable us to speak sense, to have chain thought, to render words approximate as particles of reason, to speak chain words, to speak a speech not entirely composed and made up—as perhaps the animals is—of dot-like detached words like green, red, yellow, blue, buff, mauve, lilac, purple, violet, fawn, grey, which is a kind of speech stripped of all descriptions of

Becoming, Eventuating, etc., meaningless to be spoken while it is we men who speak.

All this done to enable the categorical necessity with satisfaction to itself as having speech to have object of speech, for to speak is to *mean*. All this done with satisfaction to the categorical and in order that the categorical may be satisfied, and all this only doable and done as the categorical is satisfied, satisfied even as to the rightness of the *impasses* itself thus indulging itself produces.

All this done to satisfy the categorical, and the further categorical is not satisfied. No sooner does the question of our full Identity and of our being only able to be self-contained and self-containing minds necessitate its further entrance into our mind than we are aware of a matter not now outside our mind, which is a consciousness limit and to which our categories of Causation, Eventuation and Becoming must attach in a new manner, and as to which they must deliver themselves in a new manner by speech, their new descriptive speech now being required to be with new describings of Causation, Eventuation, Becoming, etc., and unless so being, being unable to be at all. We are aware that a chemistry of conversion, which cannot give Growth or Increase, or even Malthusian ratios of increase too fast, is challenged, by

all the categorical residing in such expressions, in favour of one yet unnamed that can, whose describings of itself must be with new describings of itself in respect of Causating, Eventuating, Becoming, etc. And we further know that this chemistry can only be a chemistry more than conversion, and therefore not conversion, precisely as, with aspects of itself rightly treatable as if conversion, it depicts itself in that which (as conversion) can bring about such *impasses* in itself as prevent Growth, Increase, etc. It must bring about Growth to such show of *impasses* in the guise of conversion as prevents them. Its show of *impasses* must prevent *impasses*. It must simulate conversion precisely as it prevents it. Conversion is a true chemistry, precisely as in equi-proportioncy as in an *impasse* Growth and Increase are prevented. But this view will be truer, precisely as the Growth and Increase it conducts phase in some of their aspects to exhibit themselves as the conversion (as betokened by equi-proportioncy) that cannot be, and the *impasse* (in respect of equi-proportioncy preventing Increase) that cannot be. We have not the name yet, but we have the fact—the fact in non-conversion, and our knowledge as to the possibility of its existing is as absolute and as definable with as active a disknowing

of what we do not want in the guise of conversion, as was absolute and definable our knowledge as to the possibility of conversion once, phasing its features, existing; for we have all this additional knowledge gained by means of the *impasse* to certify us—to certify us of its greater truth precisely as it, by turning a once less truth (conversion) to error establishes itself more true, only as, by knowing error, knowing the more truth; only as, by winning and reincorporating the less truth into the now greater in the guise of that “error” (conversion) from which it is defended, it (non-conversion) achieves itself.

Lastly, we are aware that the whole theory of sensation upraised on conversionary lines has gone, and that all categorical pronouncement of Causation, Eventuation, Becoming, etc., in respect of such a system, is liberated to other employment of itself. We are aware that it will have to use itself in the service of a chemistry that phases as conversion precisely because it is not conversion. We are aware that we have won some new position in the universe, in that knowledge in the progress of which that universe is revealed and as which it must stand; and we are aware that so long as we must speak designful speech, all that is meant in that speech by Causation, Eventuating, Becoming, etc., is liberated, as formerly

applying itself on old lines, into a fresh applicability of itself, and we in our new position are newly applicable towards one another.

Into what new syntheses our categories of Causation, Eventuation, and Becoming will have now to settle themselves and compose themselves to make delivery of themselves, as they solely can, through the medium of a speech that can never but be designful—what new speech we may have to speak on this question to give them their rights in categorical delivery and pronouncement of themselves, that for the moment may seem a staggering problem bursting upon us here. Yet we shall soon find, in point of fact, that they have themselves given us the clue, having already prompted liberation of themselves in Science and *τα φυσικά* on lines not conversionary in their describings of themselves, and that between what they have already done for themselves in Science as a part of metaphysics and what metaphysics (as, as we have indicated, the greater Science) may further ask of them to do on similar lines in the interests of greater Science the path of progress will always appear. In Sciences *τα φυσικά* must, as must appear for all time any new discriptions of themselves by the categories of Becoming, Eventuating, Causing, etc., as have been bound to appear

there and there only in the past their old describings of themselves as conversion. Hence an apparently illimitable problem is limited and we need never be at a loss where to look for the solution.

WHAT GREATER SCIENCE DOES

HOW WE ARE CONTINUALLY REDISCOVERING
OUR WORLD

Huxley the scientist ended by making the same discovery as Kant the philosopher. Instead of beginning with matter we have to begin with what our understanding of "matter" is. Instead of beginning out of our minds, we have to begin in our mind and keep on in our mind, and ever to know at all we have to proceed on the ultimate basis of the trustworthiness of our understanding.

Hence the spectre of materialism raised by Huxley does not depend on matter but on our own understanding (in which, as Bacon knew, spectres may arise, which we, the Truth-makers, the Truth-compellers, may have to lay), in which according as we make "matter" is made the spectre.

Matter does not depend on matter but on our own understanding of it, which makes it and unmakes it and in doing so varies with itself the fact. Hence any "matter" not raised

in consonance with our highest understanding is not the matter with which that highest understanding needs concern itself—which highest understanding in the highest deposition it delivers from itself as to “matter” is so continually remaking with itself “matter” and the material world—is continually re-delivering to us and rediscovering to us our world, as we the Truth-makers, the Truth-compellers, beat down successively our phantoms.

Unless, therefore, our highest Intellect comes to defeat in the depositions it continually makes from itself as to “matter” and its progressive stages of itself in its successions of understandings as to “matter” it cannot contain any error which would defeat at any time its competency to have a right (progressive) view (understanding) with regard to matter. It must always be right in its progressive understanding as to “matter” or it will never be right and its progress, as exhibited in error, must always be a progress in this higher kind of right. And this can only be if these errors—*impasses* only—do not break the chain because they are linkages to secure continuity only. The orbit of this new movement of the understanding has not yet been traced but there is no reason why it should not be. It will show our intellectual system

revolving, not in truth and error about some stationary sun unpermissive of knowledge, but sweeping in continually greater truths and these their necessary *impasses* about some wider Hercules of right, in the march of the Truth-makers and the Truth-compellers.

And as regards proof, remember, nothing can be proved to the intellect but what it approves. Nothing can be proved but what jumps with its approval. So its approval (gained by it in the process we have adumbrated) is the only kind of proof necessary and required. But its approval, to exhibit itself successive in this the successive stages of itself as always right, must have some definite plan of construction to enable it to do so ; and in this will be exhibited its movement in successiveness. Scrutiny of this in its progress after a time should enable us to see on what lines this new orbit moves and this new development takes place and will take place. It should enable us to prophecy our world. There must be some continual chart of this development, easily accessible as the history of the "errors" that have figured as momentary *impasses* in the past ; and these "errors" must depict that continually less right blending itself into the greater as it in some way becomes necessary to the greater and becomes continually part of the greater—

part in the greater—as it at least kindles into “activity of disknowing” that greater. And if our knowledge is thus composed as regards intellectual truth as truth knowing itself with error, and as getting to know itself further in some way more and more as “error,” as it becomes more right by means of these “errors,” and has more of the actively disknow, so, too, as uniformity must prevail to satisfy the demands of an identity, and to render knowledge an identic, doubtless in the moral consciousness have we a similar course of development, with changes in the succession of moral actions promoted thereupon.

In knowledge, therefore, is something more than what a man should merely use. In it is at times an actual winning of a world. With it we achieve a new world, and with it spread a new heavens. With it we are continually discovering a more than our present world—that new world which is always thus by the apprehending intellect exhibited as that intellect apprehends it and delivers it to us, and commits it to our charge in these depositions from itself as to the world. For so hold we any world, old or new. For the world can only be exhibited to us and charted as the intellect exhibits it and charts it, in that its understanding as to it from which there is no appeal, and in charting it so exhibits at

the same time charted, its own progress-stages of itself.

Thus there may be here a step onward possible to us into a new world, if we have rightly found our way by means of these *impasses* in the old, to the edge of the old and the beginning of the new.

The great ocean current in the mind, the streamway to the future which is continually going to waft us to the greater universe, shows signs, we think, for all time, of being thus composed between Science and Metaphysics, the lesser categorical and the greater. Whoso launches his ship of thought here will, we think, willy-nilly, make continual discoveries. And this must be our justification and our plea for asking a question which, but for some such justification, might seem to imply that we, too, were desirous of attempting to go out of our mind.

THE MIND A COHERER

AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN

I ask you, reader, "Is the mind a coherer?"

"I do not know," you reply, "and, furthermore, I do not know how to go about it either to ask or decide such a question."

I know that you do not know. I do not claim to know myself. But we never will know till we come to some agreement as to what it is we want to know. We never will know till we have seen what reasons we have for asking the question. Having set forth those reasons, we shall find ourselves just as competent to survey the issues involved, and to come to a decision upon them as we are—though the question is wider than any we have hitherto asked—to come to a decision upon any other matter upon which the mind may exercise its scrutiny.

It is our part to set forth the reasons we have for asking this question: it is yours to bend upon it those powers of scrutiny in which you are as well equipped as I.

What then, for the purposes of this essay, is a coherer, reader?

Speaking broadly, in the world of physics we have become familiar with it as an instrument, an effect in which can be produced only and solely declaring itself and fulfilling its purpose as an effect in coherence when it bears witness to that similar effect, in a similar instrument produced, which, howsoever produced, was of it the exciting cause. An effect linked with an effect is believed to expose coherence. An effect so linked upon a similar effect as to be not only dependent in the world of physics with it, but, in a yet unknown mode of force, dependent upon it, typifies coherence. A similar effect produced in one instrument in consequence of and in dependence with an effect like it in kind, produced in another similar instrument, constitutes coherence, and in the depth of mystery which still surrounds the question we possibly cannot for the present attain any clearer conception. One effect called up by means of another, not through conversion of force, but through the power of the force involved to cohere from one instrument to another, and excite it to a similar effect is perhaps all we can at present understand as to coherence. Two instruments so similarly responsible that an effect of a particular kind produced in one calls up, itself as exciting

cause, its like effect in another is the bare fact that warrants those instruments to be coherers in touch with one another not through conversion of force but through some ability in force to cohere in those excitings. We need not trouble ourselves that one instrument speaks as a transmitter when an effect which is the exciting cause in it of the other is produced, the other as a receiver. The full fact only exposes itself when an effect of a kind produced in one instrument competent thereto entails with it, itself as exciting cause, the production of a similar effect in another like instrument similarly competent: and this fact is the one science is adumbrating to itself as an effect in a hitherto mysterious mode of force, coherence.

We may be wrong, reader, in our interpretation as to what Science is trying to shadow forth in this fact of coherence, but rather than to be right or wrong we seek to be clear, and for the sake of this essay it must remain that when we speak of coherence we involve this conception of two similar effects, one of which, when excited in an instrument competent thereto, excites in another similar instrument similarly competent a similar effect. . The mode of exciting is coherence: the instruments involved and involving themselves so in their workings are coherers.

Have we then any reason to think that at least in some departments of mind, as in the single sense say of touch, some sensations can only be produced in the field of consciousness of one man, when with the instruments—bodies or minds—addressed to the effort, a similar effect is produced in the similar field of consciousness of another man; and have we any reason to suppose that the similarity of these effects, because only so to likeness producible, constitutes them effects in coherence, and renders it possible for us to believe that the instruments, bodies or minds, producing them in this their similarity together, are coherers? A big question, as you see, reader.

If there were not two men alike in the world whose bodies similarly composed were capable, when they touch one another, of only coming into the modes of sentiency called sensations, as in both their bodies upspring similar modes of sentiency there would be no possibility for us to begin to speculate about coherence. But if there are two and not only two but more than two—if we find all men possessing themselves in similar modes of sentiency then is there need of this question, for who knows then that these modes of sentiency are not themselves the immediate modes in coherence upcalled in extancy together in coherence of coherers? I am going to suppose that they

are. Not a very grandiose way, you may say, of beginning to stir up so big a debate. Not a grandiose way certainly but a candid. And remember this that whoso finds a new world if he approaches it in the daytime must expect to see it at first like a tiny plumelet of cloud on the horizon. So not the grandiose way be ours, reader, but the clear, for we want to approach this new world, if it be one, in the daylight, and to make sure if there be a port before the shadows fail.

Who says then, that all men are not so similarly composed that they may present themselves in virtue of this their likeness to one another as coherers, adapted by nature to be instruments in coherence?

Who says they are similarly composed? Science surely.

DIFFERENTIATED CELL

THE DIFFERENTIATEDLY SIMILAR

There is a wonderful similarity between men if this be any sign of their being coherers.

Science pleads for a most tremendous similarity. The bodies of all living things, Science declares, are composed of cells. Differentiated cell composes all bodies and all the differentiations of those bodies. Here, then, occurs the first portent. Millions and millions of men repeat on the earth to form mankind who live side by side as those differentiated cells; and consciousness takes up the tale in the story of mind. All these millions possess for their fields of consciousness sensations and emotions and ideas so similar that in their passions and sensations and ideas, because they are similar, it is permitted to them to live together in what, for want of a better term, we may call the consonance of reason. These modes of sentiency are not themselves reason. But in the commonness of their applicability by all men to the purposes of life we have the

only guarantee of a mankind being able to live in the consonance of reason together. If men did not have similar emotions and similar sensations and similar ideas what a world would it be, but it would not be a world of any consonance of reason. What a world would it be if men, though composed of cell, did not have similar bodies, but were some beaked, some taloned and some capable of flight. But where would humankind be in that world? Gorgons and hydras and chimeras dire might inhabit there, but where would be the place of humankind?

The similar is upon us in the world of body and in the world of mind. The similar is the normal.

— But there is a further peculiarity in this similarity. No man is so alike another as not to possess some mark of individuality. Too great a similarity would do away with the individual. Few men possess a "double" so like him as to be wholly indistinguishable. This fact obtains as to bodies as a whole and as to their parts. Take, for instance, a man's fingertips. They are like another man's, but they are just enough unlike to give an individuality proper to each. They are cells, as Science says; but in their arrangement every man has a different pattern, and has probably had since the world began, at least the great

majority do. The majority of men have a different pattern of arrangement of those cells which will print itself differently to view, the pattern peculiar to each persisting, in the normal condition, life long. Dig up the Pharaohs and the Pharaohs had their fingertips each apparent after a Pharaoh's pattern and wore their deathless scarabæus on them, each their individual seal to hand, the same as we do.

In fact, Science's portent is the differentiatedly similar, and is it not the same in the world of mind? Do we not argue men differentiatedly similar in their likeness to each in their fields of consciousness? The sensations may be alike in the majority of men—must be if the consonance of reason is to hold, but some men, as we all commonly think, have stronger passions than others. More vivid sensations, better and brighter ideas, we all commonly think, are the lot of some men than of others. Perhaps, as we say, this is a base for our being coherers, similar instruments, capable, if we produce sensations, emotions, etc., of producing them in similarity, because we are coherers, and because we thus ensure, timeously or no, the production of similar sensations and emotions in others, and are that guarantee of their being up called, timeously or no, distantly or no, whether propagated or no by the universal ether from

one instrument to another, after their declaration in the one, which is going to declare in life other modes of force than we have hitherto involved.

MODES OF FORCE

CONVERSION OR COHERENCE

Other modes of force than we have hitherto involved.

What have we hitherto involved? Does a man grow, reader? He is supposed to. I know he is supposed to. Once every seven years we are supposed to change off our bodies in favour of newer material. But how are we supposed to grow and change off those bodies of ours? By conversion?

Well, conversion is just that mode of force we are so dubious about. Can a man really grow by conversion? Can he change off his body every seven years and yet increase and come to the stature of a man? He certainly seems to increase, but can he by conversion?

That is the crux. Conversion is the mode of force we are depending on to give us these increases in body, and any other increase that may be real or apparent. Have you ever taken the trouble, reader, to think why conversion cannot increase anything? Yet

there is such a reason going down to the roots of Science. Science has tied chemistry up in a system of equiproportionates. Any portion of matter that can undergo the transformation called conversion can only result in a proportionate quantity of matter. You cannot take a definite quantity of hydrogen and oxygen, and from it obtain an indefinite quantity of water. Only certain proportions of the two will proportionate themselves into the new element. Which, as Science's explanation of chemistry, may be right, but where is the growth, where is the increase of the matter in these transformations of matter involved in the sustentation of life going to come from? How do they sustain themselves? Keep on pushing the bounds of the universe further back in order to avail ourselves of more and more matter, but tie it up at the same time in a system of equiproportionates, but the riddle of the least part will still be repeated in the whole. That may do as a continual make-shift to delude the mind in its survey of this question, but the impassible difficulty recurs again and again, tending to discard it as a system of life and of the matter necessary thereto, in which conversion is the mode in which matter displays those changes of itself throughout the world of the alive and not alive. Did not sage old Leibniz see this, and had for

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his universe a system of monads, which, whatever else they did, did not convert, as his solution?

Kindly ask yourself, reader, if you grow, if you increase, if humankind increases, if a man's life transacts itself converting before you put away on the shelf where you keep your unquestioned and unquestionable ideas this idea that the force (whose manifestation of itself in the world of life and not life passes as matter) transacts in those its modes as conversion, for the riddle of the least part of matter is repeated in the whole. And remember that time and the time during which a matter remains unconverted is not going to help you to any increase. It will only delude you with a show of such. If you want to mean anything when you talk about "ratios of increase too fast," and to take a malthusian view of things kindly examine first what you mean by increase, and how it is possible in a system where conversion of equi-proportionates obtains and keeps every possible kind of matter tied down and limited in its possible equi-proportioncy for any one kind of matter to increase at all or increase too fast. Ask yourself where this increase can be obtained at any point out of a world which has once settled—and it is always at every moment settled—in a system of equi-proportionates. Does the mind when it voices this idea of

increase compellingly ask for the real or only the apparent? If it asks for the real then we know our destiny. We may not convert at all and that is the next philosophic step toward the possibility of our being coherers.

NON-CONVERSION OF MATTER TO MIND

IMMEDIATE MIND

This is the first and foremost corollary if conversion as a system of chemistry fail us, and there are few who will not bid it welcome.

Have you ever reflected, reader, how horribly cumbersome this system of conversion is when it comes to dealing with the conversion of matter to mind or to allowing it to have play in our mental processes?

It is a system wherein two and two does not seem to make four; they are required rather to make five. We always have to go a step further than we either require or desire once we begin converting. Beginning from that break in Nature over which matter passed to become mind or sentient matter, we look at last from our specular head abroad upon the world and see what? Not the Thing-in-itself, because the Thing-in-itself remains matter, while we are converted matter, mind? What then? A sensation of the Thing-in-itself.

This Thing-in-itself is a bugbear the philo-

sopher would like to get rid of. We certainly make the most of it as a bugbear by the system we have of approaching it by means of a mind in which has been represented the conversion of matter to mind. But there are features indicating the possibility of its abolition.

There are some things which we feel sure even the Thing-in-itself must do to justify its existence. We cannot help thinking for instance that the Thing-in-itself must change and keep pace in change with every change of those sensations in which we are informed of its existence. The leaves of the tree bud and grow yellow. At least we reason so because our sensations, in which we apprehend them, run that same gamut of change. The Thing-in-itself runs that gamut of change, or how do the sensations run that same gamut? run it so certainly that even if we do not know the Thing-in-itself it is just as good as if we did because the result is just as stable to all men as if there were no such Thing-in-itself, though there will always be in the end, as we say, some man at the end of his tether to cry, "Yes, but we do not know the Thing-in-itself."

This spectre of the Thing-in-itself has been built up in a conversionary system. In that system the Thing-in-itself has to be argued as so much matter, more or less convertible in the universal expanse of convertible matter,

nourished in its changes in conversions of matters. We, too, as to the body, are matter, but in mind, as we look towards the Thing-in-itself, are converted matter, mind; and every step in conversion has thus demanded another. And thus knowledge, while it cannot but deem itself as potent over the Thing-in-itself as if there were no such thing, at least so potent that reaching beyond its own sensations it can handle the Thing-in-itself to continual conformity therewith, yet is said never by some men to attain the Thing-in-itself.

Does knowledge reach the Thing-in-itself? A philosopher would like to know: yet it is too early to say. But we want to make a surmise. Take another glimpse in which knowledge may be not so much aiming blindly at and hitting, as in a conversionary system, the Thing-in-itself, but supplying it.

Have you ever pondered the fact ordinarily called colour-blindness, but which would be better called colour-variance. We believe that we know that one man's sensations represent colours to him differently to what ours do in ourselves. In this case we know a double Thing-in-itself supplying these sensations, or as we suggest supplying it ourselves, we do not need it.

In this instance we believe the sensations of two men are alike except as to colour. The

railroads could not be run if one engineer saw in a switch-stand light an elephant standing on the track, another a rock which had fallen down, a third some other obstruction of the crossing. That would be the end of reason. How do we then know that men have colour sensations variable amongst themselves, which they can influence and vary in one another through the medium of that Thing-in-itself, the switch-stand light? By accidents happening? But without this prior knowledge as to colour-blindness, do I know that accidents can happen? How do I know just by my own colour sensation that an accident can happen, and ever has happened? How do I know that this is not the merest excuse of an unintelligent man saying he sees a green light where I see a red, or that he is not speaking one speech, meaning red when he says green, and another meaning green when I say red. How do I know that both our sensations are not alike, but our speech only unconformable to one another?

I tell you, reader, the more I ponder this problem of colour-blindness, the more I feel tempted to think that on account of some peculiarity in itself, knowledge is literally reaching beyond itself—is reaching beyond its own immediate sensation as green or red—into the Thing-in-itself in another man—is supply-

ing itself with that Thing-in-itself, and is in some position of knowing that it does so. For neither the one man nor the other can have this peculiar knowledge as to colour variance, there cannot be this knowledge till it is between two, and it is this being as between two that is the peculiar and hitherto unsearched note in knowledge—perhaps only possible because knowledge is in coherer receipt of information, and carries this mark of it. I cannot prove it here, yet as I say, there is a suggestion lurks here that knowledge in one man actually knows the Thing-in-itself in another; that what may be the immediate mind (that mind, we mean, that never obtained its footing in the world through the conversion of matter) of one man possesses itself as it knows in at least the case of the immediate mind of another man, the Thing-in-itself—the Thing-in-itself being that colour-varied sensation of another man's, so dissimilar that the man who possesses it may bring about an accident by running in his field of consciousness, his sensations, past a red light, yet so similar that he will not stop his train when he sees the light because he has seen the light in the colour and shape of a lion in the path.

This is a small symptom to instance, but it is an symptom. How do we know that we

are not all wrong together in this matter of colour-variance ; that it is not merely a mix up of speech so that we all really know and mean the same thing ? And if this scheme of knowledge, always made up, as it must be, between two, be right in really having and holding the the Thing-in-itself in at least the case of these colour-varied sensations in another man's mind then, in the uniformity that must obtain throughout the whole field of knowledge, we have no reason for thinking that in all its sensations, even in those which are of things, like trees and objects generally, the mind does not grasp everywhere the Things-in-themselves, and have the knowledge that is real as between two.

If conversion in matter fails, conversion of matter to mind fails. If minds are going to arise in the world in some way immediate in their tenancy of themselves as minds, and to approximate each other in that immediacy then we must examine what this immediacy may mean throughout all its ramifications, for perhaps then all this labour of explaining the positions of the mind with regard to the Thing-in-itself, in a conversionary view, should be directed into other channels, with a view of explaining whether, possibly as coherers, the mind does not transpass at some points its knowledge of itself in immediate cognisance of

what is transacting in another man's mind, the Thing, in this case, in itself. We must examine whether our knowledge in any immediate sensation is not knowledge of the very Thing-in-itself and the ordinary state of affairs, because from one point of view upon what may be this state of affairs—we mean our knowledge as to the variance of colour sensations in different men—we see that we do go beyond our sensation to be assured in our possession of knowing the Thing-in-itself in the shape of another man's sensation. We are assured in the last case, we believe. Why not in the first, in a scheme in which knowledge will have to be uniform in its capacity for certainty? That extension beyond the ordinary which we believe to be the rule in the case of our knowledge of these colour-varied sensations in ourselves and another man, should not render doubtful the ordinary in which we have sensations of objects generally as the very Things-in-themselves. The matter, however, is not argued to a conclusion here, but is added to that bulk of suggestion of which we mainly seek to compose this essay.

If matter is not to be converted to mind then we must seek again in the field of consciousness itself for the origination of the idea of matter (and of mind too, for the matter of that) and must examine its competency to exist

as an idea in the field of consciousness, remembering this, that at least we are simplifying upon those scientists who, having taken a more or less arbitrary matter, afterwards remove it from themselves in the world of their sensations, the field of their consciousness, as a Thing-in-itself, while they do not propose to do the same thing in the case of that mind which they possess themselves of in the field of their consciousness, so that their knowledge of matter in the field of their consciousness or what portion of their field of consciousness can only concern itself with matter, can only be of it as a sensation, they having only a mental perception thereof, while they make in some way immediate in their field of consciousness that mind which, if they preserved uniformity in their method, they might also come to see (or to suspect) they have only a mental perception of.

“What portion of the field of consciousness can only concern itself with matter.” What do we mean by that. Does not the whole field of consciousness concern itself with matter?

In a way, not, because we must divide the field of consciousness and must have a field of consciousness divisible and divided to be able to possess the idea of either matter or mind.

Did it ever strike you, reader, that we must divide the full field of consciousness, the full

field of sensations, in proposing an idea as of matter, and that the full field of consciousness when proposing an idea gives birth to a division of itself—a division in that knowledge which, as we say, immediate as consciousness itself, and immediate as existence itself, deems itself adequately to understand and cognise the Thing-in-itself? So that it is in our field of consciousness as with Homer's Jove, at whose nod the earth shook, or with a greater than Jove at whose ideas the substances divide.

THE POWER OF THE IDEA

THE DIVISION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

This is where the great German philosophers have busied themselves for yeas past, and we cannot allow their labours to go for nought.

We are up against a tremendous number of problems when we come to examine the ramifications of an idea in the field of consciousness. What it took men like Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, a century of effort to explain do not ask of us to make clear in a day.

Yet there are certain broad features plain ; always your field of consciousness when you stamp an idea out of it, will be found to be divided. Some of these divisions are very plain.

If you are to have an idea of your body you will have to divide the sum total of your sensations in the field of consciousness into that portion of them which constitutes the body, and those of them again which constitute the not-body, or the place for that body. You must divide the field of your consciousness to

gain any idea, as of matter or mind, the material and the immaterial, or to gain any idea of a self and a not-self, and so on. You must divide it into those portions of it which go to make up the yourself of an idea, and those residual portions that make up in the mind the not-self. The mind, be it remembered, as exercised throughout the whole field of consciousness, is not divided. That is where it differs from the mind which the Scientists, we suspect, mean, which is merely situated in the full field of consciousness, at the other end from matter in their idea of matter-mind. That pole-end piece of their idea which must complete their idea of matter and give it place in their field of consciousness, is used by them wrongly as the complete and full mind, which as mind is capable of having sensations of a matter removed from it as a Thing-in-itself. Having got this mind by conversion of matters like those of which it afterwards possesses sensations as of the Thing-in-itself, they use it for the purpose of getting those sensations that make up, in the idea of matter, matter, and then, without perceiving how this mind has been arrived at only as one end and one half of that idea of matter, they are ready to tumble from it, as if off the edge of the world, into that maelstrom of theirs of Things-in-themselves, mental perceptions of matter, non-mental per-

ceptions of mind and so on, forgetting that if they used the equal weights at both ends of an idea, which an idea will always ensure to itself in the mind as synonymous with the full field of consciousness, they might claim, as they do, to have a mental perception of matter, but they would have to go and claim as well, at least by reason of the force-form of the idea, a mental perception only of mind, both or neither, in the logical conclusion of their system, removed from them, in the scheme of their apprehension, as the Things-in-themselves, or both or neither in some other scheme of their being brought to immediacy in unity together.

Remember, then, that the mind overlying the full field of consciousness and existing so broad is not divided. Its essential unity is not disturbed, but the idea, reaching across that field from pole to pole, is divided, for you can only affirm the affirmed portion of an idea, in your ordinary positive speech—as of a body—when the knowledge so affirmed is coupled in the idea with an active disknowing, a knowing in not, of what does not constitute your body, which activity of disknowing exhausts with knowing in not the whole remainder field of consciousness; so completely exhausts it that your positive speech of an affirmed portion of an idea is completed with this unheard negative speech which you mingle as a silent

ingredient in your affirmation: so completely exhausts it that the Germans are right in saying that knowledge is to that degree absolute and can proceed to no affirmation (and can exercise no affirmation of itself as speech, and no activity of itself as actual or actualising) of a portion of its full field in an affirmative idea—as of a body—which is not accompanied by a knowing in not (an activity of disknowing) of what does not constitute that body which exhausts the full field of consciousness, (and, as we think, of actualising and the actualiseable) and permits no contradictory thereafter to enter therein. Moreover they are right in saying that if knowledge by reason of some scheme—not conversionary—of its immediacy actually exists precisely as it knows, it exists within the scope of the idea to completion as matter mind, and no division of existence, immediate consciousness, so small, even down to cell, but it will display cells as these peculiarly polarised entities, matter by one end as by the other mind. Surely it is time Science took some stock of what Philosophy has been so long asserting, more or less confusedly, certainly, in this respect.

And this portent of the field of consciousness dividing in ideaing and only able to propose in ideaing that of which it must be positive and which cannot be contradicted and

against which nothing else can be actualised is a master portent. It holds good even in the perilous descent of the philosophic into everyday life. Did you ever know a man go blind who could continue to see in the field of consciousness the sensations that he asserts are his body, yet could not continue to see those other sensations that are his place for that body; or vice versa? Did you ever know a man go deaf who could continue to hear in the field of his consciousness the sensations of hearing that he accounts his, his own, his very self's, while he could not continue to hear in that field of his consciousness the sensations that pass to him as others, or vice versa? or who, becoming paralysed, could feel that sensation of touch which he styles the feel of a particular piece of velvet, yet could not, in feeling so, ascribe part of that sensation to himself as being his sensation and a sensation of himself as feeling velvet. No, friend, the portent goes down into everyday life.

Whatever instrument, if consciousness be not immediate as its own instrument, places these portions of consciousness in the full field of consciousness, that instrument always places them there by these dual portions; and thereby is going to hang many a tale. Now at the ambrosial beck of Olympus the earth will quake. Whatever instrument produces con-

sciousness, it produces and always has produced for its particular brand of consciousness the consciousness which attains, by virtue of these dual portions, itself in unity of matter and mind. Let the field of conscience be our phrase when we mean the full mind.

There can arise in the idea no such contradictions as science bespeaks in its use of the words matter and not matter, matter and mind, activity of an object, passivity of an object and so on. There can arise no such contradictions because the idea conceives in contradistinguishing not contradicting and any further ideas which arise also arise in a contradistinguishing amongst themselves, not in contradicting.

Are ideas then all equally good. In a measure no, in a measure yes. Anyone examining the history of ideas will find that they rise one above another criss cross, tier over tier, in a trestle like structure, the legs of one, so to speak placed on those underneath, and those above so needing the support of those underneath (like this of coherence needing that of conversion) that you cannot knock away at any stage of the work the lower without demolishing the whole fabric, just as all ideas, for instance, that go to make up a conversionary scheme are good precisely up to the point where they necessitate the laying of such a further trestle as we think the idea of a

coherer scheme may be, and precisely up to the point where they strengthen and support that work. For no one who does not know the ideas of conversion can handle the idea of coherence, and nobody can make use of the idea of coherence without making use of those of conversion up to the point at which they are good. And it is the same with all ideas. The history of the ideas as written in the development of science and the elaboration of philosophy will show in what order they have arisen and in what order they were forced to arise. They are equally good but they cannot be wrought out except in a certain order and sequence and only in their order and sequence can we make use of them in the structures of thought.

But we shall lose ourselves if we keep on very much as the Germans lost themselves for want of terseness, or very much as a prospector is liable to lose himself by reason of the multitude of streams in the Yukon Flats. Let us choose some wide Aphoon and hasten on to the sea.

DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF A COHERER IN IDEATION

WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF A SENSATION

We have got to remember then that if we are going to attempt to put a coherer into use in the full field of consciousness we are going to have it at once presented to us, by the necessities of ideation as being thus and thus active in one quarter, thus and thus passive in another quarter in that other kind of activity, passivity, which is the complement in the field of consciousness of any idead activity. We have got to put it right down in the full field of consciousness, already criss-crossed and segmented as that field is in every direction as the ideas overlying one another cut it up, here into ideation or not sensation, here into sensation, here again, even in sensation, into those divisions of sensation which enable us with our ideas to idea Sight-sensation as not Touch-sensations, Touch-sensations as not Sight-sensations and not Hearing-sensations, and so on; and at every quarter we may

expect contra-distinguished (and so far—and so far only—contradictory) manifestations of its workings. For this reason, as we suggested at the outset, the only practicable field of discussion is perhaps that in which we may be sure that similar sensations, be they of Sight, of Hearing or of Touch, if they arise similar in similar men do so to demand a coherer establishment, because there is what there is of philosophic necessity underlying the failure of their conversionary establishment to make us go on and demand for them a coherer establishment. Our coherer we are forewarned is going to present to us features in one quarter as it will apparently fail to present those features in another. It is going to succeed in one quarter as it apparently fails, so far and in that respect, in another quarter; all by reason of its higher success. Rather an exasperating argument to advance perhaps but it seems to be a difficulty inherent in the case itself, a necessary consequence of the truth to be developed, and anyway, reader, the good things are hard, as the Greeks say. If we get a result of a certain kind in one compartment of the senses, say the Sight-sensations as distinguished from the Touch-sensations, then we are going to obtain a result in some way varied in the other compartments of sensations, precisely to

the extent in fact in which ideating differentiates in the sensations Sight-sensations from Touch-sensations, Touch from Hearing and so on.

And some of these distinctions in sense are pretty obvious.

What is the distance of a sensation ; perhaps we should say in a sensation ? As regards sight it may seem to be in some cases the distance of the very furthest star, for these sensations own a range, as regards this method of treating distance, from the very furthest star to whatever as least distant is just cognisable by our eyes. As regards Hearing-sensations the extremest distance at which the very loudest explosion is just audible, and thence downwards. But as regards Touch, an apparent approximation is demanded for we never have a Touch-sensation unless in our field of consciousness a Sight-sensation known by us as Body approximates in the field known by us as Not-Body a sensation known by us as Not-Body—which two in the field of consciousness giving place to these varied Sight-sensations which represent the Body and the Not-Body in a state, however slight, of pressure as the result of the action that demanded amongst those Sight-sensations that phenomenon, we have in the Touch-compartment of sense an institution in the guise of a Touch-

sensation—the distance in which is what? A next to impossible question to answer, but the distance of which, as far as it is capable of distributing any action of ours to a further result in the guise of another and still further varied Touch-sensation would seem to be limited into an approximation and to be of a lesser bodily range as to distance than those (Sight-sensations) in which, as in the case of the flash of a gun, we can distribute about our action similar Sight-sensations amongst a body of men. Here then is a big difference already established in the field of consciousness if our object be primarily to concern ourselves as to the range of working of coherers; less perhaps if our inquiry be limited to seeing in the possibility of these sensations arising at all in similarity in different men the possibility of their being modes in coherence of coherers.

Or take ideation, which ideating has divided in the field of consciousness from sensation. A coherer will not for that very reason, show its working there in the same way in which it may expose its workings in sensation. For instance, all men do have, for the great bulk of their consciousness similar ideas. So far the ideas may be competent to be a cohering part of the field of coherers, and men may perhaps be capable of cohering immediately to similarity of their ideas. But it does not

enter the range of practical politics at present to think that they do so, for it is quite possible that while they end by having ideas in common they have to devolve their pronouncement through sensation to raise them up in other men's minds. I can hardly think that all the ideas which I am putting down on paper and which are raising similar ideas in you through the medium of those sensations which constitute in your field of consciousness these printed pages can be engendered in you by any amount of thinking on my part if I never talked, or wrote, or uttered them. In a word, any action of myself which evoked those causations and made them stand forth in the shape of printed pages is the only kind of action by which a coherer can come, through the similar sensations which you as coherers are forced on approximation to receive, the engenderment in your mind of similar ideas—the product (perhaps) in passivity in you as coherers as they in activity. Perhaps then, except in this kind of passivity, the ideas cannot speak to one another, though they are essential parts of a coherer's field of consciousness, but must converse through (or never but at the same time with employment of) those channels of action devolved through sense which can alone constitute a coherer's range of action as a matter of practical politics. There may be all sorts

of questions in the non-practical politics of a coherer, and they may be very interesting ; but here, at any rate, we have to put them on one side. There are as a matter of fact an immense number of such questions and some of them are of the very highest interest. Some scientists for instance—and they seem to be right in line with those who allot differentiated cell for every differentiated function of life—say that the conscience, the specific arbiter of the good and the bad morally, is at most just a few differentiated calls somewhere in our cerebral establishment ; some even have the opinion that good thinking and bad thinking is actually accompanied with different physical conditions in the body, Saints like St. Francis d'Assisi having smelt of violets. So be it : I do not wish them to say anything else for if the conscience be but those few differentiated cells, then hovering just outside the practical politics of a coherer establishment, possibly within it, is a profoundly interesting question. For if it be such a part of that coherer we are conceiving which is that immediate mind that not from converted matter finds its establishment, I would like to be assured of the possibility of this being only able to be varied in one man as it immediately causes to be varied with itself in another man his similar conscience ; as in fact Being is

directly its own mode of Doing in respect of another. I should like to know whether moral action on account of this moral being is not action that can be evidenced by these variations of these similar bits of the field of consciousness. And the theologians, if I mistake not, will soon be in line in acknowledging the profound interest of such a suggestion. If not a question of practical politics now this at least is one that is going to be so just as soon as we can decide whether sensation is so exempt from the emotions that the emotions as a part of the field of consciousness are not a kind of a sensation capable in the same way that the sensations are of distributing their own action, one of those idead portions of sensation in fact the notness of which as not sensation does not argue then as not but being another kind of sensation, equally capable with the sensations of distributing, since Being is a mode of doing (by causing the institution of the similar in others) their own modes of action.

It is time that we took some note of what we mean by action.

BEING AS A MODE OF DOING

THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION BY ALL POINTS IN THE FIELD OF CONSCIOUSNESS

I know the compendious view everybody takes of action. You throw a cricket ball ; you put your arm up, you raise your gun, you pull the trigger, the gun goes off and unless previously dead the bird gets away. This is all the practical man means by action.

But whether we like it or not this is not sufficient. This is not a conception of action which will satisfy you for one moment once you begin to scrutinise for your warranty of action those changes of the sensations in the field of consciousness by which alone you can know that you have action. For action is connoted there solely by the fact that some of the sensations, or even a mass of them, as of the uplifted arm, change their position with respect to others in that field ; and the extent of the action and the account which you will give in speech of that action is connoted by the extent of the change which has taken place amongst those

sensations. You only know action by change, either a relative change amongst the same old component sensations in your field of consciousness, a new grouping of them into position, or by a change which has instituted some new sensations into your field of consciousness and has led to others being dropped therefrom. It is by change alone we know action, and without change we cannot denote it, yet change alone would not give us any complete scheme of the action that we account ours, for there may be change in the field of consciousness without its being a result of any action that we can conceive to be ours. One more factor is necessary.

Somewhere in the full field of each man's consciousness is the will, charged with the possibility, whether it exercises it or not, of so putting the sensations in the field of consciousness into change that their change then shall denote our action. Here, so to speak, is the centre of action. The will uplifts the arm ; it causes to arrive in the field of consciousness throughout all the avenues of sensation the sensations in their new relative positions in respect to one another which constitute the measure and extent of its action. If the sensations be as we believe them to be the only and veritable Things-in-themselves, then it, the will, causes the transference of them, the uplifted arm to a new position amongst others.

There are vast portions of the field of consciousness always in a state of change, old positions being changed and new sensations being induced in place of old, because the will is in action, at one while retaining them in their position—for we must not lose sight of this passive effect of the will and this effect in passivity—and then again proceeding to secure those changes of them that are accompanied with the institution of some new and the dropping out of some old. There are portions again in the same field of consciousness where not our will but that of others is inducing these changes, linked upon one another as they are in their field and ours, in that necessity of similarity in each field which we believe to be a token of coherence. These two portions, which we can segregate from one another in our field of consciousness, about sum up the portions in which we can expect to identify for practical purposes action as being ours or similar to ours. There are of course proceeding amongst a whole lot of our sensations in a further portion of the field which are dedicated under the idea as the Not-self, those changes, apparently of the sensations themselves amongst themselves by reason of themselves which have the apparent result of elevating these sensations into the position of Things-in-themselves acting on one another and by reason of one another;

which changes we cannot discuss as a question of practical politics in any consideration of how we act, because they are proceeding in that negative area where if we ascribe the will acting at all, we have to ascribe it acting in some negative kind of action from which we have contra-distinguished it as acting positively and as the ideal ours in the other portion we first spoke of, but as philosophers we know the unity may be there—nay, in the end, we shall have to think, must be there, to the literal ensurance of always suitable Things-in-themselves, an always suitable scheme in nature to the proper man. All this notwithstanding, when we say we act, as a matter of practical politics, we centre down on to the fact that without will we could not be conscious that we could act, we could not even say we had raised our arm when we had done so; and without changes in the sensations to connote the extent of our action, or to enable us to express it in terms of what we had done, we again, could not know we had acted. These two are the main factors.

Now what reason have we for supposing that our action, whatever in its ultimate nature as an effort of the will it be, when it effects changes in that portion of the field of consciousness, wherein we established the ourself of our idea, in which portion, as we know, the idea in allotting to the self sensation differentiated

from the emotions differentiates into many different classes the sensation it there allots (or at least cannot but find allotted to be right ideation at all) making of it Sight, Touch, Hearing, Taste, and Smell sensations, and so on. What reason have we for thinking that our action by one only of these classes of sensations is competent to secure changes, not only in that class of sensation but amongst all the other classes as well. Why should we pick out any one class of the sensations as so only competent to radiate, so to speak, that demand of the will, which on account of the resulting changes, we decide to be action. It is absolutely unreasonable and unjustifiable to do so. We have been doing so in the past because we have allowed sight sensation to be our only informant as to matter and everything else, and have taken no heed of the unseen world in our other classes of sensation. But there is no reason why we should continue doing so, and here begins again one of those possibilities for a new view of our possible coherer establishment in this respect; for the possibility is staring us directly in the face that if no one of these classes of sensation is more competent to distribute action than any other, then everyone of those classes of sensations is as equally competent as the others to distribute that demand of the will for change (coupled with that less

discernible quality which may exist of that insistence of the will for passivity) which, according to the extent of the changes in all classes simultaneously is capable of being registered as action—action by all points in at least that part of the field of consciousness styled sensation. For any reason we can advance to the contrary, all classes of sensation are equally competent or incompetent to distribute action. If they do distribute action, then all are equally competent to do so. If by any action is distributed then by all severally is action after their kind distributed; and each particular class is only competent to do so, to distribute, that is action after its own peculiar kind, Sight into the seen, the others into the unseen world, precisely in the proportion to which we believe that each of these forms of sensation, Sight, Smell, Hearing, Touch and Taste, cannot by any possibility be originated out of one another in their simultaneous existence in the field of consciousness as radically distinct and differentiated kinds of sensation. We know they are capable of so existing simultaneously in that field, and that they cannot be originated in that their simultaneity of existence by conversion out of one another, any more than any of the changes which may ensue in them in response to, and as the result of the action that has effected

them (or in them) to redetermination can be originated, in their again simultaneity with one another by conversion out of another. Here again, as we know, is a failure of conversion and of a conversionary establishment, impelling us to a belief that if it is action causes change in these different sensations after each different class, then the action that can cause this change can deal only through these different classes of sensation as inconvertibles, and has to proceed towards its re-determination of them directly through each in the channels of its inconvertibility. It has to proceed by each class of its sensation to its re-determination of that class. It has to proceed as we opine a coherer would have to proceed, by action at all these points in the field of consciousness possible ; and beyond this fact of action being thus possible at all these different points in the field of consciousness, the different classes of sensation, impends another, the fringe of which, so to speak, we can just dimly see, for if some sensations, when instituted in one man, demand, as the normal condition of things, the institution of the similar sensations, each according to their class, in another man, then beyond the action of the first in securing each of those sensations to himself, impends another fact ; the fact Being is a mode of Doing. For this the Being of

one man, because as we must opine, it is a coherer achieving coherence, and can only so achieve itself in coherer establishment, after he has secured it to himself by his will as a mode of his Being, is a mode of doing to others, and cannot exist, all the while it does exist, except as a mode of Doing ; as it necessitates the institution to similarity of the second man ; in a word as in proof of its being a coherer, it is with necessitation of that necessitation.

That action by all points in the field of consciousness is a possibility, and that being is a mode of doing, and a very sufficient one, are two of the theories we are bound to develop if we are going to argue for the field of consciousness its coherer establishment. And so far as the sensations are a part of the field of consciousness and are differentiated amongst themselves in the presentation made of them there according to their different classes, it does appear that all over that portion of the field action by all points is a legitimate speculation ; and that there attends upon this possibility the further that so far as any of these sensations are modes of Being Being is a mode of Doing. So far from action being something single and solitary in its discharge from us by actions of our modes of consciousness to a re-determination of them, the correcter view would seem to be that we

distribute action, this effort for re-determination, in, so to speak, tunes, according to the number and classes of the sensations making that application for re-determination which we can alone judge to be action by reason of the resulting changes.

TUNE ACTION

ACTION BROADSIDES

WE let off action, so to speak, in broadsides, not in single shots.

Did you ever hear anyone make a crash on the piano, put his fingers down we mean on seven or eight keys at the same time, the pitch or the tone or the tune as we call it of the whole, while apparently a single note being determined by the keys the musician includes in the crash. Now in nine cases out of ten the action we put off in one of these crashes, the tone or the tune of the action, while it may appear a single note and so cause us to think it a simple, single sort of action, being really made up out of several classes of sensation and always remaining on that account tune action or action into which as into a component all the keys mingle their several sounds.

We may be wrong in our use of the musical terms involved, probably are, for we are not musicians, but the figure we have used, if we have succeeded in making it plain, gives adequate expression to what we mean.

In nine cases out of ten we say action must be considered as affecting sensation in more than one class at once. But is not this an understatement of the truth? Is not the real fact this, that we cannot possibly detect any action that shall affect one class of sensation and cause it to undergo redetermination in the field of consciousness without being at the same time forced to acknowledge that there must also be at the same time action in at least one other and further class of sensation causing it to undergo the redetermination of its sensations as present at the same time in the field of consciousness. We have likened action to a broadside. Is it not a fact that at least two guns must always be fired together, two classes of sensation be affected in their redetermination simultaneously in inconvertibility with one another.

Take a few instances. Can I possibly secure any change in my sight sensations without having at the same time to acknowledge change in some other class of my sensation? I do not think it. We can come, it seems to me, very near doing it, but never quite. Without moving the body as a whole the will may roll the eye, and in changing the point of regard certainly induce a considerable amount of change amongst the sight-sensations in the field of consciousness; but in the fine end

have we not to acknowledge that we must and do have in a different and distinct class of sensations, either Touch or Feeling, some new and only so arrived at new sensation in which we say we feel we roll the eye. Again we may snuff vigorously for further smell-sensations with the nostrils, and may so induce a considerable number of new smell-sensations into the field of consciousness; but in the end we must acknowledge that our sight-sensations will also include amongst themselves new ones, after their kind, of the snuffing nostrils. Or we may taste our own mouths for further tastes than we have hitherto been noticing in our fields of consciousness, we may do this with shut mouth and with no accompanying results in the way of disturbance amongst the sight-sensations, but we shall certainly have new and concomitant results in Feeling as we feel our tongues moving about. The net result seems to be, as we say, that there is always a disturbance of at least two classes of sensation at the same time. The broadside of action is never less than two guns, at least two classes of sensation being always involved.

And the broadside is very often of course more. Anything that can be styled in ordinary language full bodily action, as when we advance the body a yard forward always analyses out, when analysed out as change in the sensations

according to their different classes in the field of consciousness, into a change of the sensations in each different class of sensation—a change proceeding simultaneously in each different class and therefore with inconvertibility of the sensations involved as being in a state of change. For if we move our body a step forward, as we very well know, we have to acknowledge our Sight-sensations in the field of consciousness in the state of flux and change that depicts that action. We have to acknowledge our Feeling-sensations or Touch-sensations as of the action reconstituted according to their kind; and we certainly have to acknowledge the liability of the Smell and Hearing-sensations to attest with newness of redetermination in their classes to the part and portion which they have in the action involved, or new Smell and Hearing-sensations would never come to us at all. In a word, we have to acknowledge that our action in this case by token of simultaneous change in every class of sensation we have is a broadside, like the different keys as they lie side by side on the piano sounding each only according to its own note, so, side by side in the field of our consciousness, lie the different classes of sensation, Sight, Smell, Touch, Hearing and Taste, yielding only states of consciousness moded according to their several kind, and like the crashes on

the piano in which are exposed the productive action of the pianist exerted by this, and this, and this key simultaneously so do our crashes of action, by Sight, by Smell, by Taste, by Hearing delivered simultaneously, produce in us states of consciousness, which, for the variety contained in them, it would be as unreasonable to call single and elementary and to accept as the product of some single and elementary action, as it would be improper to call single and elementary and to accept as the product of single action the mixture of notes which the pianist obtains by several keys on the piano.

A TUNED SCHEME FOR ACTION

ORGANS—WHAT ARE THEY?

This internal method, as we call it, of analysing out action by means of the changes in our field of consciousness which can alone be the expression of action, and which, so far as they are changes at all points in the field of consciousness, allow action to be produced, so to speak, at all points, cannot be proceeded with by us for any length of time without our being forced to acknowledge to ourselves that it is going to modify profoundly our philosophic outlook upon anything that we can consider to be the world or the scheme of nature. The fact, if it be a fact, that by present modes of Being we are rendered competent to act, and that, in acting, we act through them at all points to secure others which are the expression of this action; coupled with the belief that our action in securing by present modes new modes is impossible unless it works as well to secure to another similar modes; this we say, is a little lump of leaven which is bound to evolve a vast amount of new suggestion and to influence very decidedly our philosophic outlook at a good many points.

Take a few of these new considerations as they rise one by one.

If this tune action, as we call it, be right, does it not demand a tuned scheme for action—does it not demand a tuned scheme capable of being appropriately responsive to tuned action? Does it not bespeak some tuned scheme, so to speak, of the Things-in-themselves, the credit formerly accorded to the Thing-in-itself of varying, while itself an unknown thing, the sensation attendant upon it, being now translated and transferred to the account of these similar sensations, always co-varying, themselves the only kind of Things-in-themselves, with one another? Or are we to suppose that we are not interested in knowing that we may have been living, by all points of our nature, in such a tuned scheme since the world began?

Again, in the field of consciousness in the old conversionary view, a presentation is believed to be made through the sensations themselves in different parts of the field of the organs for manufacturing these sensations, both the portion in which they express themselves as manufacturers of sensations, and the remainder. What amount of credence, then, are we to bestow on there being any such organs for manufacturing sensations of themselves as at work manufacturing the sensations of themselves and other things? What kind

of a body, removed as a Thing-in-itself from itself when manufacturing the sensations of itself, is this? What is to prevent our thinking in the end that "these sensations of these organs manufactured by the organs manufacturing the sensations of themselves manufacturing the 'sensations,'" does not contain a gross and intolerable duplication which demands philosophically, some kind of erasion of the organs, or at least a perception of the fact that by the sensations which the organs manufacture of themselves as manufacturing the sensations of themselves, we can come nowhere nearer to any such organs than the sensations themselves, which, only from some necessity we conceive ourselves to be under of believing them manufactured by organs, do we suppose to be under the necessity of revealing to us the organs manufacturing them.

Anyone analysing action out, as we have said, by the internal method, is going to find his ideas as to organs undergoing some mortification, to say the least. Instead of starting here and there all over his field of consciousness with organs for manufacturing the different classes of sensations, including the sensations of those organs themselves as supposedly manufactured by the organs when manufacturing the sensations of themselves as manufacturing the sensations, which leaves him utterly, as

we say without a warrant as to whether the sensations, which he so allots to organs as so busy, are organs or are of organs working in the way he would suggest (the Body when re-maufacturing sensations being required to be outside the Body) instead of seeing, as we say, these organs all over his field of consciousness he is going to see, simply and immediately the sensations themselves, the whole of whose differentiations, under whatever aspect they crop up here and there in the field of consciousness, and are idead and talked of by him, are simply to him (and need be nothing more to him) the different interests by which interest and stimulation and occupation, in changing of his interest, is given to his life. Comparing the old and new point of view, it is as though we were looking in the field of consciousness with all its varied sensations at a Mercator's projection of the world. In the old view, Egypt and Africa, and America and Asia, and Europe and any other point that could be named, would be organs of that for ever vanished body. Under the guise of themselves as sensations would be seated the organs that manufactured not only those sensations of themselves as making the others, but also manufactured the others. In the new, the coherer view, in which we question the competency of conversionary sensations to

exist at all, we have to examine what competency any particular portions of the field of consciousness (these specific sensations as of the organs), retain to be the sensations that make the others, or the sensations of that which can make them and the others. And if we fail to find such, we have to regard the possibility that while these specific sensations are always linked with some of the other in such a manner as to simulate organs, they are only organs as they are with all the rest interest, and as they offer that field for the advancement of the will by its interests in its interests, which is capable in the long run, the long run of life, and the fulfilment of this movement of the will, through these its interests, of allotting to the will further, even organs, precisely as they are interests. This last Mercator's map of ours is a map by interest as offering employment to the will, busily engaged, and unable to be anything but engaged in a perpetual re-constitution of them about itself; a perpetual re-constitution of them which no more ties it to a corpse manufacturing death to it in the shape of an organ, nor condemns it to walk about with these organs in the guises of corpses chained to its neck waiting to kill it; but a re-constitution so far perpetual to the will throughout life that, as it is a scheme where nothing is at stake,

neither will nor organs, except this process itself, so with nothing in the process can it threaten or prevent the fulfilment in the process.

Bound to be modified, then, is our view of organs. But to what extent and how to define the modification is not easy to say. To start with, however, as we know, there is something utterly unsatisfactory in making just a few specific sensations, confined in one particular portion of a particular class of sensations, revelatory of the actual Things-in-themselves, the organs for making sensations, not only of themselves but of the others, while in the case of the other sensations they are held not to reveal with equal surety the Things-in-themselves. To accept a revelation of this kind is impossible, because it all depends as to whether we are bound to accept the revelation or not, as to whether we do or can accept it. It all depends whether we accept the revelation or not, as to what necessity there is for having such organs. At the back of all lies the ultimate question, how is it possible to believe that these few specific sensations, as of these sensation-manufacturers, can give us in them the veritable Things-in-themselves, the organs, instead of remaining (for all that they can and do give us), just those few specific sensations themselves, albeit linked always (with what significance attaches upon that linking), to

make always a showing of themselves and a change of themselves in connection with a showing and a change amongst other portions of that field.

If we fail to find in the organs themselves any cogency of proof as to their being what we have supposed them to be we literally have to argue the question of what they can be and what they cannot be on the lines of the general necessity for their being such organs ; and we have to accept the indications of that general necessity as authoritative. We have to make our facts in the usual way in which Science, though it sometimes does not notice what its privilege is, has to make and always has made all its facts.

It is in a conversionary view we most need organs—and only need the kind of organs we have indicated. If the Thing-in-itself does not do the thinking we have got to have an organ to do the thinking about the Thing-in-itself. But if the thinking were done in the Thing-in-itself that would alter our conception of the organ involved in the thinking. It is conversion most causes our old time view of organs and gives us organs everywhere to do every thing. It was because the organ was kept away in a supposed conversionary scheme from the Thing-in-itself, even from itself as a Thing-in-itself (for that is the crux) that we so con-

tinually wanted it to be an organ and to do something to justify its existence. But the minute we cease to keep the Thing-in-itself away from the organ upon the necessity of conversion, why, the organ that accepts, for anything we know to the contrary, everywhere in itself the Thing-in-itself, whatever sort of one it may yet possibly continue to be, is not one that is under any necessity of constituting of any part of its field of consciousness machines for manufacturing the rest of those its acceptable presentations. It is not going to make any part of itself machines or organs for doing so on the old lines. But on the new lines? That is another matter and the one to seek. It may yet be an organ, even the one surmised by us as a coherer capable of accepting at all points that consciousness immediate as Being and immediate as Knowledge which, in such a tuned scheme as it dwells amongst of Things-in-themselves, accessible by it at all points in reality in tuned action, supplies it safely with knowledge both of the Thing-in-itself in respect of itself and of others. It thinks as the Thing-in-itself, and as such, has the same certainty of knowing other things as Things-in-themselves; for it is not then removed into a position in which it is (so to speak) of a Thing-in-itself and so can only think of Things-in-themselves. In a word it is real.

DIFFERENTIATION AS DOOMING ORGANS

LINKED SENSATIONS THE ONLY SYMPTOM OF ORGANS

The old organ is doomed, but under what aspects its passing is accomplished and under what aspects the new view is seeking to reveal itself is the point in question.

To us it seems differentiation carried to a certain pitch involves necessarily doom to the old view of organs, and the linking of sensations together upon action will perhaps explain, in the new view, how some sensations come to simulate organs and were mistaken for such; for this linking of sensations upon action that may give to some the semblance of organs is but a necessary corollary as we see the matter to the delivery of tune action, or the action which must in simultaneity of change link at various points sundry sensations; and is in short the real indication of the new point of view which is tending to make a revelation of itself so as the coherer, with action possible by all points, in point of fact and in the pursuit

of its practical politics accomplishes these changes of its sensations thus in linkage together.

It is hard to put into a concrete example this linking of sensations and the semblance of organs to which it may give rise. But the following figure may suggest what we mean.

Say that note A considered as a Sight-sensation, lies on the piano in one statutory place with respect to the rest of the field, and its sound lies there, in that one particular quarter with reference to the other sound sensations. Note B, as a sight-sensation, lies next to it in its statutory place by sight; and its sound consequently lies among the sound sensations in that spot, and nowhere else, as its particular spot and statutory place, where in the scheme of things it has been served with statutory notice by Sight and Sound, and as Sight and Sound to remain. And so of all the other notes, by Sight and by Sound, each served with their statutory notices, to remain by Sight and by Sound, and as Sight and as Sound, in certain positions in that field with respect to others.

Now, cannot this illustration be made to help us perhaps when we come to perceive that Sight makes of some specific few of its sensations (as of the eye) an organ for seeing (the eye also, we know, feels and is an organ of

feeling though it is not credited with smelling or tasting). By others again (as of the ear) Sight makes of some few specific sensations an organ for hearing, which organ, also as we know, feels. Of others, again, of its Sight sensations it makes (as of the tongue) an organ for tasting; the seen and the unseen modes of sensation being apparently linked and placed together in the field of consciousness with at least some semblance of the manner which we ascribed to the different Sight and Sound sensations on the piano, so that there is no disturbance by sound without there being also at the same time a disturbance in a similar position amongst the Sight sensations. If the old organ view of these sensations is going to dissolve, it is going, we fancy, to dissolve with a perception that the Sight sensations by their differentiated place there with the Sounds, tastes, feelings linked with them by differentiated place do not make them (that differentiation by place but linkage with others does not make them) organs—at least not in a conversionary method. The disturbance effected in the different parts of the field of Sight sensations when different smells, or tastes, or touches are to be encountered along with those Sight sensations is no proof of the Sight sensation making the Sound any more than the trembling Sight sensation of the key

in motion can make the sound simultaneously in motion with it, or vice-versa. It rather suggests that there are no such organs at all but that at all these points the different aspects and semblances of organs arise through tuned action always proceeding in different departments to move simultaneously linked sensations in the different classes to a resemblance thereof.

Perhaps another line of argument will better suggest the same thing, namely that Differentiation itself is carrying doom to the old organ of our former views. Do we reason the eye, in the old view, precisely in the same state whatever sensation we possess ourselves of by means of it?

If you reply "yes" then all I can say is that that eye might do very well for a glass eye, for a glass eye, that never changed, could do as much, but it carries no meaning to my mind as a living changeful organ.

But do we then push Differentiation to the following pitch to the point of asking, "Does, then, every different sensation, of which presentation is made, demand a different state of eye as a living organ making the presentation?"

I think we have to say "Yes," that every different presentation, however minute its difference from any other, demands some differentiation in the eye as a living changeful organ from the aspect it wore when making any

other presentation. In other words, we have to carry out differentiation in the eye to the precise extent in which we have to carry out differentiation in the sensations it is supposing to be presenting us with, and this is precisely the point at which, carried out to such an extent, we ask which of all these eyes is the eye, and the whole system is liable to collapse from one of conversion into one in which any of these differentiations do no more than accompany any other. For if the eye is practically not the same eye when making these different presentations when is it an eye? The whole system in connected differentiation is liable to be in-taken into the scheme of the tuned action of a coherer exploiting in tunes all its matter and modes (immediate consciousness) in tuned connection one with another.

There is so far reason for saying as we do that carry differentiation far enough, and the old organ view of the eye and the ear and the other organs will crumble of itself, and that the only symptom of the new organ will be linked sensations.

Do you remember, too, what we said about cells. They might be matter at one end, we opined, as at the other mind, in order to satisfy the demand of the ideas as to matter and mind, because as portions of the field under the subjugation of Ideation they might carry out in their

littleness what is equally exposed in the whole field of consciousness in its fulness, and this concerns what we are trying to suggest here. All these little cells that at one end yield themselves in Sight-sensation as the eye, in the other end may be the unseeable and other dimensioned mode, Touch-sensation. Except by comparison of place, you cannot, considered merely as Sight-sensation, tell one key of the piano from the other, and perhaps it is the same with these Sight-sensations. A finer study of comparison of place might tell us that with the differences exhibited as eye, as attesting to different presentations, it is the same thing as saying that the linked sensations attest themselves together. If the keys of the piano are Sight-sensations at one end as at the other sound, so, in satisfaction of Ideation, all these little cells that at one place in the field of consciousness are yielded in Sight-sensation as the eye may be at one end Sight as at the other in unseeable mode and dimension they are Touch. In other part, ear, they may be sight as at the other sound, this substance in bars being the one substance of Consciousness, Hearing-sight, Sight-smell, Sight-taste and so on, variously idead at different points, in which alone is laid the proper base that renders able the tune action of a coherer.

A WORLD OF COHERERS

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

Our first suggestion as to the possibility of our being coherers was limited to the surmise that when two men touch one another the Touch-sensations, similar as they are in each other, arise through the instruments involved in the production of those sensations being coherers, so that the sensation which the one has could not arise in the ordinary and normal conditions that render consciousness possible without its being forced to accomplish an existence in similarity to the other. These modes of sensation, depending as they do upon an actual conjunction and contact between the supposed coherers, afford a very narrow field of action for coherers, and give them a very narrow range to work in.

But is it not allowed us to broaden the base of our argument? Is it not possible that we can extend a little further than to these immediate modes of Touch the same suggestion? namely, that their rise in simultaneity in two or

more men, even when those men are some little distance apart, may, because these men are coherers, proceed in attestation of the same fact, viz., that the Being of one man cannot accomplish itself and maintain itself in the consonance of Reason as some of the other modes of sensation, Sight or Smell, without necessitating accomplished to another man his simultaneous existence.

Our first suggestion was limited to these Touch modes which, arising out of immediate contact of two coherers, reduced the radius of action of the coherers in respect of them down to immediate contact. Is it not possible that we may extend, at least a little, the radius of action of those coherers in respect of sundry other sensations?

Take the case which we have supposed to exist that the eye, however it directs throughout the body as lens, retina, optic nerve, and the buried and hidden brain-cells, is varied as a bodily establishment, and must be varied as a bodily establishment with each varied presentation which is to be accomplished to us at the same time as not-body or place. This variation, as we see, proceeds logically in differentiation to a pitch at which the eye from being varied as a bodily establishment with every varied presentation of place is liable to lose any such consistency of bodily establish-

ment as shall warrant it an eye at all, or an organ at all on the old lines ; and becomes the opportunity of some scheme which merely attests an always linked establishment or part establishment by body as there is also an established presentation by place or a portion of place. Now, if tune action has its opportunity (should two bodies touch one another and raise, say, a couple or more of simultaneous appreciably distinct Touch-sensations in each) of ensuring, as it works by both, the sensations in the man, whose will started the movement that ended in their establishment, the similar sensations in the other man as a coherer, so, we cannot help surmising, the tune action that may link these always concomitant differentiates by body and place in one man may have the same opportunity of being only able to ensure them to one man as it ensures, working by both of these its differentiates, similar to another man at perhaps some appreciable distance.

For instance, a gun is exploded by one man, and whatever action does that is so far tune action, the tune action we made so much of a few pages back, that the presentation which it will secure of the flash of the gun is always accompanied by an eye which, as a bodily establishment or part establishment of the body, is different from the eye accompanying

other kinds of sensations considered as presentations of place. But if another man is within a certain range the action of the first not merely causes in himself the sensations to arise that constitute the presentation by place and that peculiar bodily establishment than it causes in the second man that similar presentation by place and that similar bodily establishment. Hence, as we say, what is to prevent our surmising that the efficiency of one coherer to be and to prove itself a coherer effecting coherence with another is just as much present here as it was supposed to be present in the modes of Touch where immediate bodily contact was requisite for the tune action involved to come into effect? What is to prevent our thinking that while it is tune action links the presentation by place with the bodily establishment appropriate therewith in the first man, the man whose will put forth the action, it is not more by that place presentation than by the eye itself that the action of the first man went forth as a coherer, his own being as a coherer being once established to render necessary and to necessitate established in the second his similar eye and his similar presentation by place. The eye, those hidden and buried states of the body as they mostly are that was peculiar and particular to the first man, and which he only gained himself as

he gained a peculiar presentation by place, that eye may be as vivific as a coherer to necessitate enforced to the second man his similar eye as may have been vivific on its part that peculiar sensation by place in the first to enforce to the second his also similar presentation by place. We are brought face to face with the possibility in this manner that these hidden parts of our bodies may be able to cohere, and at distances apart, in the same way that the only coherers we have knowledge of in the physical world, those concerned in wireless telegraphy, at certain distances cohere, though seas and skies and earth intervene. We also receive warning to another effect that we shall not make of our body or of that portion of the field of consciousness ideal by us so a particular portion to be viewed as transmitter, or of the other particular portion ideal as not body and given up to place presentation about us, a receiver ; for the effort, of the will, working under the unity of the idea, that secures not more each differentiated presentation by place than each concomitant appropriate state of the body is the real effort and the real action in tune distribution of itself by body and place in which transmission accomplishes ; both transmission and receiving being not more through the portion of the field devoted to presentation by place than through the portion devoted to

body secured and accomplished. The man who wills the action resulting in the changes, who wills and acts, is the transmitter, the other the receiver. And in the fact of transmission, depending upon an effort of the will, being possible through the portions of the field of consciousness devoted to the not-body, with its corollary that if it obtains it will obtain with whatever portion of that field as body connected therewith can ensure it, we are on the borders of the measureless. We have passed at one swoop beyond the narrow limits within which we can find our coherers and gave them connection with one another, when we viewed similar Touch-sensations as the only competent proof of coherers. Now to similar Touch-sensations we add all that arise in conjoint similarity (as all do) in the consonance of Reason are being, may possibly be, rayant and a matter of rayancy.

IN THE CONGRESS OF COHERERS

COMMON OR COMMUNISED AND COMMUNISEABLE BEING

We have arrived at measureless man as the end of our journey—measureless, we say, because who can really say what is the distance in some of these presentations by place which we believe tune action to be in a position, as we have said, to handle.

It is true there are many of the presentations of place in the field of consciousness, as, for instance, the sensations in which the furthest stars present themselves to us, which appear inaccessible to any action of ours in the way in which such sensations as the flash of a gun are accessible and our bodily states in connection with which, and as being present to us and belonging to us when they (the place presentations) are present are therefore as modes of a coherer—if we be such—in some similar degree also rendered stabilized and so far as they are rendered stabilized inoperative of change in respect of one another. But we

have to remember that every such presentation is present in the field of consciousness which allows it there at all; and that they are therefore, however stabilized and inoperative and inoperable by the will, only stabilized and inoperable as in respect of them the more recondite aspects of that unity obtain—a speculation which witnesses us on the borders of the measureless.

But while our case in a sense rests, we had better familiarise ourselves with some of the aspects with which we shall have to become familiar if we are to render clear to ourselves in all its potentiality of novelty our new standpoint as coherers. We had better consider what features emphasise themselves in the new standpoint which we are seeking to shape for ourselves as coherers.

Some of these features are pretty evident. It is plain that we are according an extreme fluidity to body and that portion of the field of consciousness devoted under the idea as such. If what we regarded as organs under the old view are in the new view but the particular differentiates as body that cannot but accompany in the field of consciousness the particularly differentiated presentations by place, and are with them always linked, to render possible in respect of them the action that can be tune action—then I say we are

rendering that body fluid, constitutible and reconstitutible, to a degree that we have never yet accorded it. We always of course have regarded the body as changeable, changing with the snows of the Arctic and the suns of the tropics, but this instant differentiation of body as always linked on the possibility of tune action in peculiar differentiation of itself with the place presentations present with it in the field of consciousness—this, we say, is according to it a degree of instant fluidity and change of consistency far beyond what we have hitherto granted it. However it be that the will, acting by means of what is present to it as body and place in its field of consciousness can accomplish that dissolution of them which is consonant with its transference amongst the other coherers who compose whatever is the scheme that we may call nature in this view, to the reconstitution of its field as consciousness according to its new stand-place as a coherer in such a scheme—however the will can move from place to place in the world and accomplish when it does so this process of the dissolution and reconstitution within its field of consciousness of what is there body and place—and this, though we grant the mystery, is not more a mystery than was the mystery of a conversionary organism slipping its moorings in its old stand-place

in the world and coming to anchor in its new, to receive impacted in itself, through the channels of conversion, its new field of consciousness according to its new stand-place in the world—however the will do this and from stand-place to stand-place pass and take up its stations in the world it may be with a more extreme fluidity of body than we have hitherto accorded to it that it will do this. We may even have to suppose that the will can dissolve the body though it may be able to do nothing more, when it does so, than have to make it anew.

Again, we have to perceive that to complete this scheme we are going to live one and all as coherers together in a world where common or communised and communising and communiseable Being is a fact inherent as the field of consciousness itself; and a first essential to the security of that scheme. However it can be that the leaf of a tree, a living Thing and the Thing-in-itself remember, can so be in the world that upon my approach as a coherer organism to within a certain distance of it I shall have present within my field of consciousness the presentations or sensations which always divide themselves into the leaf and not-leaf (these divisions accomplishing themselves out of the portion of the field I dedicate to my not-body) and the Me besides—how this can

obtain through my adaptability or impressionability as a coherer organism to rendering so accessible to me the Things-in-themselves; at all points here may be opportunity of further refining; yet this necessity of refining in our view of ourselves as a coherer organism ought not to blind us to whatever necessity there may be of bringing forth this view to be refined.

If it be arguable that all things in the world, even every leaf, has some effect on me physically considered, even at the remotest distance possible, this state of affairs from meaning in the old view that I am conversionarily a microcosm as all these effects are in me of all these things, may in the new non-conversionary coherer view mean that I am a microcosm as are present in me in infinitesimal and imperceptible degrees the very presentations themselves, which enlarge, so to speak, and become perceptible as the will accomplishes hither and thither in the world its transitions as a coherer, which infinitesimalness, as it must bear witness of itself in a certain amount of differentiation as my body may explain a certain stability and largeness as it were, on account of the amount of the infinitesimal always so present with it, of the body, may ensure me, I mean, a certain amount of body and a certain stability of body, linked, if we have made clear

our suggestion, to these infinitely removed things. But these recondite thoughts apart, common being is evidently that form of being in which alone a coherer can securely establish itself ; to cohere we must communise ; common or communised being is one expression of this state of affairs, communiseable being is another, for it is only in modes that can communise themselves that a coherer can ultimately be believed to reside.

“ If I look at a black eye am I bound to have a black eye ? ” you ask.

You are bound to have a black eye, if you look at one, in this peculiar way, that, unless you are blind, you must have that black eye which will reside as a sensation in that portion of the field of consciousness which is devoted in you to giving your presentations in place of your neighbour, and unless you are blind if you do not have that black eye when you look at your neighbour, your neighbour for anything we know to the contrary will not have his. I say if you are not blind, for I have a little to suggest later on about those modes of Being, like blind eyes, in which appear to reside unconscious life (or, as it also means in a scheme where consciousness may be as immediate as life, the sensations that cannot for some peculiar reason be conscious.) He will have his black eye : you will have yours,

but situated in that negative portion of your field of consciousness in which it will not interest you so much as it does him, where it is situated in that portion he devotes as self, as compared with the dedication which it accepts in your field as not self. But is all the same so far common Being seeking to cure that black eye is going to cure it in no one else's field unless in the sufferer's as well. The whole business passes in common being or in being that can communise. That his interest in this black eye of his may be greater than yours, that is another matter. If there were a preponderancy of black eyes in the world the interest of the few peaceful citizens left without these marks of honour might become painfully keen.

If you are not blind you will have a black eye of a sort, if your neighbour looks at you with one and it would be an interesting study to decide how in every varied sensation transmission and receiving by commonality establishes itself. To us it seems to depend upon his will or yours, carrying you within such distances of one another as rendered your respective coherers organisms susceptible to the formation of these new modes ; but it does not confine either transmitting or receiving to either the body portion or the place portion in the field of consciousness or decide that it

proceeds in either portion in priority of the other.

As we have said, if some differentiation in you as eye is to accompany in your field of consciousness every differentiated presentation as place we must beware of limiting transmitting or reception to either of the portions that peculiarise themselves in the field of consciousness as body or place. We must remember, as we said, that by tune action at all points the transmitting and the receiving are to be regarded as accomplishing themselves. The point is imperative but we need not labour it. The eye is not accessible to itself. All the sensations of sight are cast in externality ; all the sensations of touch reside internally, you would not be able to find out by means of your own eye alone that it was composed of all sorts of parts, lens, iris, optic nerve and so on, varying presumably with every different presentation present with it according to its several states in the field of consciousness. That is the extraordinary part of it. Yet push Differentiation logically to its conclusion : say the eye varies as a bodily establishment with each presentation, and it follows that all these bodily parts vary totally or exhibit change in part, as in our simile of the different keys which are portions of the piano, with every presentation by place ; and if this change or

part changes accomplished itself, as we opined, in attestation of and in consequence of tune action linking these differentiated portions in the field of consciousness (the unconscious, or otherly conscious as it would appear to be here) then beware, as we said, of asserting that the eye, these hidden modes, are not as capable as the rest, both for transmission and receiving of their changes, as any other portion of a coherer.

Again, as we have said, remember that by all these its parts the will is dedicated to a conquest and contest of interest, even the body by all its parts and organs being reduced into an interest. Why should I think that by any portion of these interests it is dedicated to a death? I do not think so, for I am not made to think so. Where the process is amongst interests I can catch no note of finality but the process that is proceeding to fulfilment, I can catch no suggestion of finality but this; we must change our interests—we must change in our interests. A fair place must ensure, apparently, a fair body; a fair country would seem to demand a fair race of people. If this progress by interest has been proposed by body and place to the will I am not going to dedicate one portion to a death upon the other. I expect to realise by both the accomplishment which the possibility of that progress

suggests. Yes, reader, it is entirely a map by interest, by eyes, by ears, by hands, by hearts, and all. Everything is an interest. Just the common things of life and the ordinarily viewed necessities are interests.

FOOD AN INTEREST

PERHAPS YOU FEED : PERHAPS YOU DON'T

Did you ever consider food as an interest? More often as a necessity, eh? Well, let us take a look at it both ways.

Through your body runs a shaft. Once, twice, thrice a day through that shaft must pass so much of the exterior as by its peculiarity as food is necessary to keep going the scheme of you as an eating creature. Well, it passes. And the old conversionary view says that these matters rigidly tied as they are in a system of equiproportionates are converted by you into just as much other matters which continue for a time to reside in their new place as your body. There is so much food in the world; and as a result there can only be as many living bodies as there is food for. So far the argument cannot be impeached. The line of strictest necessity is drawn here: the practical politics of the world take their stand here in respect of the food supply on the ground of necessity.

But what follows? These bodies are living creatures. They typify life as that into which this food by conversion enters, and from which it is relegated again in a process where equi-proportioncy governs at every step the possibility of these convertible matters obtaining and maintaining exhibition of themselves. The question then is, how are we to keep on continually expanding together this increasing amount of food supply and that increasing number of bodies at the expense of the remainder convertibles. Unless we can do this, however strictly the line of necessity may seem to be drawn, here in a scheme where conversion is to be thought as obtaining and explaining the process the line of necessity cannot prove that it is drawn amidst convertibles. It can just as easily be drawn amongst other manifestations of substances whose appearances, and disappearances, and linkage in appearance and disappearance, while capable of simulating conversion, are in point of fact in accordance with and an outcome of some process whose progress accomplishes itself with the merest show and not reality of conversion. How do we crib the fact of an expanding and increasing body delaying conversion to an extent which allows an aggrandised body, yet permitting it at the same time to relegate at last these matters out of itself, to the consequent death

then of that body. Life converts matter. But matter converts life. Which then does which?

It seems to me that we crib life as simply exhibited by matters in a state of converting to perform, at the expense of equiproportioncy in the converting, what it is not fair to call upon it to do. How do we grow? How do we expand in a conversionary system? How do we variously delay this living matter in the conversionary scheme to explain any expansion in the province in which life stands of interconvertible matters—the expansion representing these living bodies—representing in short, life itself. How are you going to keep up equiproportioncy in these matters—so much matter of one kind demanding its conversion into so much matter of another, if you are going to delay from time to time the requisite conversions which these matters force upon one another of converting from so much of one kind to so much of another equiproportioncy.

There can be no proof of conversion on such lines. Even the gradual degradation, if it be possible, of the various-kinded matters into but one kind in equiproportioncy would not prove conversion, though it might simulate it at every step; for this degradation could, as we can imagine, be as easily accomplished in some other system, even of immediate integration

and dissipation of the life-modes exhibited as matter in simulation of conversion as it can be accomplished in conversion. It could be accomplished much better because it could supply the features in respect of Time and Increase that conversion cannot.

It is because the line of necessity is so strictly drawn in simulation of conversion that it can never prove that there is conversion. It is just the strict line of necessity that is itself double aspected to exhibit either conversion of these matters as a necessity, or a necessity of these matters being exhibited in some system as if they are conversionary while in point of fact they are not, but are taking their standpoint from the process of that scheme whatever it may be.

We crib life to do an unfair thing. To delay conversion. To delay conversion! But why then needs it converting? What factor enters the field to liberate it to its new faculty of converting, after a time, when it wants or does not want to be converted out of life; to suffer, after a time, the matters to be converted away from it in which alone it exhibits itself as living. Life for a time converts matter; after a time matter converts life, living matter. It is very much a matter of saying matter converts matter.

The question of conversion being or not

being a fact can never be settled by the mere study of chemistry, not from any angle at which we can study the question chemically.

But the line of strict necessity is there. So much food must pass through the shaft through your body if the life we know now is to continue. The only possible difference between the two schemes is this, that while the appearance of so much food and its being brought to undergo a change in some way linked with changes in you is a necessity of the conversionary scheme, a chronic recurring necessity, it is as well a chronic recurring necessity in another scheme that the appearance of so much food and its being brought to undergo a change in some way linked with changes in you should be a symptom in that scheme, but it is only a necessity now and a recurring necessity as upon you has been devolved the prerogative of upcalling these linked changes—changes which, for anything we know, do not demand any such timeous equiproportioncy in the changes as shall prevent you by reason of that higher prerogative acquiring the requisite expansions by these changing manifestations, the modes of life, which shall accord you substantial increase by means of them in the midst of the others as your field of life; changes by virtue of your higher prerogative and in attestation

thereof, which you, you yourself, your life itself, and all life like yours, may have the privilege of outcalling into those inequalities which may in their outcalling be outsummoning the phenomena as if of life delaying conversion at some aspects of its conversionary period, and as if of life, again, exposing amongst such phenomena those of which we can constitute the apparent degradation of various-minded matters into one, or vice versa. But if so, what becomes of your food supply and its former conversionary aspect? It will be an interest now as much as ever it was and a point in practical politics to ensure, with sundry changes, as of the food supply, those others as of the nourished body, but the practice in the politics, we are aware, may be totally different, for we have begun with life; and having begun with life we may be dead sure that we are going to end, in this scheme, in a different way to what we propose to end in the other. We do not live upon bread alone; we live with bread, which is an interest, not more, and we are going to accomplish our progress in respect of these and other interests because the system is not drawn to prevent our doing so, only to maintain our doing so.

As we say, the whole aspect of the field

of life changes over in a coherer standpoint to interest. All these variously aspecting changes in their linkage together are interests. Some of these changes, aspecting as food, are so necessary that without them we know our scheme of life as we know it here is not going to continue the scheme that we do know here. But we have begun with life, and perhaps a more eager study of this question should convince us that we ought to begin with life. For we shall never be in a position if we do begin with life to show that it is not from that prerogative that we are capable to exhibit all those discrepancies as to apparent conversion, apparent violation of equiproportioncy, apparent necessity of degrading many-kinded matters into one or vice versa, which may be flaws in a conversionary system, but which, because they may not be flaws in a system wherein a coherer upcalls its linked aspecting changes, may be compelling our attention to such a system. I do not know but that those changes may delay there to the institution of a real and not an apparent increase without a violation of that system.

Life to science identifies itself with cell. *Omnis cellula e cellula* is its maxim—"Life only from life." This is science's imperfect grasp on the wider truth of Panzooism which

asserts that life itself has produced all the so-called matters of the universe, and about lives only are they produced and upon lives only are they versed or changed.

I say again that just as Leibnitz thought that his monads did not act on one another, but acted with one another in correlated changes, so we may come to perceive that the action of life and of lives together may manifest itself as all these variously aspecting changes manifest themselves because it is doing so, because it, not they, has the doing of it. With it, not them, lies the doing of it. There are some of them its interests; some of them in the dispensation of the divine in which they are outsummoned, its even necessary interests, interests intensified to a degree of necessity in which they enforce, in that dispensation of the divine, the purpose fulfilling itself there, and prevent it from delaying short of that conclusion. There are some of them its pleasures, which a man will wisely tarry with for a while. But in the beginning is the end, and they are not in a position, with whatever aspect as interest they are charged, to do anything but carry out that end.

If we keep on analysing action out by the internal method, even at these critical periods in the field of life, such as food, the map by interest will cover the whole field of life. It

need not disturb us one whit in our pursuit of practical politics. The food supply will be as much a question as ever it was. So much food within the range of what seems (in the portion of the field of consciousness we dedicate as the not self), our vital power will have to correlate with the changes going on in itself so many other correlated changes in the field of vital power we call (in the portion of the field of consciousness wherein it appears), ourselves. The only question that will remain is who supplies the food; whether out of our life is the food supplied, or the other way about. One view is the conversion of food and life; the other is the exhibiting of life by all these changes in the full field of consciousness in its feasibility.

Strange, then, as it may appear, and well-nigh incredible, the only alternative to the conversionary view of food and of life is the scheme of the correlated changes in the field of consciousness—changes which correlate those proceeding in that particular portion of the field of consciousness which is not self, not you, as it is food filling a tube which the exterior, the not you, passes right through you, with those proceeding in the self portion of that field the body as it touches, like interior to exterior, self to not-self, that food; and in this correlation of changes, I have no reason

for supposing that that which is changed in either portion may not be so correlated as to permit in the self-portion of a substantial increase, especially when I remember that the food, when it undergoes the change, is in actual touch with the body, is, in common language, inside the body, and in a position competent to render it accessible to that tune action by place and not-place, or body, we once discussed. But this increase I know to be the despair of a conversionary system, and an almost impossible acquirement in it.

WHY WE DO NOT ALL THINK ALIKE

A LITTLE STUDY IN THE UNCONSCIOUS

It is time we proposed the subject of our essay to ourselves from a different point of view. It is time we took stock of some of the contradictions and exceptions which obtain in certain quarters in our interpretation of the possibility of this system.

Why do not all men think alike? If it is a fact that man so coheres with man that the being of one cannot be without its establishment within certain ranges necessitating similar modes to another why are we not all alike, or much more alike than we appear to be? Why don't we all think alike, and get rid of our individuality in a universal commonness?

One reason is the varied scheme of nature. The trees of the antipodes are different from the trees of the sub-arctic. There are all sorts of climates included in that scheme of nature; there are all sorts of bodies existing in accommodation with those climates; the body accommodated with one, and as we say, suited

to it, being different to another, and actually existing therewith. Whatever may be the ultimate form in which we may come in the end to propose a coherer to ourselves—however and wherever in the field of consciousness such an element as the will betokens itself may reside—whether the will can accomplish its transference amongst the objects which compose, as the veritable Things-in-themselves the scheme of nature—whether it do this by an actual dissolution and dissipation of its immediate body in linkage with the power of establishing with those Things-in-themselves and amongst them an always new and suitable body—whether Ideation, whose home in the body we cannot locate, really does, so to speak, wave one end free in a residence exterior to that body, as it assumes itself, accompanying the will in its migrations, always to an idea of these objects of its body—or whether the coherer, as situated always in a field of consciousness, remains an instrument and instrumental to grasp these Things-in-themselves only, always by means of sensations, both of itself and others, which sensations are yet a means of grasping (as in the colour-varied sensations in different men), with requisite authority and knowledge as to their being the Things-in-themselves, all the Things-in-themselves we

shall ever acquire or need to acquire—whether the will be that incredibly discursive and volatile thing which, with instant quittance of one body, can accomplish on will-action its will - o' - the - wisp-like flittings amongst the Things-in-themselves, in its ever new, instantaneous new attachment of itself to them, with an ideation of them instantly upcalled as it does so—can e-ray itself so to speak—if we be rayant being and beings in a state of rayancy—or whether the “field of consciousness” is more than a phrase, and does bespeak an instrument competent to have upcalled in itself as a field of consciousness that knowledge of the Things-in-themselves which, we suggest, is adequate—all these are points which it is too early to pretend to pass a final decision upon. I have indicated in all these respects an inquiry, rather than conducted one.

But this extreme debateable area apart, the coherer man of the antipodes is not going to think quite the same as the man of the temperate zone just by reason of the fact that in all these different features in his field of consciousness, as by body and as by place, his field of consciousness is bound to be different from mine. Heaven has given to each man his particular in freedom. Here is one of the big reasons why we do not all think alike. Here is one of the reasons why the interests presented

to us by body and place in our separate fields of consciousness, and the practical scheme of politics which we pursue in respect of the same must be different, according as we exist in the antipodes or the arctic.

But coming nearer home, taking the case of the man right alongside me. Why should not he and I think more nearly alike than we do. He should be just about as much my brother Indian as it is possible for a man to be, yet, as I know, he may be about as much unlike me as it is possible for a man to be, who should apparently have, by reason of that proximity itself, common interests, since almost common being, and a scheme of practical politics in respect of those interests induced by those interests themselves into a conformity with mine. He is near enough to me to have common being we suppose. As we sit on the stoop, one smoking, one not, we possess almost in an identical commonness : the same sunshine, the same vistas of sight and sound and touch sensations. Why does not he think alike ?

The answer is that these interests, while present in both of us, are differently accented in each. By which I mean that one man, while similarly sighted with another, and having sight-sensations like those the other has (which sight-sensations are the interests we speak of) may be better or worse sighted. One man, while

he hears similarly with another may hear better or worse ; one smells better or worse ; tastes better or worse than another. Which means that the interests and the inducement to the will which these variously-kindred sensations will present in the different men is different to the point of rendering different the scheme of practical politics which each will pursue in the world by means of them. One man is going to end by being a musician in the world just because he hears better. Another is going to be an epicure just because another class of interest in his field of consciousness is accented in him to a degree and appeals in him to a degree more strongly to have him gratify it, to put it on change, than it does in the other. Here is the beginning of that wide divergence of his practical scheme of politics and of life from mine : here is a reason for such divergence having its inception in that apparently necessitated different accentuation of motive in him and me, which begins here and continues till it reaches the startling phenomenon of colour-variance, or as ordinarily called colour-blindness. In the possibility of such divergence and its apparent always actuality dawns one answer to the question why don't all men think alike? They have no right to that I know of. It is just the opposite : we ought not to think alike.

In this case we rest on a statement that all

men while similarly conscious and having the being that can communise are yet not quite similarly conscious because in this different accentuation of what obtains as interest in each is laid the first foundation for each to be a genius ; genius being always reckoned to be a different thing to anything else. These men are similarly conscious ; but they think differently alike.

But there is a second state of affairs, not so common as the first, whereby it is rendered impossible for all men to think alike. Some men will not think alike with one another because in some of them some of these differently-kindred sensations are actually in a state of eclipse and obscurity in them, rendering it impossible that they should think alike. They can't all think alike because they are not alike conscious ; and cannot be alike conscious.

Some men, as those who have living blind eyes have the whole of the sight-sensations blotted out of their field of consciousness, some are deaf mutes—another suggestion of tune action—and have all of that kind of sensation present in their field of consciousness, if it is present, in a state of living eclipse.

Attention, and the faculty of giving attention to some sensations rather than others is credited with a certain power of relegating into unconsciousness whatever sensations are not being

paid attention to in the field of consciousness. Men on the field of battle have had their attention so absorbed in what is going on to sight around them that they have lost their legs by a cannon ball and not been conscious of it at the time ; all by reason, it is thought, of the power residing in the faculty of attention to apparently vivify to consciousness, or at least to claim to itself in consciousness, whatever sensations it pays attention to, and in doing so, to relegate others to unconsciousness so that, as we pay attention and find it to our interest to pay attention, we are not going to think alike because we are going deliberately to relegate to unconsciousness different portions of our field of consciousness. The Germans have classified, if I remember rightly, nineteen different modes of unconsciousness in mind. This is one of them, the relegation of portions of the field of consciousness into the unconscious to correspond with attention paid to other quarters.

But in the case of the blind eye that lives, for live, by all the marks of life, it does. What about it? These blind eyes apparently exist as cell. They apparently maintain themselves during life with all the phenomena ordinarily attributed to nutrition. They maintain themselves life-long in the rest of the living body with all the manifestations deemed to be the phenomena of conversion. They are cell and

not-cell. They are protoplasm and not-protoplasm, which protoplasm some say is life, though alone, without not-protoplasm, it surely never is. Did you ever know protoplasm alone constitute living matter? Never in the case of a highly developed organism. There is always something more in the case of a highly developed organism, without which protoplasm has never been witnessed or been seen to compose a living body, and that something is waste, the so-called dead matter (perhaps one of these fountains of Panoicism, as we said, in which Life itself as it spouts and ejects matter has the outputting of matter) which must appear with the other, in the case of a highly developed body, to constitute life, laying even in this small beginning in respect of cell and not-cell, protoplasm and not-protoplasm, the peculiar possibility we have so repeatedly urged of tune action, and the residence in the field of consciousness of life in negative, and so far dead forms and negative areas.

And these blind eyes maintain themselves in the body, and are a portion of it, with all the phenomena of cell and not-cell, in which the other departments of those living bodies maintain themselves. They are there persistent throughout life as a portion of those living bodies—a portion of the field of life wherein, for some reason, life is in a peculiar

condition of deadness—a portion of the field of consciousness wherein, for some reason, consciousness cannot come into its own. Nor do I know of any other reason why they should so exist, or consciousness in respect of them be unable to come into its own, unless, as is my privilege as a philosopher, I speculate, as I will attempt to suggest better later on, that it is because our fields of consciousness are part of the trains of God's thought which it is our privilege as a coherer each to suspect; each of our fields of consciousness representing and being that much of God's thought, which we each of us individually engage, distributed as it were by these similar modes amongst men, in which they become, in respect of one another and as a scheme of nature, coherers. It is because our fields of consciousness are of that thought our individual engagement and susception that some of us cannot (in these unconscious areas) not even with attention kindle them to the vivified consciousness, or gathers them in in the vivid consciousness that bespeaks itself a consequence of attention paid in the other portions. For if God's thinking betoken itself in a process of a betterment, submitting itself in these modes and by means of them as interest to our susception, as it moves with his attention payable, and now paid, now here, now there, to the modes of which that

interest-plan is being composed and evolved, with full security of whatever remainder is relegated therein as his temporary unconscious, so it may come about that as some of us meet not with this his immediate attention, and carry in consequence, yet in full security, these unconscious portions suscepled in our field, even as He carries them secure in Him, these portions are in as much security present therein, and suscepled, though we cannot kindle with attention them, as are present in my field in full security unconscioused portions, when to the rest wherein I meet God's attention, paying attention, I meet with the proper element upon which and within the range of which attention kindles to a consciousness or claims consciousness in the sensations it attends to.

But this speculation apart, the thought will suggest itself—What if these portions in the field of consciousness (otherly conscious in that field as they may be) are carried in coherence with the living bodies around them? The insulation that gives them a certain lasting unconsciousness being only accomplished, as I say, upon the fact that any element of attention cannot intrude through the medium of God's attention, into which I have to pay it, into my neighbour's field, to which God may not be paying as similar attention,

and consequently cannot enkindle it. What if all the ordinary incidence of change displaying itself there is the ordinary incidence of change which the coherence of one coherer with another will establish, viewed as the scheme of nature? What if all the ordinary incidence of change which manifests itself there is but the ordinary incidence of change which the change of one coherer must pass upon another to the enforcement in change of the other? In a word, what if the so-called living dead man's portion of unconsciousness in his remainder field of consciousness is precisely that bunch of similar sensations in him (in our immediate and not matter-converted estate of life and knowledge) which, when, I have mine, I must cause him to have, and must maintain, linked with mine, in him having it. He is dead so far, yet he lives.

This would be a startling extension of the coherer range. Yet it may be that it is the living coherer holds (in that so far dead neighbour) it to life and to all the incidence in life that we cannot but think to be in some way a manifestation of its life.

He may be, then, much like me, that man dead in parts alongside me. Yet he will never know it as I know it who have the use of my eyes. He will be interested in the same way that I am interested; yet he will

not. He at least, as far as these obscured sensations are a part of thought, will not think alike, nor can I flog him into doing so.

And if the eye, the nose, the ears and other portions that we call sensory are capable of being present in the field of life and in the field of consciousness, yet without offering actual interest therein by virtue of consciousness within their possessors' field of consciousness, what limit are we to put to the extension of this fact? If the sensations or some of them can be and yet be in the obscurity of unconsciousness in my brother Indian what is to prevent some of the emotions from being able to be in a similar mode of unconsciousness? We talk of lunacy. For anything I know, some lunacies may consist in the fact that some of the emotions, as well as some of the sensations, are similarly eclipsed and are present in the lunatic's field of consciousness in a state of unconsciousness. The lunatic may have more of these unconscious patches present in his field of consciousness, more of these living dead patches present in his body than is with the rest of us fortunately the case. This may be the greater part of his misfortune, but should these unconscious patches ever kindle—and we begin with life in our scheme, be it remembered, and can propose no end to whatever life has produced except as life itself shall fulfil

itself in respect of them—he may be the future statesman and poet and orator of Heaven. The lunatic who eats sticks and stones may be acting for anything I know with perfect propriety in the field of interest permitted to him and possible to him. Yea, for anything I know, he may as much hold me to life as I him, the dead coherer being present in instantaneity of action with the living, for he (though blind) may fire a gun, or light another historic candle, the flash of which he will never see, though I may; while he and I may be alike conscious of the noise, which, in the scheme we propose is only possible as he upraises these modes of hearing as by body and as by place in his field of consciousness in tune action; for as far as tune action is concerned it might be said that there exists no lunacy—not even a lunatic can act irrationally, though the interest present to him as compared to mine may cause him to seem and to be irrational as compared with me. But he and I will not think alike.

If anyone then considers that it is an unanswerable objection against him being coherers and possessing common or communised and communiseable being to say, “Yes, but if so why don’t we all think alike?” let him first consider the possibility of all these objections against his own objection recoiling on himself. It may be a sufficient answer against our being

coherers to say that we don't all think alike, but it will not be so till after we have decided that to a far greater degree than we imagine we are not always carrying on the business of life, alike in the conscious and unconscious parts of our fields of consciousness, and carrying them on further in relation of these fields with one another. For then it is no proof for or against our being coherers that we should all be conscious alike. These unconscious portions present in some of our individual fields do not defeat the fact that where we are conscious, in the other portions, we think just as much similarly alike as we can alone hope and expect to in such a system which rests in its bottom modes on the approximation together in different fields of consciousness of the dissimilarly similar—dissimilar enough to be in the main indicative towards a coherer standpoint; similar enough to be the one guarantee to men of a common humanity and of their living along with one another in a consonance of Reason.

There are one or two other considerations, in themselves neither making for or against our being coherers, which are worthy of a moment's consideration when we are discussing why men do not think alike.

One of these is the rapid degrading which we witness in the case of the senses, of the ability of Ideation to divide sharply and clearly

between the self and the not self. Take the case of the sight-sensations, the most numerous perhaps of all the sensations having place in the field of consciousness. I am never in doubt, nobody ever is, as to the definiteness with which I accept some of these sensations in my field of consciousness as not me, others as me. Then there is the case of hearing and the hearing sensations. Here, again, I accomplish with readiness in my ideating of these modes as present in my field of consciousness a distinction of them into me and not me. I know the voice of another instantly, however like my own it may be. I define it instantly as the voice of another and not me, not mine. But in this class of sensations, the differentiated sensations, I think I am right in saying, are not so numerous in my field of consciousness as in the case of Sight-sensations; there are not as many voices as sights. And when it comes to Touch, the degrading process is in full process of accomplishment. I touch another and know it not me. I touch myself and am convinced of its Me-ness. But in the case of the first I have to reason it is one of my sensations, and if another touches me mine is my sensation, whether or not I go on to reason that his also is some sensation allied thereon. Taste and Taste-sensations occupy but a small portion of our fields of conscious-

ness and comparatively rarely do we attempt or need to define whether the taste-sensations which I have are me or not me. They can only interest me in one way as they are tastes, while I am often as profoundly interested by the sight-sensations in which I merely exist as watching others and the not me-ness of which Ideation instantaneously imparts to me as I should if these Sight-sensations were of myself in a state of bodily activity following some pursuit or pastime in the world.

But when we come to the emotions, which in the differentiation of the field of consciousness under Ideation may be a kind of sensation, (not sensation only as sensation is ideated there) I lose at once any ability to grasp in them immediately the me and the not me. I am not able to realise a distinction in them of me and not me. At the most I can only believe that hope, fear, grief and joy and the other emotions are produced in me and are put to change in me sometimes through the will-action or the unconsidered action of another rather than of myself, who also can act to excite and induce changes in my emotion states. But as for defining with the same instantaneity of decision what action of mine will be accompanied with what changes of emotive states in others with the same readiness with which I know that if I explode a gun I am going to

give another man besides myself the sight-sensation thereof, I cannot do it. The man who gets a black eye is going to get it with certain emotive accompaniments either of shame or pride or anger or annoyance which are not necessarily going to produce themselves in me, even when I have the sight-sensation of that black eye in the field of my consciousness as an interest to me in not me and the not me portion of my consciousness, because I rely differently upon my own emotions, any such a black eye as he may so give me only as an interest but not me in my field of consciousness—truly true as it may be that that black eye is as much mine as his. We cannot follow out any scheme of emotive action or action immediately distributed through the emotions with anything like the clearness with which we can follow out the instant effects of action in distributing to consciousness amongst men in their separate fields of consciousness sight and other sensations. Yet there are times when something like an immediate explosion of action by means directly of the emotions seems to be ponderable. When as fine a body of soldiers as the world has seen, the celebrated Light Division of the Peninsular Campaign, can be thrown into an instant ungovernable panic; in such panic routs, which have occurred several times in history, we

seem to have something like an instantaneous propagation of emotive coherence. There is something comparable to an explosion of emotive action amongst men linked in emotive coherence in such instances as these few, rare in history though they be ; and there are periods in the histories of the churches when something like an explosion of moral action has also been witnessed. But it is hard to define these cases ; it is impossible to say that they were explosions of moral action or emotive action amongst men linkable in emotive coherence. Only, if the field of consciousness begins in one portion to show symptoms of coherence we know uniformity of process must in the end obtain throughout the whole field ; and the instances we have in altogether general terms suggested may indicate that extension, though by themselves they could never prove it.

Again the not me interest in the field of consciousness, if I be a physician, or be making my living as a professional man, may be more interesting, such is the love of science, than the interests that stand to me in my field of consciousness as me, and if any emotive changes accrue to me as a consequence of performing an unheard of feat, curatively as a physician, surgically as a surgeon, it will be men who apply emotion similarly (on their ideal) who will give indication of emotive coherence. If

there be a propogation of that emotion direct, it will be, as we believe, only as a body of skilful surgeons around the operating table, or of skilled physicians around the sick bed are brought together in an alliance of professional interest which renders them attainable to such emotions. Among soldiers, and especially the best soldiers, a panic may spread easily. Amongst a crowd composed of some soldiers, some bakers, and some mechanics in a similar position, we doubt if it would as instantaneously spread as it has been known to do amongst *corps d'elite*, because the dominant purpose in each upon which and to the attainment of which they allied their emotions might be an issue confusing to the possibility of such an immediate propogation. The better the soldiers and then the more, and the better the consequent panic. The better the physicians, and then the more of them and the better the immediate propogation of similar emotive states amongst them when witnessing some hitherto unexampled feat of curative effort which, as we say, does not disprove the possibility of such direct coherence amongst the emotions. It only shows us that the matter has here reached a stage which it is almost impossible (certainly in this first rough draft of so huge a speculation) to give distinctive utterance to, because men out of the fields of sensations present in

their fields of consciousness are going to make of some of them their predominant interests as they follow a career and pursue a profession in respect of them. They are going to ally their emotions on the ideal they set up while pursuing their profession, which ideal seems, as we say, to cause some check in the direct coherence of emotionality amongst them (or, all the emotions being present in each, they accentuate them differently in the same way that, all the sensations being present, they will "attention" towards them differently—so seeming in both maps to have entirely different minds) a soldier being likelier and better able to affect a soldier, a statesman a statesman, and so on. A spendthrift with his foolish extravagance may affect a usurer quite in a different way to what he intended to, or to what he affected himself, which, mind you, does not prevent their emotive states as to the magnificence of the expenditure, let us say, being the same, and by coherence in each ; it only means that the usurer may apply, from the point of view which he has endeared to himself and made his ideal as a practical politician, other states which he allows predominance to in the case of a certain transaction—such emotive states not being as favourable to the spendthrift as those he would allow himself to apply to himself on the same transaction.

The complexity of the problem almost removes it from expression. Ideation has lost, as we say, in the case of the emotions, its power of denoting in my emotions a me and a not me and perhaps with it we have lost all power of distinguishing in the case of the emotions the symptomatics of coherers, and yet a suspicion must arise in us in the case of the instantaneous panics amongst soldiers and in the instances of intense religious excitement in churches, where in each case individuals are closely compacted together, that there may be direct coherence of the emotions.

Besides this, the ideal which men pursue as world-practitioners, renders different the application of emotion thereon, according as their ideals differ. It does not, however, disprove emotive coherence. It would be an interesting point to have solved in psychology and philosophy, whether the emotions are present in the field of consciousness in the same form and substance as they would be if they could be ideated into a me and a not-me, one end, that is to say, composed positively and one negatively in the same way that that black eye which one man has, though he cannot see it with his own unaided eye, is present in him and between him and another, as it ranges from an apparent actuality in him, or what ideation ideates as actuality in him, to a mere

sensation, or what ideation ideates as such as it intrudes by its other end in my field of consciousness as a merely ordinarily conceived not-me interest and sensation only there. That all men have in the main similar emotions in their fields of consciousness is demanded if they are to live as they do live in a Consonance of Reason together. That these emotions are capable of being excited in them through the action of others as they thwart or contribute to the realisation of the ideal which each man proposes to himself of that portion of his interests that he makes his world of as allied upon his emotions—with all the criss-cross that ensues in his realisations of his emotions, and the interests he allies them on as he now self excites those emotions to the attainment of his ideal (such self exciting or not by self exciting being the only glimpse we have of ideation here), and as they now again are excited to the defeating or helping of that ideal—that state of perpetual criss-cross is a hard one to explain. But the final word seems to be that it is no necessity for our being coherers that we should all think alike. It is the other way about ; we are not any of us called upon to think quite alike.

THE QUESTION OF ORIGIN

PANTHEISM OR PANENTHEISM

Nor can we fail to perceive that an establishment of the mind as exposed in the fields of consciousness of different men on a coherer basis is going to inform, with a vast amount of new suggestions, the question of the beginning and the end which those minds are going to propose to themselves. It is going to rework with a new searchlight the question of origin. It is going to display in a different aspect all the questionings of teleology or of the end.

Why should it do so? Because we have cut conversion and all that conversion stands for, at least speculatively out of the problem. We have cut conversion out of our question as to the beginning of life; we have cut conversion out as an end or a means of attaining an end. Nothing, not even these fields of consciousness, can have begun in conversion, and they are not carrying on their operations now, or going to be brought to an end in con-

version. If it be true that not even a cannibal can, conversionarily, eat a cannibal, but that the changes as of the one eaten, one eating, are proceeding as these lives, not begun in conversion together, proceed in their only correlated changes, then I say for those lives, whose version we so regard as they so proceed, we can anticipate something further in the way of change than we dared to anticipate or could hope to anticipate if they had proceeded conversionarily to eat one another, and in conversion were their end. No man need be ashamed to be eaten in the new view.

Do not let us hesitate to be bold to the right degree in our conclusions. We have begun with life, we said. Science in the conversionary scheme begins with protoplasm. All her digging and dissecting brings down life at last to protoplasm, the living matter of a living cell, and there is no continuation of life save as Science's rule in Science's language obtains—*omnis cellula e cellula*, only life from life, only cell from cell, only protoplasm from protoplasm. But if conversion is cut out here, what follows? What vast field of suggestion lies before us? Panzooism, we think—human life from the divine, from human life under the version of the divine protoplasm and not protoplasm cell and not cell, all the substances and matter that now make the cosmos up,

originated. Science opens the door to this in *omnis cellula e cellula*, and says it cannot close that door. This is the view we see through the door.

Omnis cellula e cellula. This life of Science's cannot be obtained from non-living matter in any world, animal or vegetable. So far Science has to begin with life that exhibits itself as cell, and goes on to have accomplished, just as it exhibits itself, all those new exhibitions of itself as all the cells which have been and are since the world began. How came such life, as a question of origin? Till Science does close the door the only answer can be her own, from life, and vested with what prerogatives of making exhibition of itself as living, immediate as matter, mind, cell, protoplasm and consciousness, ever the more profound the view the more true as long as the door does remain open and enables us to gaze on this huge vista beyond.

We cannot help seeing that the world scheme, as made up of all these cells that are and have been as they were exhibited by all the possessors of them and inhabitants of them that are or have been proposes itself differently in a non-conversionary point of view to what it must in a conversionary. In a conversionary the world-scheme was not; then it was, and when it was, these lives, in cells exhibited,

lived as converting one another. The power that could so cause the world-scheme to come into being did ; but life at once lost track of its origin therein in that scheme because it was confined in that scheme to relations proceeding only therein in conversion. In the other it is not for any so known reason confined. Has it ever lost track, through its origin, of its originator? Can it ever lose track in its origin and subsequent maintenance of its origin for, proceeding thus, that maintenance may now be as directly with its maintainer as in the day life first started? Need it ever lose track in its origin of its originator, its maintenance now proposing itself as directly between its originator and itself a question and a matter of every-day occurrence, as, in the other conversionary scheme, it proposed itself only a matter of every-day relation conversionarily with the other parts of the scheme once created to be maintained with conversion of parts?

Of a surety, we do not know how to lose track in our origin of our originator once we decide that we are not under the necessity of losing track of Him in a scheme removing us by conversion from Him. If we are persons—and if what we *must* believe, as agnostics like Herbert Spencer would say, *must* be the truth—if we are persons, and if, because I must believe I am a person I am one—then all I

can say is that I cannot have lost track, by becoming any kind of a person, of that originator who caused my life and other lives to come into being not through conversionary channels. I cannot propose my origin as a person in this scheme, where all lives come into being from their originator, and not through any scheme of conversion removing them (after the first life was made) from their originator, without seeing that as I am a person I have lost philosophically my last chance of denying an originator who can be as personal to me as the very demands exhibited in my being whatever person I am demand. It is true that a coherer scheme, if we have imagined it rightly, is going to stand and must stand for a personal God, an originator who cannot possibly be less personal to me than I am personal to myself, than the exhibition made of myself as myself in which He has brought me into the relation to and maintenance with Him, which constitutes my daily scheme of the life I now live in this scheme not conversionary. Remember that conversion has a bad effect upon God; removes Him from immediate approachability except by one, Adam. After Adam, you have a scheme of nature instead of a God; in the other system you have a God; and only as it is within Him, a scheme of nature. But if you are not coming out of

nothingness by conversion you are not going to come out of whatever originative source you do come out of in a scheme between your originator and yourself not conversionary without having in the end to allow that that power that was able to produce all these lives and to maintain all these lives not upon a conversionary basis with one another is literally able to be personal to them to the precise degree in which their establishment by Him with Him exhibits itself personal. He who has to maintain the personal not through conversion is just about as personally accessible as the most devout person can desire, and by personally accessible what can we mean but personal—for if he were not, as there would be a gap between our originator and ourselves, what power could have anything to do with the origin of ourselves but ourselves—a position repugnant to all thinking men.

This is going to be one great suggestion gained and clarified by us if we view our establishment as lives as beginning and being maintained on a coherer basis—I mean the personality of God. None think they could create themselves; none think they can maintain themselves: they certainly never used to think so. They demanded a scheme of nature to convert them into and out of life. But if life is not so in a conversionary scheme of cell

from cell, and an earthly life from an earthly life (barring the first few lives) by life itself from an originator removed, I am face to face as life, whatever life, with the living power that could bring forth whatever life I now as living live, and that could bring it forth in life to be only such kind of life as could realise its most intimate hopes and yearnings for its fullest, furthest and best realisation. Such a life could be brought forth not to end here; could be brought forth to be what kind it is here only as it is the particular kind that necessitates fulfilment, for in the degree of our impotency is indisputably the standard of that Omnipotency. I am face to face with a living and personal Creator; and, furthermore, in a coherer system, I do not know of any possibility of escaping from such a pronouncement.

I am aware of the distaste which reverend minds of many different schools of thought entertain for anything that savours of violent suggestion on such a question as that of origin. Men have set up authorities to which they look for the discussion and settlement of such questions, and those authorities are not all alike. The authority to which the Scientist turns, and the authority to which the religionary turns are different, and they have, with the use which they have made of their different authorities, come to different con-

clusions—conclusions which are well known and displayed in the history of thought.

With as little offence then as may be let us do our best, on the oldest authority of all, the necessity of thinking, to see if we cannot in some measure reconcile those different authorities in some of the pronouncements which they have variously made.

Conversion, we said, has a bad effect upon God. A certain number of lives began in a conversionary scheme when the world of life began, or one did. But however they began—for they have never been known since to begin out of non-living matter—as they increased together they became a conversionary scheme of nature, and the longer that scheme of nature, as made up of that increasing number of conversionaries, has continued, the further we get away from God. The primal sons of God become demigods on earth and lastly merely human—the golden age, the Saturnian realms emerge into the mundane—in short, the longer that scheme of nature, as made up of that increasing number of conversionaries has continued the further we get away from God the starter of that scheme, the more deeply impacted we have gotten to be in such a scheme of nature, and all its accumulated past and present changed and unchanged laws, those laws typifying nothing but the way all those

things have gone on acting on one another. Some Scientists have given up the task of getting beyond this corporation of laws. They have ended by having in them and in all things that display them a scheme of nature, but nothing more. And they must continue to stop there, and we with them, if we cannot in some way find our way out. We stop in a scheme of nature, in what position set in respect to its maker, we know not. The nameless name of nature, some automatic nonentity dimly believed in pervades all, as with clouds and ever-during dark.

But it is in the other scheme where the only scheme we have is as all the coherers that are and that have been also compose what we can call a scheme of nature that we do attain the possibility of finding such a way out, the possibility of reopening all the avenues deemed closed, and of walking in them to further conclusions. If all these coherers that were, and that are, did not begin as cell from cell, life from earthly life, protoplasm from protoplasm, as they did and do in a conversionary scheme but are only to be begun as the life exhibiting itself as them and maintained as them with those constant features of its beginning and maintaining was begun and is begun, was maintained and is being maintained at all points by and with that constant originator who can produce them and

allow of their on-carrying as under such constant modulation by Him—then I say that having begun with life and with the living relater, maintainer and modulator of it and its on-carry, not hidden away from us by conversion, not lost in an Adam, we have turned one corner that the scientist in his conversionary scheme of nature can never turn. We have in all these bodies that were and that are—we have in them a scheme of nature, as their relations with one another constitute such a scheme, as they rightly do; we have a scheme of nature, but we have something more: we have that within which this scheme of nature is set. We have the living power able to modulate our lives with Him and only as those lives may rightly through Him exhibit relations with one another, as they will—have we a scheme of nature. We have a scheme of nature set where it ought to be set in the constant originator, maintainer and modulator of it. We have turned the corner to Panentheism, which means All-in-God. And we have done this as it is our duty to attempt to explain when we treat of the will, without falling into Pantheism which means all-God. Only as there is Panentheism is there Pantheism—but in some other philosophies there is Pantheism without Panentheism. At least we have disclosed the possibility of turning that corner.

We can bring back a special providence to every point of life, to every jot and tittle of that nature which is this world scheme.

Strictly speaking, a conversionary scheme is neither Pantheism nor Panentheism. It stops as a scheme of nature, and the science that limits itself thereto stops with it. It is right in doing so as a matter of practical politics, or if it has never surveyed or refuses as wrongly thought out, the other alternative. But stopping there it stops with a scheme of nature and ponders for its beginning that *impasse* that impossibility, as it deems it, of getting at the back of the first few lives, vegetable or animal with which that scheme began though they on-carried afterwards as cell from cell. But these impasses as we know are the open doors to further thought.

On the other hand the religious, or to speak more definitely Christianity, if it were to propose a philosophical scheme of nature would apparently be right in producing, if it stands by its tenets, and if we interpret its tenets rightly, a panentheistic scheme of nature, for it is a tenet of Christianity that in Him we live and move and have our being. But Christianity has never yet produced a panentheistic philosopher, partly because it must be fairly charged against it that the authority on which it seeks to rest does not seek to avail itself of philosophy

and does not demand nor favour discussions of this nature from a philosophical standpoint, which is a pity.

And the philosophers as a class have not yet produced anything like a full-dress panentheistic scheme, because while leading many of them up to it from many avenues of thought some main conception was wanting (there were not yet prepared by science sufficient impasses nor that knowledge of their interlocking) to enable them to break up completely the great conversionary scheme of nature and give them a chance to do so. A German Krause has advocated the term. He coined the word panentheism, and must have had something in his mind to the point. But he was obscure, they say, even to his countrymen. Leibnitz had a scheme which was a kind of Panentheism. His monads were everywhere all, he called it, "fulgurated" by God and must have been maintained to Leibnitz's thinking in some way at all points in fulguration and been changed in some analogous manner. But his system needs modernising and reviewing and further fitting out to make it plain how near Panentheism he was. Leibnitz himself ranks as one of the most remarkable of all the philosophers. He is a star removed in originality from all others ; peculiar in his glory, and, oh readers, he died the death of a star—alone. If he could have lived after the

galaxy of German idealists his might have been a scheme of Panentheism that would have reconciled science and Christianity, and that would have incorporated all the idealist's work. Or had they been more certain and imperative in their demand to break up science's conversionary scheme of nature they might have included his scheme and evolved a way out from the Pantheism, in which they nearly all ended, to Panentheism. They might have found a Pantheism only as there was Panentheism and seen, as we begin to see it, a scheme of coherers—Leibnitz's monads—at all points conducting their lives between themselves and God, and only as they do, composing of what relations they display towards one another a scheme of nature. As it is the subject has never been properly clarified by Philosophy, though over and over again philosophers have culminated in Pantheism to the abolition of all individuality in God.

How then do we propose to proceed to this attainment of achieving Panentheism out of Pantheism?

By the use, it will be found, of the immediate. We rest on immediacy, and that is going to give us a scheme of immediate lives, in the everywhere immediacy of God immediately attained and maintained, which God, unremoved by conversion, dealing

directly with them, permits as a scheme of nature to exist only as those lives in the relations which they exhibit of their havings with one another exhibit such a scheme of nature and cause it to be ; only as in Him that scheme of nature also resolves itself, since in Him it is alone constituted and has whatever constitution it has ; since it is alone out of His parts the scheme of nature composes itself.

LAW THAT DEFEATS ITSELF

LEGALITY—DIALYSITY

WE begin with immediacy. Those who begin with immediacy recognise that God can have proceeded to the establishment of the world in a manner more direct than a conversionary one. They not only perceive that He can, they are actually forced to believe that He must have proceeded to the foundation of the world in a manner more direct than a conversionary one. If the world was ever brought to a beginning at all, and still more notably if ever out of the world scheme some law as once sustentative of parts therein has been abolished and laid aside with the parts in favour of other law as now sustentative of the newer parts, if there be in that world newer parts now law-sustained which evince a betterment in that scheme precisely as the older and worse parts with their law have been abrogated and abolished, then is there in truth always a continually constant beginning of the world scheme in respect of those parts

and their enharmonisation with the former and the possible to come; and this constant beginning, if we lay our foundation in immediacy is a continual constant challenge upon that Living Power in its immediacy. Since upon a Power not abrepted from us by our lives as founded in immediacy.

What may this immediacy mean? What are some of the suggestions that force themselves upon us if we lay the foundation in immediacy of all this beginning by parts of the world scheme.

We have looked at this suggestion before. We claimed that the fields of consciousness might be immediate and might know no conversion from matter as they exist, to make up with others a world; and consequently might be founded in immediacy from that Power related to them by immediacy, so as to prevent matter either being that power, or blocking their lives in their relation thereto.

And this thought is not without corollaries, some of them of an immense range of suggestiveness. Immediate life in the field of consciousness can be acceptably viewed as immediate Thought, for it is not by conversions that we proceed to attain to distinctions of it as Thought, which may be but ideated. Immediate life in the field of consciousness can be acceptably viewed as immediate Thought,

since we begin the fields of consciousness with Thought in all its various differentiations under Ideation for the only life we know and the life found in immediacy, with the corollary, therefore again that the Living Power who caused the world scheme to arise and who continually causes it by its newer parts as made up of those fields of consciousness so only immediate to arise is by an effort in making immediate to us as we know it this Thought causing the world to arise and to exist for us. What that effort involved to Him was that from being without that proper kind of Thought about us that involves us he became with that kind which so did involve us. And this in an immediacy not conversionary.

Why should such a scheme as Christian Science begin with such a tenet as this that "All is Thought?" Because very imperfectly they recognize what philosophers over and over again have recognized, that if we begin with immediacy we can begin with nothing that is in any way less immediate and instant to us than our own field of consciousness. I have no personal use for the system calling itself Christian Science, because as I see the matter, beginning with what is in the highest degree philosophically true, they proceed to abolish all the varieties and species of Thought which they find present in their fields of consciousness into

but some one kind, and permit themselves, to my thinking, absolutely incredible feats in the way of letting this some one kind suspend the others at will, *e.g.*, in the case of the sensations, which are just as much Thought as any other portion, they absolutely cut out, if I understand them rightly, anything like the right or the power of action to be distributed thereby (though all is Thought) to the reconstitution of Thought. To me, if a man by sight and by feeling and by all his other sensations knows a broken limb, it is to my mind an inconsequence against that theory itself that all is Thought, not to take the proper action through the sensations that are Thought for the proper recovery of those parts; for a proper recovery in fact of Thought, and for a proper Christian Science victory of Thought achievement over Thought. All is Thought and there is no more reason why lying on our backs should be any more Thought than the proper curative action of a surgeon exerted in Thought—exerted in the sensations themselves which are Thought to the recovery of Thought. The action of the surgeon in respect of that immediacy, the broken limb is as much an exercise in thought, I would think, and an effort of Thought rightly asserted in Thought as the Christian Scientists would apparently claim lying on their backs to cure a cancer

would be the effort of Thought required to deal with that. I believe that all is Thought, but with these people, in spite of their words, all is not thought. I have no use for this kind of thinking which has made a system of crudities by not recognising that if all is Thought even curative action can be viewed as the proper ultimacy of that system itself since it is Thought proceeding in action over Thought to a Thought-cure. But like many another crudity this system is based on the highest possibility we have in Philosophy: that if conversion cracks, the immediacy in which we are founded, if we are right in calling all the field of consciousness Thought, literally distributes as Thought itself our action-appeals to the abrogator of laws therein, literally puts us in relation as Thought itself with our Maker, because it only, of other kinds that may have been possible, fulfils the necessity of its being founded in that immediacy of non-conversion.

Take another idea, lately exploited to considerable purpose by the academic theologian and with all that pedagogic propriety which one would expect in token of its origin. I mean the idea which the theologians have been discussing of the Immanence of God. They mean the presence of God in some way in the world as exhibited to us in our fields of consciousness, as our total fields of consciousness

upgather all together that world scheme. They mean this immediacy there, and the world-scheme's dirigibility in some way by God in presentness of ability to do so. This is a fine thought, but, no less than the other, it has come into being because its authors, knowingly or not, have been cutting conversion out of their map ; and have begun with immediacy. But if you asked one of these theologians "Then do you mean that just as I am a coherer, and just as one of my sensation-modes in my field of consciousness cannot alter without affecting to similarity in immediacy my neighbours, so God's own modes of thought (as exposing what effort he made when he put Himself by this thought in immediacy of relation with us) when he founded us in immediacy cannot alter in respect of any of us as now coherers without affecting us to similarity : is that how you would manufacture and equip and maintain and instrumentalise the Immanence of God?" he would not be able to answer because fine as his idea of the Immanence of God is, profoundly as it has given him as a reverent man a certain satisfaction, his knowledge of how to instrumentalise this Immanence is nil ; he has not that wide knowledge of the relation of parts whereby he can alone perceive how in relation to all the rest of thought he has come into attainment of that view. He has caught a

glimpse through the valley gates of a wide prospect, but he has not seen all. He has not sighted how behind the gates that vista lies in relation to the rest. It is for Philosophy still to sit like a Pindaric eagle in the uttermost eyries of thought and to survey all the sun-bleached summits and rain-swept lows, to trace every lambent lake and trickling stream.

These movements in modern thought however show us that the leaven of immediacy is working in many men's minds.

If there be any meaning, then, in cutting conversion out of the question of origin it means that of all the kinds of life that were possible to found me into the life I now live as an immediacy that particular kind was chosen and I am now in exposition of that particular kind and no other as having been chosen that did retain in its origination and that does concentrate in itself all the values attachable to it as an immediacy to put me into relation and to keep me in relation with the living nonconversionary power the maker of this life. What is in truth to prevent my thinking that as lives like mine are also exposed alongside me in coherer relation with me—what is to prevent my thinking that the God who could found these coherers to be as a scheme of nature together as they expose in their havings of themselves against one another the havings

they all have of Him.—What is to prevent my thinking that he could Himself be that coherer presented everywhere by all these modes, whose virtue and prerogative as parts it is to expose what He Himself can be? Too often we think only the life we have now was possible: too often we think only the Thought we have now was possible. There may have been 50 kinds of Thought possible yet only this one chosen because by its parts we could learn to know Him. I do not want to force suggestion on this most tremendous problem. I want to let suggestion flow as naturally as possible from our minds. But we must attach some particular value to immediacy to betoken in respect of what we consider ourselves to have got rid in that immediacy of the conversionary incubus that has so long been present in our minds. And what is to be that value?

I say again that if I am to mean anything by getting rid of conversion and anything by substituting immediacy for conversion I must do as we say we always have to do, I must present the thought in the values of what is not (in active disknowing) to be thought; I must mean that a particular value attaches to the life I have now as being the one that does conclusively get rid of conversion and all concomitances. I surely must mean that I am brought nearer by life itself—out of fifty possible

immediacies the one chosen—by thought itself, out of fifty possible kinds of Thought the one chosen—to a living author of the particular kind of thought I live. I am brought by this life and no other nearer, nor can I attach in activity of disknowing any other value to the abolition of conversion except this. I am brought by this Thought and no other nearer. And by the toe of Hercules declare his stature. If all these fields of consciousness be coherers and be all together composing the world scheme that once was not and that even now proceeds with erasion of parts and birth of new parts, what must I think but that it was within the competency of their author to come into such manner of His promulgation abroad? What is to prevent my thinking that when He was without the world scheme He was without this manner of His Thought, but when he promulgated that scheme and in immediacy, it was of fifty other possible kind of thoughts that he mannered this one only to be my Thought and my Life because it was the one mannered one whereby I must know Him, and because it was the one mannered one, when being a coherer he became with us wherein He is in right efficiency promulgated and known to be present with us? What is it to stop my thinking that it is the one mannered one whose right efficiency it is to allow us to do nothing but

know Him? What is to prevent my thinking that this kind of Thought and Life in its other ideation as Thought is the only kind we suspect in our fields of consciousness as we go in it that journey of the will in change that is to land us elsewhere because it is the only kind of Thought, the one mannered one that would land us elsewhere. So might I understand how our Thought rolls with God as one coherer with another.

Words are weak surely. The pen is sometimes harder to handle than the sword. But to add what little confirmation we can to this speculation let us consider, objectively and subjectively, the progress we do as will seem to accomplish in the interest submitted to us as this kind of Thought and this kind of life. Let us consider if the will has changed the world scheme or parts of it.

Look at this world scheme from an objective point of view. Every part of it held in its place by law. Every part sustained as it was a part by the law sustaining it. Yet some parts have been cut out and passed out of the scheme by, we think, the will of man.

We have to think that nature, though it was that scheme itself, issued these laws and enforced them only as its enforcement of them was a temporary enforcement at the same time of the abrogation of what particular laws, when

the excision of parts has happened have had the enforcement of their abrogation abrogated. Nature did this!

But supposing it did. Nature's law is not what we have customarily regarded it as being. These laws have two strands in their cord. One enforces, to secure displaceable parts, as there is enforcement more or less temporary to prevent abrogation and so secure for the time being in its place the thing that can be abrogated; one abrogates as its enforcement enforces to secure abrogation. They are a most peculiar element, these laws, to be so secured that they can stomach and stand to be the law that defeats itself. They are legalities-dialysities. As our positive speech at all times is accompanied with the silent activity of dis-knowing and is completed thereby, and only so delivers itself on the air so is this loud law accompanied with this unregarded abrogability. And in all the scheme in nature everything in which is produced by law (Science says) and governed thereby, and constituted thereby, and maintained thereby, there yet evolves for the long history of evolution which the scientists have depicted a movement which can be nothing if not a movement in this higher element of Legality-dialysity—law defeating and capable to defeat itself. I do not know what others might call this higher element.

It certainly suggests a Law-giver, even in a conversionary scheme, if in that scheme has been a movement in the world scheme to betterment accomplished with erasion of parts and substitution of the new that admitted betterment.

But regard this same process from a subjective point of view, limit it to just those fields of consciousness whereof, in our subjective point of view, this world scheme is equally capable, as a number of coherers to be composed. Who will say that the will, choosing amongst those portions of its field of consciousness which are interests, has not accomplished all that erasion of parts for institution of new, whose appearance as new is continually presenting itself to us there for no other discoverable reason perhaps than that choosing for better the will deserved the newly better—who will say that the will has not requested in some way and secured all the movement to better, which as the long history of evolutionary betterment we shall equally find in this view presenting itself to us as the bettering of the world scheme. But a will do this in immediacy of relation to nature when it and all the parts amongst which it moves supposedly compose that nature! Not now, for we may think better. We know now where nature may be set; a Panentheism in Pantheism, a panentheistic scheme in a pantheistic; and

we know consequently with whom the will may be working and in what higher element to ensure in that higher element, which we style Legality-Dialysity, that movement.

THE WORLD MARCH OF THE WILL

WILL FREE OR NOT AT ALL

However it be that the will be present in the fields of consciousness (it is present and able to be present on the prime supposition that in a coined expression God will not be *en coherer* nor his will, without necessitating, for Him to be so, our being *en coherer* and having included amongst our modes of consciousness an element similar to His will, free to choose amongst those modes; in this being of his *en coherer* lying the secret of the manifestation of force Leibnitz imperfectly made a guess at as "fulguration") on the necessity that what I must believe is, I must believe that there is an element styled volition present in that field, whose prerogative it is to choose between instituting or not into its field of consciousness some of the sensations that interest it. There are men who have what I consider the fatuity to say that because the will must have a field of sensation to chose amongst therefore it cannot be free, because a causal relation must

apply between it and that field to keep them necessarily together, there being no possibility of freedom, in their view, anywhere where causal relation applies. I would say that the only causal relation between it and its field is the necessity of its being there to be free. If it cannot be free it cannot be at all. Those who abolish free will on such grounds abolish will.

They want us to think that because it must have a field of sensations to choose amongst the will cannot be free. In other words because it can only be volition exercised and exerciseable on a field of sensation it cannot be free. In short just because it is volition it cannot be free because it has to will. What do they want us to will? as if the necessity of its having such a field to choose amongst meant anything but its necessity to be free as will in its occupation in such a field? These men call themselves necessitarians and determinists in consequence, because, forsooth, the will is held to a necessity, being, of being free, since it is held right down to a plain necessity as will of willing. I admit that I am a necessitarian myself if to think that the will must be free is any infringement in necessity of its right to be necessarily free.

Let the man who declares against free will decide what he means by will. Mill issued a declaration against free will, or something very

akin to a declaration against free will. Yet to carry on his argument he had to allow there was a will. What is the will if not the element that feels itself as volition volitionally free to chose even though (just because is the proper way to put it) it must have a field of sensation to render it volitional there among? What is the will if not the element that feels itself as volition volitionally free to choose amongst the interests that are submissive to its declaration. I cannot but think that I can make to be warm or not warm my shanty, make to boil or not my kettle, scald or not scald my fingers in the hot water. If that is not free will because, only able to act within these confines, it is held to a necessity of being free only therein, which is but a small part of life's field, what would will be in this case—what is even will? It is easy to abolish a free will if you abolish will; I know of no other method.

Some would have us think because the will cannot in a moment purple a field with flowers it is not free. But if these are but parts of the scheme wherein the will is free (which, as we say, simply means volitional, or able as will—nothing else for it will ever be able unless it can be free) to work and to institute a change in the world with erasion, of parts and substitution of others that is all the freedom and the will we require to set going a movement in

the higher element of Legality-Dialysity which we know means the enharmonisation of all ordinarily called Law ; for it would not be free nor be a will in respect of any part if the Legality-Dialysity in the rest of the field were not so enharmonised and enharmonisable with the portion wherein it is free that in that portion it could be free.

The question of freedom and necessity presents itself differently from different angles. The same facet will shine green or red according as we let the light fall on it. It is necessary that the will have a field of interest (sensation) within which to be free. That is necessity, and apparently the will, by reason of that necessity, ought not to be free, since it is not free from having such a necessity wherein as will to choose. Yet from another point of view it is sufficiently obvious this necessity amounts to nothing more than that it is necessary only that it should be to be free. To quarrel with the necessity of its being free is not to quarrel with its being free, though it is what Mill, we believe, tries to do.

The will, again, cannot work on itself—cannot will its own abolition. Necessity again. But only as it is necessary that the will should have its proper field wherein it must be will. All these facets that shine as determinism or freedom according to the way they catch the

light, have for their centre simply this, a will rendered unable to be anything but will at its work—that is free. This is the crystal that emits all these varying coruscations, determinism if you look at them in one light, freedom if you look at them in another, and all salencies of freedom. 'Tis but one diamond contributes all the facets, and the diamond is Freedom since Will.

Now, if ever the will has led to certain parts of the interest present being stamped out for ever from the field of consciousness, how has it done so? If the will has stamped out certain diseases in the world, how has it done so? Always, as we think, new interest is flowing in to keep present with the will in the field of consciousness a field of interest to keep it in a state of freedom of choice. How then has it stamped out the old, and rendered possible a history of betterment in the continual incoming new?

It alone could never have done so, for we are not, to our own knowledge and that irresistibleness of opinion which must be knowledge, creating ourselves. It is in Legality-Dialysity it finds its privilege to do so, and in a field of its interest where Legality-Dialysity obtains. If another man's will or the wills of several have caused to be burned off an entire forest, what ordination prevented that forest

from being there again the next day? It was there by Law, it was burned by Law. Well, the Law, why not, could have been such as to put it there again the next day. If men's wills have caused to be stamped out certain diseases, what ordination prevented them from being there again right away quick? They were there by virtue of that which could put them there, but apparently would not put them there again. They were there in that higher element than Law of Legality-Dialysity, and that is why they are not there now. But that would not show that the will could do anything in that element unless something in that element interested itself upon the action of the will, and favoured its doing so.

Huxley has drawn an extremely misleading picture of man playing blindfold against Nature, or Nature's Author and Law-Giver over a chess-board, the game being Life. Man (he must mean Man-knowledge), plays with God at that board, and as long as he plays, says Huxley, according to knowledge, he will at least avoid the mistakes that mean death and sudden snuffing out. But unfortunately for Huxley's argument, knowledge is never in the position of foreknowing what new like modes will be introduced in the course of the game on the board. Densest ignorance does this, and knowledge cannot thereafter do anything more

than re-do the same as ignorance, except as it entails with its volitional mastery such as ignorance has not. It is not, then, their ignorance that is punished, nor is man, by reason of ignorance, blindfolded, as Huxley wants to suggest, and all that we can really say of his mis-drawn picture is that, while man chooses good and ill knowingly, he reaps good and ill.

But it is not by choosing the good and the ill that we know that we can secure the further evolution of our interest-field in good and ill in Legality-Dialysity. Something further is needed, and we can think of nothing further ourselves unless it is that our habitual choice on good and ill, the good and ill we do know, is a merit appeal to that which secures in Legality-Dialysity the life modes on which we choose, and which can issue both better life-modes, and the appropriate Legalities-Dialysities to accompany those better modes as still submissible therein to will. We can think of nothing further ourselves unless there be by means of the present a merit appeal issued to introduce the further possible in good and ill to our choice. Huxley makes too much of knowledge; too little of the fact that knowledge is not playing for knowledge, but for the life in which to have knowledge, and for the will in the life which is knowledge to choose better-

ment by means of modes suspensible in the element of Legality-Dialysity in which they are exposed, such betterment palpably not proceeding by virtue of knowledge, which is continually being enlarged at all points as ignorance, but by the choice made by the will in knowledge.

The man who first made fire ; had he knowledge. His knowledge began when the first fire kindled in densest ignorance ; in densest ignorance was done what knowledge can only afterwards re-do, and densest ignorance can as well light a fire now by accident as knowledge. So that in penalising ignorance and in depicting man as unfairly blindfolded by reason of it, Huxley was wrong ; for densest ignorance can do, and is always continually doing what Huxley would have liked to have had knowledge alone do, raise that is, new life-modes, new terms that is for our will as completing and essential to complete the element-knowledge, to afterwards choose amongst. To ignorance the unexpected happens ; to knowledge (though it avails itself of the same laws to bring about the result as ignorance did, and therefore there is really no such thing as ignorance nor is the movement to betterment carried on by means of it or by means of knowledge but by means of the choice of the will constituting a merit appeal

as between the good and the bad for the introduction of further modes) the expected happens. Knowledge alone, no more than the will, standing only on the present as the present, can undertake to raise these new terms without a privilege attached upon in the present Legality-Dialysity to enable it to do so ; the privilege, as I think, of a merit-appeal issued by means of present modes to call for the raising of others.

Densest ignorance man-generated steam, and no amount of knowledge afterwards can cause the qualities of steam to be other than what in Legality-Dialysity they are. No amount of knowledge can cause them to be such as they are and steam in consequence to be such as it is, more useful than a horse. No amount of knowledge can cause steam to be what it is, its province is to let the will institute it when it pleases as it is. Yet in utilising it as it is Huxley is unfair to the other Player at the Board who could introduce steam on to the Board as it is, more useful than a horse ; and could admit the laws of its Legalities-Dialysities to be exploited by ignorance first as afterwards by knowledge. If Huxley had properly analysed the values of ignorance he would not, I think, have drawn the picture as he did. For knowledge is only playing for knowledge as it is playing for a

competency of itself to a process in knowledge and it could not go on playing with that other Player if in some way on our choice in utilising were not in some dependant the suspensibility in the all-enharmonisable Legality-Dialysity of the old and the new. No amount of knowledge, especially in a Huxleyan setting and environment of Immutable Laws will explain the different utilising we make by the will in knowledge in what is not Law but Legality-Dialysity ; nor how upon that utilising in Legality-Dialysity in which the utilising is possible the world scheme moves with a suspension of some utilities for others rendered possible. Rendered possible for what reason? I know of none. Huxley's Immutable Law, Law Immutable because inexorable is none for it would stop everything, itself included—knowledge is none—unless on our choice in utilising that movement is, in honour of that choice, further choice rendered possible. But here enter the very ethical reasons Huxley wanted to cut out as impossible and irrational, and as having no possible show as affecting in Legality-Dialysity the other Player at the Board. Bring the matter to a show-down, and these are precisely the considerations that do enter. Without they enter the will should go on repeating in Law, (Immutable Law, which puts the forest right back again when it

burns) which to Huxley is not Legality-Dialysity, the same thing over and over and over again; so should knowledge. But if the will has anything to do with securing the cutting out of the old in Legality-Dialysity and causing the old parts to be suspended from being because newer have been offered, on what consideration precisely are the new offered as continually further in subjection to the same power of choice. I can think of none myself other than that in Legality-Dialysity which cannot issue itself we have an element situated exactly as a Law-giver and Law-keeper, and a law (or rather a Legality-Dialysity) abrogator should be situated who can issue the further immediacy which is consentaneously both life and knowledge as the will merits for such further issue to it of Life-modes by the present choice it is continually making amongst it now Life-Modes. If a study of Law, its presence in the scheme of nature, its excision therefrom with the Life-modes with which it was exposed, its ingressibility therein, its regressibility therefrom, does not lead us in Law to Legality-Dialysity as being the element of which Law (Immutable Law would stop everything, even itself) is in reality composed, then have I not power of suggestion, and if in Legality-Dialysity (which the life-modes alone as we

live now expose as but the relations in which these modes stand towards one another) we are not brought right down to the fact that my will and your will as choosing amongst those modes are the promoters of this movement to betterment, because to them, in that field in Legality-Dialysity, as they choose, field for future choice is going to be offered (in what Legality-Dialysity will then attend) by the Author the Issuer of our lives, so, again, I say, I have no power to suggest, nor the proper thrusting style in which to urge suggestion home.

As a matter of practical politics it is only the sensations in the field of consciousness offer a career to us. They are what we expect to choose and to change as all together, in all the coherers that exist together, they make up a world scheme. As able to will at all we change them upon our will. They are our interests, and as all these interests have been changed upon all the wills of all men so have parts which have been life-modes been stamped out of the map of life in the evolution of those life-modes to betterment. Now that they can be suspensible or not by the will testifies that the will operates in what is only Law as it is Legality-Dialysity, as the will avails (or there is no will) to introduce them or not. And as the will passes some in Legality-Dialysity for

ever out of the map because newer have been offered to it on similar terms of suspensibility, we have testimony again to a progress accomplished in Legality-Dialysity (itself as exhibited entirely by the life-modes composing that scheme, for that scheme is composed of nothing but life-modes) which neither the will nor knowledge without some privilege attached upon their exercise can connect up with the future in Legality-Dialysity, or can be competent to secure and explain—since it is unthinkable and mocks some of our profoundest necessities of thinking to suppose that we are immediately making ourselves. Leading up from one phase of the subject so to the other it is impossible not to think that the real issue of life-modes is accomplished as God, who from being sole in life and without us became (as *en coherer*) on that kind of life that admits us in it to His Presence, and gave us in Thought itself, of the kind we must now have, His Presence, alters that life-Presence of Him with us, and that Thought and life accordingly of ours with Him, in pursuance of His own Self-pleasing Plan which He can and does change and modify with Honour paid to our will, Himself free as Honour, His own Self-pleasuring Honour to maintain Himself in Honour, and with us. We cannot bind this ultimate factor in Legality-Dialysity by

anything of the known things that are there with Legality-Dialysity only exposed and stabilised. That ultimate Factor is free as Honour; it is freer than the very freest thing we know, and it rightly induces in our minds a sentiment of Omnipotence. If it decide by preserving itself in an honour to us to present us in an Honour towards itself in those few words we may touch the very secret of our generation, wherein and whereby we become what we all are, all honourable men. In those few words we may best describe how God became a coherer, preserving himself in that honour to us, which is a coherer's thought and life as now, a communised and communisable existential wall, as we were therein and thereby engaged in all the Honour, as it practically seems of Legality-Dialysity with Him. How to found a will except as an Honour I do not know. But it can be founded, I think, if God will insist by preserving Himself in a peculiar state of honour towards that will to preserve it to Honour, and then it is that Honour, as I see the case, we now have as will and as sense, and as their conjunction together in the life whose modes exhibit themselves with Legality-Dialysity for the only form of law in which they have connection and relation with one another. By self-insisting, and by deciding to self-insist to preserve Himself in an Honour

towards us to admit us to that Honour, God may have founded Himself as a coherer and us as coherers (those coherers which cannot approve themselves unless there be others) when He so only composed that common existential wall between Him and us, that Thought and that Life and that Presence which we now have, which only divides us from Him, to be real true personalities as it admits us to know and to enter upon the course of life with the destiny Himself as such Honourer (self-Honourer and so us-Honourer—as one coherer as we say cannot be or approve itself being except as there be others) carries for us. Look for us then

“along the uranian sod,
Among the bearded councillors of God.”

. If anything more naturally than this is led up to through a study of Legality-Dialysity and of the will, viewed from the subjective stand-point, accomplishing a journey of changing its Life-modes therein, my ignorance is such that I do not know it.

MAN AN HONOUR

WOMAN A GRACE

Leibnitz "fulgurated" his monads out of God. I think our chance lies, if such bold and commonplace language can be excused about a problem so deep and wonderful in a common existential wall between God and us, which has projected us into real personality only as it admits us to that His Thought and Presence, to go therewith and there through that journey of the will in privilege which is to lead us on. It is horrible language I know to speak of God in such terms of mechanism but as outwards invest themselves to us with the privilege in the world of Science—but we speak not of machines here but of the quite as we think opinable view that God could and can become on what kind of Being He chooses and could and did become on that kind of Being that did necessitate this coherer kind of Being of us. In that map we may find Legality-Dialysity, the Law that is with its own defeat immanent in itself—I know not how else. There we may find a will and a privilege for the will—I know not how else—unless in this anthropomorphic and existential wall. There I may find in that Presence of God, which I could

not know it if I did not have this Presence, a necessity for giving to my thoughts about God an anthropomorphic cast—I know not how else. For this Presence, this Thought, this Life, that with all their distinctions and differentiations under Ideation declare themselves the same thing and substances of the one thing—this common existential wall that reveals us to Him as Him to us—what is this but a supreme anthropomorphism into which all conducts.

There was a time, in my life, reader, in my early days, when I would have scorned to be, as I thought then that debased being a philosopher with a leaning to anthropomorphism; and I might have remained so. The truth is that the necessities of life are such that few men have or make the time to do much real thinking, or to elaborate for themselves the relation of their thoughts with one another. And another fact of a peculiar kind obtains in some of the disputes into which men who have not much time for thinking fall with one another. Just as the outline of a hill will vary in contour from every neighbouring valley, so that men approaching it from different sides will draw differently that outline, and perhaps name it, by reason of those outlines, the same hill though it be to all, differently, so with the contours in Thought of these great big questions like anthropomorphism. It is only after we

have circled these big hills from every side we shall ever learn to know them under all their varying shapes as still the one big hill ; and know moreover how to find them again after we have once left them and in relation again to the rest, a matter of craft in which many are lacking. Most men have not time to circle their hills ; they never relate their thoughts together under all their many shapes. They live under one hill ; where is their land. They know not the land where the many hills may change their shapes yet be those big hills still, and the land remain a land of many changing hill shapes. We had an object lesson of this a little while ago in the way in which the hill called Freedom of the will varies its faces, as now determinism, now freedom, according to the way you ascend it. So it is with most of these questions. We call it returning to anthropomorphism only because we have had the time and the persistence to circle our hills and to learn to recognise what they are and where they stand under many changing contours. It should be the peculiar work of philosophers to learn to recognise these hills under all possible points of view and to draw such maps of them in their relations with one another that the other men who have not the time may never get lost among them or fail to recognise them from all

points of approach ; that they may recognise and learn to assent to the land in which these hills are found. Do I return to anthropomorphism? Yes, if you like to put it that way, but I have just put it in the way I would prefer.

Schopenhaur, of all the philosophers, has been peculiar in the emphasis he lays on the will. He styles one of his many works "The world as will and Idea." And while he saw the prospect from his point of view, we think we have said enough to show how cardinal an element to the interpretation of the Knowledge-scheme and the world-scheme is the will. Good then was his work in laying a stress on the will. For if this scheme of betterment we know as the evolution of our Life-modes under will be in a progress it is on the will rightly rests the final responsibility. On the will and its privilege to secure by some fact of present choice field for further future choice rests a responsibility which the Theologian will know is putting us in touch with problems peculiarly his own "of Fate, Free will, Free knowledge absolute," as one hill is given up to the gold-prospectors, one to the searchers for silver.

And there may have been a justice in Schopenhauer abolishing, if he did abolish sensation, and viewing the world scheme only as composed of will and Idea, since from our point

of view, all the field of consciousness is that one thing which is but ideated into differentiation, and which as Sensation the field of the will in progress is only Sensation as not Ideation.

So, reader, if we are proposing common existential walls we are proposing anthropomorphism. I am proposing on earth that I must literally presence another (the differentiated similar). I cannot have presence and what kind of presence I have without another having presence and what presence shall justify mine. I am proposing as between God and ourselves a similar state. Without my presence stands to be what of Him has projected me into personality as it relates me by presence with Him I could not be what I am, nor could you. Coherers cannot approve themselves sole or present what we may call their knowledge sole, and remember it is knowledge that we presence and a knowledge world in which we presence. I could not presence as I do; nor could you. Anthropomorphism is only an old word because it is the name of one of those big hills that has always been in the land which the race of men-thinkers explore and in which they live; and while thinkers live in this one great land and explore it from many points of view so often will it ever and again come into view in a contour varying every time as it relates to the new prospect

they may find to view it from and the new avenue of approach they may make to it. But it will be there I ventured to prophesy as long as any race of men-thinkers like us live in the land they and we do. Not unless some volcano in that Thought-land should erupt shall we miss anon and anon that rosy head with trembling stars attended.

And there, where I saw that hill, I have seen all honourable men. Not in any mysticism do I propose this but in sheer delight of reason ; not as an idle story but as the right story in the right words. For there is that in every speech which savours of the place where it has been born ; and so now. But for this I had not been a Prospector of thought in the hills where such a tongue is spoken. But for this I had not learned the words the Hill-men speak. Ho, townsmen and gownsmen, if a man should "blow in" among you who has enringed the far hills, not that formidable beard of his, which he caught amid the eastern and the western dips, not that mien of his that wears the stars, not these regard. "Green" he may be, as a cuckoo of the hills, yet not for this deride, but let him fill your ears with his barbaric quawkings. Only if ye knew what that splendid tale imports. Not the massy hill-silver itself, not the flume gold were worth this to chase away the dross from your hearts, to light again the

haunted valleys in your blood. And has he been up the Chandelaar and has he found Noah's Ark? * Mock not ye but try to understand. The men of the Chandelaar do these things—

“He only is a living man
The rest are fleeting shades.”

And I too who have enringed the far hills, a philosopher, a prospector of thought, feign would I say that I have found something as ancient. For I have seen the rock-ribbed hill, anthropomorphism yclept, bluffed with gold. I have been where eastward westward dips, and if it be mine to shoot but one arrow in proof of my emprise I pray that it may prove an arrow of gold.

No, friend, not in anapæsts, but in such simple speech as savours of the soil where it was born are we right in saying here that all are honourable men. No place but must have, peculiar to itself, its own kind of speech; and no place, here, to use anything but that speech. Is it harder for matter to be an Honour than anything else? Is it harder for the world-scheme to be an Honour than anything else?

* Prospectors up the Chandelaar, which river on some old maps, figures under the old French appellation of *Gens de large* found what was supposed to have been a former Russian floating fortress, and report spread that they had found Noah's Ark.

Is it harder for all these parts of Honour—a Panentheistic scheme in God—to be so on continual Creation as variation as God a self-Honourer and so us-Honourer, as that very varying Honour accomplishes us to life and to our resting in life upon our will, than for all these parts in variation and variability to be in a conversionary scheme evolved and moving to Betterment? It is not harder: it is actually easier to think. It is actually easier to think it in this manner than in any other. But if we ever come not only to think it but to believe it, thinking being from one point of view a weak form of believing, believing a strong form of thinking, then its import is tremendous. If ever we do come to believe that as between the minds of men force is so basing itself that the sensations of one man cannot be without actually livingly forcibly causing similar modes to be in another and proving them similar just by their merest existence then this belief as to what is inherent in Life here is going to enter with legitimacy into our questionings upon origin; and these or similar speculations to these which we have exposed are going to come rapidly to the front: and not the less rapidly because the theologians, who are one wing of philosophy, have already paved a way for them and taken some halting steps in the same direction. Their import, if we not only come to think them, but

to believe them, to believe, that is, that of all the thoughts that can propose themselves they are (with necessity of the others being inadequate) adequate and the necessary—their import is going to be tremendous. This belief of course can no more be proved than the nebular hypothesis can be proved, or than conversion itself can be proved. Its right to exist is the right that those others have to exist up to the precise degree in which they irresistibly allege themselves in the mind as that which cannot but be thought ; only on this case, there is so much further right for them to exist according as there is a necessity of thinking in our minds beyond the barrier bounds of conversion. This irresistible necessity in necessary Thought to be true thought because it is the only thought that can be thought, cannot be proved, but it is right there from the two and two make four stage up to deciding as to right and wrong, and it culminates through all these partial expositions as conversion and so on in what is bound to still go on exposing itself as that which can and must necessarily be thought. Is it not the simple and plain fact that beyond conversion in its partial inadequacies we must think ; and there is beyond that thought, conversion, something which it is necessary that we must think. Let it only expose itself in its necessity : it will be true.

It cannot fail to be true as it is necessary.

I do not of course want to suggest that I am the only man who ever did any thinking or that what proposes itself to me as necessary according to my limited capacity and effort to think is going necessarily to propose itself with the same irresistibleness to others as it may do to me. Yet, as the individually small labours of different men all go into the increasing common stock, in this case of thought, I do say that if it ever becomes an irresistible belief in us to think that the life-modes of one man cannot be without asserting of necessity and proving just by themselves established the similar being, the Anthropomorphism of another, as we have had instituted a belief which as long as it is in any way irresistible in our minds whensoever we survey the communised and communiseable being of those modes so it cannot fail to be a belief of tremendous import.

Be it remembered too, that even agnostic philosophers like Herbert Spencer believe that what must be thought as it must be believed so it must be true; and so is true, for it marches as they know in an irresistibility that cannot appeal against itself. It is only a question of what we must believe and of what with most of this mustness does actually propose itself to us when we sit down and have a good think. Then we are ready to tell the world what it really is because we are

only ready and competent to tell it what it tells us ; and so competent we are ready and competent (even the agnostics say that their agnosticism simply consists in stopping their thinking at the *impasses*—not thinking enough in fact) to tell the world what it really must be because it has no other means than in us of telling us what it really must be. To think and to think enough that is all the difference between agnosticisms and other beliefs. We all think, but few think enough. The only worth of a philosopher to the world is that he every now and again sits down and at least tries to do a big think ; and his readers, the men of less leisure and opportunity for doing so have the advantage of getting to know, in a briefer space of time than it took him to write, what he found he had to think. They can then start out with advantage to test whether what he had to think must in their minds propose itself with an equal necessity of being thought ; or whether they can find and propose a better necessity. Though the philosopher may be looked upon as a genius because he does what other men have not the time amid the necessities of life to do, and possibly find a trifle hard work in the doing, (for we are indisputably differentiated to different capacities in the universe and to our several excellencies) to our mind there is no

particular necessity of his being a genius because he does a somewhat uncommon thing, and does it, as he will have to do it, to the neglect of something else. Everything that does its work well has an equal right to be considered genius. If the one has the genius of a fine brain, others have equally the genius of the big hand and the red heart. We are all of us geniuses as we do something—as we certainly do—a little better than our fellows; and in a big hand or a more passionate heart are making living presentations to others of our genius.

What has all this to do with the title of our essayette “Man an Honour: Woman a Grace?” We have been sitting too long under the trees. Let us get back to the problem in hand.

Some little while back when discussing food as a necessity within the chart of our practical politics, we decided that the question of food and of man's feeding reduced itself simply to this, that with certain efforts of will which are required to be exerted every few hours over what poses in the field of consciousness as place to our bodies we had to secure a placing of those modes of consciousness that pass as food there, and a reconstitution of some with a reconstitution of the modes that make up the body, and this process, we surmised, if it was

not proceeding conversionarily, might be proceeding by the merit-appeal made by the will by means of modes present to it in Legality-Dialysity for an issue of the reconstituted by the continual author of our lives. These changeful modes, as they correlated, made up the changing map of life, as these modes, so frequently necessary of change, depicted themselves an interest, even to the pitch of necessity, to us in our lives. Such a merit appeal, if it exists and is exerted in any quarter of our field of consciousness by means of present modes, we cannot but think to be exercisable by means of the present at all points in the field of consciousness; and in a brief discussion concerning knowledge and how knowledge could grow by means of the present into the continually expanding field of further knowledge, we also decided that such a merit-appeal is the only thinkable way of connecting the future in all enharmonisable Legalities-Dialysities upon the present. If this be the case, then that immediate field of consciousness, that field in its immediacy as consciousness at all points as the Honour into which God, when He self-honoured Himself thereto honoured us, and so, honouring us and in honour of us, caused us to be in what is the only kind of life we can have—that field of consciousness is composed at all points by and

upon that merit-appeal continually issuing from it at all points by means of the present. So far each man is an all-honourable creature, and all men are honourable for their last and proper title. What though the parts of Honour that must be repeated over and over again, if we are to continue to live the life we do now, the earthly life, what though those parts compose political interests and endow us with necessities, as a matter of practical politics, of doing the thing we call feeding and so on. They do nothing more. Beginning with the life that made all this its after life and its modes (those amongst them) it is we on our merit-appeals forth-call them all into those aspects in which they are necessities to us. The necessities remain necessities in Honour, honours which we must have only because like the will that must be to be free, we must be to be honourable. The scheme of practical politics to which we are forced to direct our life-efforts as long as we wish to live as now, remains a scheme of practical politics in Honour, and there is no chance of giving this scheme continuance as we and God do give it continuance, beginning as both of us do in it, as a scheme with and from that life that has the out-calling of all this these after-modes of itself as now. There is no chance of giving it continuance save as we give it continuance in Honour upon

a merit-appeal, a privilege exerted by the will at all points in that field in Legality-Dialysity of Honour. But all the necessities that surround us in that field of consciousness we make beginning from God in that life that can make all these its after-modes, to keep exposed in these modes the appearances of its necessities and so cause to be exposed in some of these its modes, those appearances, as if of necessity (food a necessity and so on of which together our map of practical politics composes. But that these things are there at all is due to our being allowed to keep up appearances in the world.

And what about the other half of the world, woman? Will they also keep up appearances? Do they not live in Legality Dialysity the same as man? Will not their life begin like ours with the life that has the out-calling of all these the after-modes of itself? Shall we not accord them in Legality-Dialysity a right to begin with the life that begins with life and to carry it on at all points thereafter in honour upon similar merit-appeals? Shall we not see their lives as political schemers equally composed at all points on similar merit-appeals.

We cannot do otherwise. If we abolish man, as we once regarded him as a conversionary being, with a life whose scheme of practical politics is dictated by conversion in terms of

conversionary interests and necessities, if we abolish the conversionary man, and institute the man of nothing if not of Honour composed, and the merit appeals which have issue thereby by all its differentiated modes as composing his field of consciousness, as he weaves of them his life, so must we, so do we, abolish woman. Only the woman by Grace remains, and only all the modes of her Grace of which, too, by merit appeals, at every point of her being she weaves, with the assistance of God, her life, to compose of them under the version of God, under, that is, that direction of them in their institution by God which is God's concern, those necessities and opportunities which give her her political interests and peculiarly feminine scheme of life, as she so composes of them all that scheme of herself peculiarly feminine in interest, hedging herself in divinity with her own necessary femininity. She and God between them obtain and maintain, upcall and cause to be exhibited in their peculiarity, as constituting her feminine scheme in life, all those modes in whose peculiarity and in whose peculiarity of sequence she finds her interests, and opportunity as a woman to live a feminine and so far not man life. And there can be no connection between those modes of hers and the modes of man, save as man's modes and her modes are from God alone obtained in that

correlation together, as portions of the total scheme in Panentheism in God which alone gives institution to an apparency of their action as direct, one over another. The woman by Grace remains, and the man by Honour; woman, who is a Grace, and the man who is an Honour, but if we are to understand their relations with one another in a scheme not conversionary, let us remember Leibnitz and his monads, which were, apparently, "fulgurated" out of God, and only so in consequence had the apparency, as in a Panentheistic scheme in a Pantheist, of action upon one another, or which only actually did have in that scheme actuality of action as that scheme was accomplished in the force of God in giving those modes correlation together, to give them that actualness of operancy of one upon another. The first of woman's rights is to keep up her appearance in the world, and to display the divinity of which her femininity is essentially composed.

The question of how to get married, if it be a peculiarly feminine interest, points differently in this scheme than in a conversionary. In a deeply literal sense, as has long been jestingly observed, the marriage of the woman who is a Grace is made in heaven, and the proof is that this marriage is always going on. Do not let us forget it that this marriage

is always going on, though in a naturalistic scheme it will begin, to give those schemes needed beginning, in a correlation of certain life-modes. Naturalistic schemes will date their origin of marriage as viewed by them from the first appearance in man's field of consciousness and woman's field of consciousness of certain life-modes. But in a coherer view of life and of this institution, the common marriage that is always going on preceded and led up to this especial, and no wise changes in respect of the especial and in the especial, that regime whereby it has caused it to be what it is. We must remember that, in what is in a coherer its continual natural state of existence, the up-calling of life-modes, that is to say, in correlated approximation to similars in others as on the will necessarily outcalled, and in the making to be of the continual appearances and disappearances of these approximated modes we actually have at all times what is like a common marriage and marriageableness always going on. We have the only kind of reproduction there is, continual producing (in which repetition of some modes counts for nothing as making them especially reproductive), preceding for a time, after Life has first appeared in Evolution, and leading up to that so-called especial beginning, when the modes are at length upcalled, in which naturalism

places a beginning. We have this common marriage, which may be identical in kind with the especial preceding, leading up to, and out-calling the other when the scheme is supposed at last to take a beginning with marriage, just as Evolution, in Science's view, began without marriage, and only when it reached that point of upcalling the modes from which the naturalistic schemes date the origin of marriages, did it give to marriage its opportunity to appear to make up naturalistic schemes at all. The common marriage, the continual production, was there all the time as soon as life started. It only reached the stage of out-calling the especial as an asset in the common later, but that especial never varied the continual production, and never does.

I doubt whether I am making myself clear. I do not seem to be proposing my thought in the easiest way in which, even to myself, it can be put. Let us try again.

Every mode of a coherer that forces with its own institution to existence, the coming into existence of another's field of consciousness as a similar mode, is practically doing just what marriage, as between man and woman, is supposed to be doing. This process is going on lifelong in every coherer. Who will say, then, that the particular modes in which naturalism places a beginning as marriage when up-

called by these coherers as always doing this, and never but in a position to do anything but this, who will say that they do anything but maintain to that coherer just its one life-story, or do anything but impart to that life-story interest, and a scheme of interest as between man and woman.

It is a significant thing surely that in the story of Evolution the world-scheme began without marriage, and only when it arrived at marriage as an institution seemed to attain a new point of departure. Did it ever attain a new point of departure at all? Did it ever attain anything but a new interest and a constitution of interest and of its interests which is not a point of departure so much as a constitution of affairs carried on in the old way rendered social; rendered more particularly interesting, with particularities of interests taking the place of generalities.

All that is done in a coherer, as each coherer grows its field of consciousness is done by a merit-appeal issued by means of the present in Life-modes in Legality-Dialysity being honoured with further modes, themselves the opportunity of a merit-appeal. And as I see the case even though those merit-appeals do come to grow at a certain stage of their existence the modes with whose appearance the marriage of the naturalists enters the world

these modes are only grown by that merit-appeal that remains simply in them a merit-appeal; whatever be the result in the shape of new modes of the merit-appeals it issues by means of them. I can see nothing in the case of these life-modes, whose own institution always forces institution of another's but what is common marriage (since common or continual production—only giving rise to reproduction as an aspect of them if any of these modes are repeated by God in that continual scheme of production) always going on, with the introduction on to the stage, by means of it and by means of the modes in which it alone is oncarried of those peculiar modes that condition our life thereafter, as from a new point of departure, to certain sociological interests. But the through rate on which the world is carried is common marriage; and in order to obtain a clear view of why marriage began to obtain at a certain and a late stage in the history of the world we must place the world on a basis of common marriage. We must carry it on on the through rate in order to see how the naturalists, to use a railway term, have arrived at their mileage rates. Then we may begin to see why at a certain stage the merit-appeal begins to live with interests in the shape of life-modes, not because it began to live by means of them or was made any more pro-

ductive or reproductive by means of them than it had hitherto been as a coherer by all its modes, but because they (those merit-appeals) began those modes and went on to live by means of them as a means and a method of bringing about a more social state of affairs to the inhabitants in those life-modes and the users of those merit-appeals ; a state far more social than that already social state that had been prevailing amongst coherers in a state as we call it by virtue of single merit-appeals of common marriage, inasmuch as these single merit-appeals, by virtue of these new introduced life-modes were required to be supplemented by conjoint merit-appeals. This is the only way round that old evolutionary conundrum of whether the hen laid the egg or the egg laid the hen ; whether man brought about marriage or marriage brought about man.

The world is not carried on by marriage ; the world carries on marriage. But the interests that are necessary to make a story in the world and thus the consequent story itself are carried on as marriage, with recurrences, as capable of being dated from those modes as others could be from others, and with developments from those interests as points and periods in that story of newer and fresher interests ; yet interests which are not from those others as points produced, but

which are produced only by the merit-appeals that could produce them and all the others to be but interests planted by life itself about itself.

Will our friend, the young batchelor, refuse his right to his proudest and best appellation, the right to be called a common father. Will our old maids disdain to take up the ever-old ever-new crown which we lay at their feet and which proclaims them general mothers. Myself who am still only a common father would feign hope not. I should cut but a poor figure in the world if I did. But if I am always in a state as a coherer of common marriage I have a certain right to be proud of myself, for as long as I am generally married the rest will be bound to take some little notice of me,

Has the reader ever heard of the old conundrum in Evolution, "Did the hen or the egg come first?" It is a tough nut to crack as long as we regard conversion as the only method that gives life its subsistence. In fact, if it has been cracked on these lines I have never heard of the answer.

But there is a way round it on the lines we suggest, and the only way, again, that I know of. If our life-modes did begin not by means of conversion but in a directness of immediacy with the living God as that Power that has the outcalling as its field of consciousness of

all these modes of itself which are the modes of the life we only can have and live as now, and if these modes began right from when they did begin, as what began to grow and goes on growing after birth, then, if we are right in viewing their installation as a matter of birth accomplished on a merit-appeal, issuable to the Author of this changeful life by means of the life-modes, that, as once instituted, were present to our life as the opportunity of farther—we may begin to see how from this power and the proper starting point it gives us, we arrive at both the hen and the egg.

If men and women, all and severally have gone on growing further modes by such as were in presentness to them as their lives the opportunity to them of merit-appeals, then we may see how it has come about, under the Version of God, that they have been accorded those modes, on merit-appeals attained, that depict in the modes of Life their marriageableness. Then we may see that these modes themselves are no more necessary than any others to ensure reproduction. They are no more and remain no more than a similar opportunity with the others of growing further modes into the scheme (in the shape of children) which warrants the scheme still on-carried on the one flat rate of a merit-appeal, and these modes as part of the scheme still on-carried as that same

flat rate and still on-carrying that rate. We can begin to perceive how the hens and the eggs came together and by virtue of what flat rate it was that they were able to be gained together. In the history of evolution how non-necessary it was apparently, that marriage as an institution should appear in the world after a time, as it did ; how necessary, when it has once appeared that it should be as an institution continued. The necessity and the non-necessity both explain themselves, I think, if we make a proper start and choose the proper starting-point from which to let this story in Evolution explain itself. Starting, for the life as now, with the Power that can, under the Version of God, grow, as life, all its modes on a merit-appeal it is nothing wonderful now if every man and woman should grow to having for a time the modes in which reproduction bases, for it is but production that is exhibited by these modes and always will be exhibited by them, even when they produce. It is nothing wonderful that men and women should continue for a time to have them, and then again, lacking them, should be allowed to carry on their lives on the same flat rate of a merit-appeal for the rest of their days. These modes do not become themselves, on this line of reasoning, reproductive. They are only as all the rest are, with this tremendous addition, viewing the

whole subject in the light of a story of Evolution, that no longer the merit-appeals of men or women severally avail ; the whole has risen by means of them to a point when conjoint merit-appeals must appear, and when Sociology, and all its transcendant interests was held on a necessity of being. Then it was possible for states and empires to be born as never before, though neither the hens nor the eggs came first. Because, of that system of the solitary merit-appeals which was proceeding in simple producing, as God upraised upon them the life-modes in which men and women were being made by Him divergent from one another (for this very purpose of empire-making) God introduced modes which were no more necessary than the others for the oncarrying of that system except as He bound in them men and women no more to solitariness of merit-appeals as producing but to conjoint merit-appeals, and bound them by them only so in continuance in that scheme, to the foundation as we say of sovranities and sodalities in that scheme in a way not hitherto open to it. With the introduction of these modes, obtaining when they did in the history of Evolution, God did not give us reproductive matters ; we did not break away in them from the course we were pursuing, simple production. It was not necessary for God that the hen or the egg

should come first. The hen is no more than an additional blessing to the egg ; the egg is no more than an interest, a solace, and apparently an excitement to the hen. In these modes God gave an opportunity to that scheme of merit-appeals in solitariness charged as it already was with blessings in the shape of interests, to be surcharged, and so surcharged by means of interests that repeat that it was able to find in these points of repetition points as it were of continually new beginnings and departures ; and producing as it was all the time it was to be led so into repetitions of producing that figure as reproduction and in that way came the modes in which the repeating is being done to aspect themselves as reproductive. Not only was the scheme continually enriched and enlarged by God as there was all this continually new producing by means of merit-appeals going on. The further interest which they produce was so grouped and placed as continually to retort into the scheme so as to seem of itself to carry it on. Because at the periods where this repetition began and at every period where it obtains since God insists on the simple merit-appeals that have done all this producing being laid aside in favour of conjoint merit-appeals ; and because he insisted and has insisted ever since so are they laid aside and so are we forced to have that higher

mutual life beyond the former the promotion of which seems to be the only aim and object we can discover in the scheme itself since it is the scheme itself. In these conjoint merit-appeals the scheme of Evolution took on a higher sociological estate, and with interests which we expose as necessities our lives were enriched. But if it ever becomes a question of those modes being able to reproduce themselves because they denote merit-appeals payable by means of them as reproductive reproduction, or if it is ever a question of their in any way preventing or hindering immortality then we may see at once that the power which is in us to expose with God all this life of ours in these its modes as interests, is not going to be dedicated by them—it cannot be—to any extinction. These interests cannot lead it up to Death because it has educed them all itself and carried them all on right to the moment of their further charge by God which alone is as Death.

There is some downright rotten thinking, it seems to me, in the way Scientists have of writing about marriage and reproduction, as if it marked in some way the introduction of a death-call to living creatures, as if it implied in some way a dying to live. Had they really solved whether their hen or their egg came first they would put these barbarities on one side. There is no such thing as dying to live

betokened by any account of marriage and reproduction appearing in Evolution, where it does, as much non-necessary as necessary. It is a living to live more that is alone betokened right to the moment of death as departure from living as now. But there is only one way of getting rid of these barbarities that I know of, and that is the way I have suggested. It is to solve the question in Science of the apparently equal necessity and non-necessity of their being any such thing as reproductive matters. Whatever theory does that is going to be true precisely as it explains in Evolution the non-necessity of reproductive matters appearing at what stage in it they do, and their subsequent necessity always to recur in the oncarrying of that scheme. I believe we have only one way of making such a theory live, and that is to start our life in immediacy under God's version as the power that causes through God's Honour all its after-modes, which after-modes will certainly never lead it to a death evolved out of itself. I know of no necessity for the modes of matter styled reproductive appearing or not when they do: nobody does. But if they did appear as that power which grew them to men and women on its merit-appeals, I can see that God may have found, and with the least disturbance of the old regime possible, in them an opportunity of laying a multitude of

hearth-stones in a scheme that was yet without them. An opportunity which is not more a necessity than a non-necessity because they are nothing more than an interest of life and an opportunity of a merit-appeal as that system of merit-appeals brought at last to a stage where conjunction of merit-appeals, as requested by God, instead of the solitary appeals of single coherers, was to witness opened further kingdoms and empires to love in the world.

A fig for the scientific business of a man getting any way nearer death because he was married, or being called on to die because he has had the natural misfortune to become marriageable. Before marriage, I suppose, appeared as an institution in that scheme, man was expected to die because he was not able to marry. How was he ever able to become marriageable. Was it the hen or the egg became marriageable first?

The flat rate of a merit-appeal on which coherers are upbuilding all their modes, including these especial, on which they are continually producing to the end of life (giving us a sight upon a deathless production as the end of life, and life's one object and achievement) this system of merit-appeals is to our thinking the best and the closest explanation we have yet had as to whether the hen or the egg came first, and if a general confirmation

for a coherer theory, of which it is part, is to be sought, it is in its success in throwing light upon these dark enigmas that it will be found, and its success here will be some grounds, however slight, of confirmation.

Our thoughts of what Evolution means from such an internal point of view as we may call it surely gain in grandeur. They gain in grandeur, and they gain in something else: I do not know what to call it. Comfort is not quite the word, though it is something like it. It makes us feel that we have something like a hearth-stone dedicated by the universe in each of us, and dedicated, moreover, by means of the method involved, continual production, in a way that sweeps it clear of death. Think of what that scheme does mean: the deathless dedication of life to life's production, interest, and nothing else. Life-interest, nay, life as interest, freely supplied to all the beings out-called to life, interests which cannot close themselves as death, or station themselves in opposition to one another at any point as interests as death. Death nothing more than the cessation of this production as now. What a promise in non-necessity. All the world loves lovers they say, and it certainly looks as if God did, and if we could really see the skirts here of God as love in all this non-necessary loveliness, and all these non-

necessary but permitted lovers, which is the sight our inner view of Evolution can see. This charging of life with interest on the flat rate of the merit-appeals of coherers, this surcharging of its interests, this repeating of its interests rather in the forms of modes which by virtue of those merit-appeals repeat to the enforcements so, as they repeat, amidst those interests of social states and empires as if of natural worlds. What a promise of what further may happen, to the enriching as death of that rating. I think we are right. The internal point of view into Evolution is one that makes for assurance, is one of hope. For love as in the world now was not necessary. But God so loved the world as to put it there over and over and over again. I have found hearth-stones in the world from this point of view; I have found mile-stones, mile-stones placed by love as these modes in which production repeats. I have not yet found a gravestone, and to tell you the sheer philosophical truth, do not know how to find one. Much as I dread them when I set myself to find one I am unable to do so.

“Death,” says the poet,
“is the end of life, ah, why
Should life all labour be?”

The all-labour that is in life, as I see it is

the one flat rate the only continually producing rate of merit appeal that produces everything as a portion of life and I do not know what is going to produce death as a portion of such life. Life alone is not. Old age, sorrow, dementia ever, all the "withered weak and grey" of the past; these are not gateways erected by death. I know of no death that can erect them as portions of life, or place them about life, where they stand. To trust the great issue, to have hope in it, to rid our minds of fear in respect of it, to attempt to deserve with this life something beyond it, this is as far as unaided reason can carry us on such a subject! But surely this line of thinking makes for equanimity.

Christianity, to my thinking, has once come near proposing in respect of but one woman what is to my mind the ideal proposition that Philosophy is seeking to make of all women. I do not say that it has proposed that instance quite in the way that what I think is Philosophy's last and wisest word would propose. But it has come nighest to it; and if Christianity be expansible then I would urge those who consider that they are the proper exponents and instruments of its expansion to tell us if we may expand its doctrines on this question, and to what these doctrines will with rightness expand. The religion of Mahomet

has also proposed something similar in the houris promised to its devotees but to an outsider this seems but a poetic accident. Yet it is for the Mahometan who possesses the internal point of view into his own religion and who has the knowledge denied to us with which that point of view supplies him to let us know too if his point of view on this question is not also expansible and to what.

For all the necessity that lives in the matters called reproductive to achieve of themselves reproduction or for the life-modes depicted as them to do so, it might as well have been that the Euripidean view had obtained actual operation in life and that by ingots placed on the altars of God men had obtained and had merited children. But what a difference in the Empire makings in Evolution if God had taken that course. Where would that race of autochthons, not the race of men and women as we know now making up the world, as we know it now, have been in their questionings upon the love that informs the world.

But since in Evolution the course was taken that is insisted upon by God, let us do our part abolishing woman, to have only the woman by grace. Let us leave to woman the right we leave to man, to be allowed to keep up appearances in the world. I believe woman in her own unsearchable heart well acquiesce. If the

secret heart of every woman proposes that she be the woman of all possible grace she is only doing what philosophy approves.

I suppose that if I were really a great man I ought now to come out and propose a series of drastic reforms. Well, I am afraid I am not that great man. The broader modes of thinking will bring about the broader restitutes of life, but it is for the broader modes of thinking themselves to do this; and broad modes of thinking are not conducive to action. Broaden the modes of thinking, however, and we may in the end broaden the grace that is in life. Meantime let us go on as we are doing every day in practice, acknowledging that the child, from the moment of his birth when he promotes his own merit appeals on God, is, as much the father in his communised being of his father as his father of it—is as much the father of his country as any country can be of it. There are countries, they say, where the precocity of the children is such that they are in practice if not in theory the fathers of their fathers. Some say the United States—the ideal name, the best of all names for a free country—is such a one. But the child I have in mind is that philosophical child of mine, whether I be but a common father or not; who cannot grow his own life modes without fathering in the common existential wall in which

they are alone composed, his father and others as well as themselves—who cannot have in his field of consciousness his modes as body always suitable to his modes as place without, like a little George Washington, fathering his country. We do not need our children to be philosophers in thought ; they are philosophers willy-nilly in practice deepest of us all, for these live in their country, the land of their United States—a land in which all those cross compliments by virtue of life a common existential wall can and do obtain.

A WORD TO THE THEOLOGIAN

BROADER HUMANITIES

I have great diffidence in saying what I want to the theologian as a class of men who are equipped to handle and have a right to handle certain questions, and I pay them the respect of not attempting here to solve for them those questions. But if any word of mine can be of assistance to them in admitting them further into these problems, and if they deign to listen to a man who wears no degree, then I would be wanting in my duty as a thinker if I did not utter what I consider may be to the point. A word then to the theologian as to what may follow to them if our belief as to coherers being with necessitation of similar being to others comes true. A word as to one of your problems.

You have a Christ, a sinless one, and you have told us over and over again that Christ does something. Well, Christ does nothing. But that is the very point, I think, you stand

to gain on if you come to believe that a coherer theory is true. Christ does nothing and need do nothing ; but because Being is the only mode of doing. It is because Christ does nothing and need do nothing that he does so much by Being and will always be in a position to do so much by Being. Being I think is the deepest note, the cardinal position you will take up into your churches if you come to be indrawn into a belief in a coherer system of Philosophy.

You seek to carry back some of your beliefs, and to carry back some of the vital operations and facts in changing vitality that you rightly call religion—not the theory only of religion—but the vitalities as well—into the appearance in the world of a man who was hung on the cross—a Divine man who was hung on the cross. Suppose, without offence, that the Being of that man, as he hung upon the cross (but more than all that throughout his lifetime) was a mode of Doing—suppose that that man once won spiritual knowledge in the Legalities-Dialysities of the spiritual for himself and others as men now win mundane or natural or scientific knowledge in the Legalities-Dialysities of that ilk, and are, as He in the spiritual, thenceforth the Truth-winners, the Truth-compellers, the World-makers of that product in Legalities-Dialysities for themselves and others for all

time or for vast tracts of time till other Legalities-Dialysities with more knowledge so attained be achieved—suppose these things and they are very right and natural to be supposed from the point of view with which we regard them in this essay ; and we have an actual institution in vitality itself, in life itself of facts in vitality the subsequent course of which it is for you theologians to explore. I say that right from such a start that life that came in the end to hang upon the cross (though that was not the most important point as I think began in “ Being a mode of Doing ” and in his being thus a mode of Doing a series of vital operations with the established Legalities-Dialysities won therewith that could oncarry into your lives. Right from his vital changes could follow a similar series of vital changes in those whose assent to him could take note of them. I say assent because there is a theological problem of assent here as much as there is a problem in attention and the will as an element in engaging consciousness to practicality awaiting the mundane philosopher. And right from that series of changes would follow, would have to follow, subject to the problem of assent, others similar in other men who could connect through their successive lives as a Church down to you. So far you are right. You have a problem and a huge one, so huge that I would do it an injustice if I

attempted to do more than indicate parts of it here.

To me this perpetual failure seems to have inhered in Theology in the past that it could not connect itself up with life in a manner so broad and plain and unmistakable that even the most prejudiced opponent could at least confess "Whether you are right or wrong I at least understand what you are stating." I say that the trouble in the past when we have read theology has been that just as surely as the mind will feel itself yielding assent at times to what the thoughtful theologian has to say, just so surely also does it puzzle us at the same time at least it has always more or less done me—to imagine in what way the theologian can give the rules which he has been describing as of Faith a plain understandable matter of fact bases in life. For however much the theologian, or some of them may dislike it, he has to justify Faith with Reason, and advance it with reasons and exhibit it as a form of reason, or the wildest dancings of the dervishes done in Faith are as reasonably because as faithfully done as any other of the doings of religious faith. Is this conception then of the fields of consciousness as coherers similitating in their lives together going to give us such a base, a base so plain that, even as we say, it will be possible for an opponent to reply, what he has not always been

able to reply, "I at least see how you propose to base your moral theories in life itself." Are we about to gain, in this conception of coherers similitating their lives together a common *point d'appui* for both scientists and theologians. Do not be afraid sir theologian, I am not going to cheapen you by admitting the scientists to a post in the *point d'appui*. Science, the knowledge that concerns itself with the material and in that sense with the practical, will always be the left wing of the army of Philosophy; the right wing will always be theology. Between the children of GAIA on the left and the children of Astraeus on the right there will always be difference of interest enough to keep them in their proper places. But something is surely radically wrong if that difference of interest which keeps them one on the left and the other on the right extends to causing them to combat one another or to lose sight of the common ground on which they stand and of the sameness of the position which from their different points of view they are attacking. The soldier on the left in proportion as his interest there led him to enlist in the battalions of the left will remain there. You, sir theologian, whom your interest led to serve with the battalions of the right you need not fear that there will remain long in your ranks any but those whom an equal interest enlisted.

There is much talk going on of the possibility of reconciling Science and Theology. Have we, on the basis of coherers, found common ground where the whole army may at length find itself attacking on common ground one on the left, one on the right. Science and Theology have been like two wings of the army of the generalissimo (Philosophy) which have been moving so widely apart that they have not really attained to knowing that it is on common ground they have been making their attack. Their outposts have even fired into one another by mistake. Because, if we are right in asserting as common ground for both a coherer view of life, it was a mistake for Science's vedettes moving on a theory of conversion to fire at the opposite wing whose misfortune it was not to know that the positions they occupied were tenable on a coherer basis. Neither side could knock the other out in this sort of business, but the trouble engendered thereby was reflected everywhere, right down to the commissariat mule, the man who eats and drinks because, as he thinks, to-morrow he dies.

The man of Faith has held his position against every possible attack Science could make on it. But while he cannot but hold, in what is his last position of all, an absolutely

inexpugnable position, his has been the peculiar misfortune that he could not declare the tenability of his position in any terms that rendered it intelligible to Science or state it in any modes of language that Science could accept as being on an equality with its own. Yet he has one position at least in the end which is absolutely inexpugnable.

The man of Faith—he need not be a Theologian, in fact he is more likely to take up the last and most inexpugnable position of all precisely as he is not a Theologian—for not always the man who gardens well is a good hand at stating the theory of gardening—the man of Faith, I say, especially when not a Theologian, has always taken refuge, when driven by Science, out of any arguments he can put up, in a position from which he can never be driven. It is embodied best in that sentence “The heart has its reasons which the Reason never knows,” meaning that the reasonings of the heart cannot be accomplished and cannot be given utterance to and cannot give utterance to themselves in any such terms as those in which Science will give vent to its reasonings as to the corpuscular. The man of Faith—and there have been many of them—who have felt their heart talking in them to this effect, may be driven by Science out of every reason that he can advance for himself

except that. But if his heart talks in him like that he is in a position from which it is impossible to drive him. You cannot drive a man out of his heart by any amount of reasoning: you can drive him further into it. I say that when an intellect like Pascals, a man of Faith, is driven out of every pronouncement of his belief but this it is into some such pronouncement as this that he will retreat, and he is then in an inexpugnable position.

You would have thought the Theologian would have taken more note in himself of this his strongest position, for it is the man of Faith who is first prompted to be a Theologian, and you would have thought he would have attempted in letting this secret information in his heart declare itself in language to deliberately strivingly search with a view of finding whether this secret information could not declare itself in terms as to its existence which would have been uniform with Science's. Here was apparently a failure of the Theologians. Remember that the Theologian is more than merely the man of Faith. He is the man of Faith reasoning. There can be men of Faith who have no theology, who have no power of reasoning about what is in their inner self at all. There can be Theologians who have no Faith, who reason through a mere study of

books, but they will be poor ones. The Theologian stands to be, it is his task to be the "words-man" of God. He is the man who lets this secret information of Faith which he has in his heart reason itself abroad into the world in the language in which it best expresses itself. He is not going to make the Faith; the Faith is going to make him; but it is his privilege by study to give best expression to the Faith. So that as I say there was some failure of the Theologian as a "words-man" in not putting into better reasoning the information which he derives from his own heart and inner self as to the heart and morality and religion having their reasons and their facts, which Reason as limited to the corpuscular can never know and never state.

Advenes, too, the Philosopher. The Philosopher in the real sense of the word is more than the Theologian. He is the "lover of wisdom." He is expected to be, and must be, to be true to the work to which he has been called, the Lover of all Truth. I need hardly say that there has been a failure too on his part to supplement with his labours the "words-man" of God by helping him to find such a statement expressive of his own as would put it in plain relation with Science's.

And there is lastly the scientist, the man whose interest and ideal is the attainment of

human power and its use over the material aspects of life. These men have always seemed to stand for a knowledge which is the most absolute degree of which knowledge is capable. They seem to have a mastery in reality and to have it at their finger ends. And yet as a matter of fact they are actually more expugnable in reality than the man of Faith. For Reason can actually drive them out of all their facts, a thing it can never do with the heart facts of the men of Faith. Their facts are only made at any moment by the point of view we take of them. They are liable to be changed at any moment into facts of other import as we alter our point of view. Hence the scientist unrelated to the philosopher will not be of much account, or the philosopher unrelated to the Scientist and the Theologian, or the Theologian unrelated to the man of Faith. All are necessary and become great in the proportion in which they connect up with one another. They are soldiers then of the one army. And all we want now is to have the soldiers of each wing understand that they are soldiers of the one army, having the same *point d'appui*, and attacking in the common cause different points of the same position. We do not want the soldier of the left anywhere but in his proper place attacking the proper points of attack which he has the genius to

conquer. We do not want the soldier of the right wing anywhere but in his place. And, friends, do not ask the generalissimo to be anywhere but in his place. Do not ask whom I consider to be the generalissimo of the whole army—Philosophy—to be anything where but in his place taking count of the work appropriately done by the wings. Do not blame Philosophy if you find it in the centre and not in the wings.

Myself am of the centre. I believe there is need for all the soldiers of the right and of the left. But as one whose place is in the centre, do not ask me to be seen in the ranks. It is not our part in the battle where I am posted to bear an active musket. It is ours to use those sources of information we have control of, and to enunciate those plans of attack which shall put into equal motion the earth-shaking battalions of GAIA on the left, and the plumed helmets of Astraeus on the right. It is for this we enlist; it is for this we gain any record we may gain of service done; it is failure in this would brand us the worst deserters of all.

The men of the centre are invidiously posted. Circumspection or hypocrisy shall seem to mark their every step. Not very admittedly, I think, are we friends with the zealots of either wing. We come and go, we estafettes of the general-

issimo, in a certain solitariness. It is not with many camp followers we travel. An obscure fire or none at all is often all the bivouac we have. But it was for this we enlisted, if so be we might be one of the battle-ranging eyes of the generalissimo.

Hegel, the great German philosopher, complained of his solitariness. He knew. One man, he said, understood him, and even he did not. It was but the half appreciation of but one man the greatest of German philosophers could command. As I say we do not travel with many camp followers.

Montaigne complained that the man of much belief is in the unfortunate position of being an infidel to the man of less, and there is a double edge, moreover, to his misfortune. For, as he suggests, speaking from the point of view of the man of much belief, no one naturally takes any pleasure in the inferior presentment of truths we may believe in, any more than a good carpenter delights in seeing a bungler "enjoy himself" with his tools.

So Hegel and Montaigne complained keeping good company together, while if myself were to start and grumble, I believe there would soon be left to me not even the half of a camp follower. It is in truth the worst trial of the philosopher, the double edge of his misfortune, as Montaigne knew, to be bound

to incur, as long as he is honest in his work, the disfavour of worthy people, and to experience something of disgust at efforts he yet knows are of good intent. Too great a lover of all truth to be partial he does not estimate as people think at their proper value the particular truths that this or that sect would pre-eminently enthrone.

Speaking then for the centre, for philosophy, I do certainly say that we seem to be in a position to get glimpses into the battle we have never had before, for look between the smoke-gaps.

Perhaps there is a Conscience. Perhaps what the Hebrews sung and Sophocles magnificently gave utterance to is true. Perhaps there is this moral arbiter, which, like all the other heart facts as we called them that are the roots of Faith actually has the advantage over Science of being forced by itself to make its own reasonings about itself in terms of itself, whereas with Science the reasonings about all things material will vary them with itself. Not so this, however, as Sophocles knew. Perhaps this conscience is, as the Scientist suggests though he cannot prove it, but thinks so because it would place the conscience as a fact in line with all his other facts, perhaps this conscience is but some differentiated cell of the brain, some different-

iated life-modes in the field of consciousness. Perhaps all this is, and perhaps something more as well. Perhaps these modes which are conscience in those fields of consciousness which are immediate in that similitating state together which is such that the Being of the one cannot be without as Being being under the necessity of necessitating instituted in similarity similar modes of Being in another. Perhaps, as we have said, Being is thus a direct mode of Doing; the only sufficient efficient mode of Doing. Imagine then, as I say, in all his modes including these, that Divine man, whether divine beyond other men, or divine, as I have suggested, beyond other men in virtue of that spirit winning with its Legalities-Dialysities beyond other men at that time, or divine only, as I think all men in a coherer panentheistic scheme are divine, either sharing in the Legalities-Dialysities once won by others, or winning for themselves and others more. Imagine that Divine man so in life and in the end hung on the cross, his every mode in Being, while he lived, a mode of Doing, his every mode of Being an institution in them (the other men) you may even say institution as them of similar modes. Imagine him sinless and say what would it be correct to assert as to those modes as instituted by him in other men as subject to the problem of

assent constituting a conviction to sinfulness in them and a forgiveness, constituting conviction to sin and forgiveness, as constituting a wrongfulness in them, that they before they possessed these modes did not have, and as constituting an opportunity to them of better things—an opportunity, I say, as there was given to them the opportunity of a merit-appeal in those modes which are veritably in them like that man himself. I say candidly and straightforwardly that I never myself understood what the possibilities are of those beliefs which the churches hold, and none could ever propose them to me in what I did not think mere breaths of wind, and as illogical as such till I saw the possibility of their reasonings, and of the facts on which they base those reasonings, exposing themselves in this aspect.

I am very much a Siwash myself, if you know what that means. I am a man of a natural disinclination to churches and synods and assemblies of every kind. Heaven's breath of freedom is necessary to me in all things. I think the churches exert an unnecessary tyranny over men; all masses of men do over the individual. The theologian often pretends to make the Faith with his words, instead of letting it make itself as his life, and afterwards as his words. Too often he is a church and not a man. He is apt to be

a point of view instead of a point of life. Well, a point of view is Theology; a point of life is Faith. But if these be churchly facts—these life facts whereby consciences base themselves as coherers with one another—if these be churchly facts, every man is, as I begin to think he is, a living church, his own living church peculiar as himself, however like he may be to others, and however much, in his desire for sympathy, he may associate himself with others, and that which made him so, in putting these vital necessities and life facts in him, has rendered him thereby, if not tyrannous towards others, yet in a certain sense necessitous or churchly towards others. These necessities enter him from God, from Heaven itself if all this course of life as produced about deathless production is but the ante-chamber of heaven. Entered so in him, they necessitate their own entrance from him into others. They necessitate with their own existence in him (as him rather) their enforcement from him by means of him in others. The man is not now merely a point of view towards others; he is a point of life, and as that life necessitous as A_{7E} . He is a point of life first, and a point of view only afterwards, as what must be his life-convictions express themselves in that reasoning as to themselves which, because nothing can be proved but the

necessity of what has to be thought being true, renders all these his convictions, objectively considered, Faith and a matter of Faith. Science is also going to be presented with the spectacle of its being turned over from one Faith basis to another, if it comes to accept a coherer view instead of a conversionary, because a coherer view can never be experimentally proved any more than as conversionary view can be *out of mere experiment* proved. There is that in Reason which demands as much Faith as in Faith itself as spiritual Reason is demanded faith. In both are necessitated *The Faith*.

Do not let us deceive ourselves. This position is hypothetical. It will always be hypothetical. We never shall be able to know by any such rule of thumb experiments as carry conviction to Science that consciences, as possibly differentiated modes in the field of consciousness which are coherers can, directly as Being, distribute their own moral action. They may forever be in the position in those fields of consciousness which the eyes occupy, cast into similarity in different men as they view to similar occasions in sight, but unable to see themselves, and unable on anything but a hypothesis of being convicted to direct coherence with one another. So far, then, this will always remain the most tremendous

hypothesis of all. But if we have reason in the main to think that a coherer view is advancing to victory in those fields of consciousness, and if we have reason to think that if it gains a footing anywhere in those fields, it must spread itself uniformly successful over the whole, then we have a reason why, hypothetical as these questions are, questions are beginning to arise to us as to Sin, Sinfulness, Sin-bearing, Sin-causing, and as to the Forgiveness of Sin in all its kinds in a way which is opening further for explication the views on these matters which have long been denominated Christian. As I said before, I will do the theologian the direct honour of not attempting to solve here such tremendous questions as these are. But I would like to add a few words as to the general tendencies we shall have to take notice of when we come to propound these questions for settlement on a basis broader than we have ever propounded them on before—the broader basis, namely, of fields of consciousness and lives coherers.

We shall have to admit to ourselves the possibility of a broadening, and to ask ourselves how much we broaden. I have in my mind's eye, whether with a just suspicion or not—and I have no use for him—that theologian who is equal to accepting the gift that Philosophy is offering him, and throwing away the purse.

I can imagine him refusing to broaden in any way. I have a presentiment of that theologian, as he throws away the purse, being capable of saying, "So you and Science are coming round to my way of thinking. Well, there is a whole lot more that we believe that you will have to come round to also."

I think that every honest man will allow that it is up to him to take the purse with the gift, and he will want to know how far in downright honesty, and in proof of his acceptance of the purse, he must broaden on these matters.

A very, very hard question, friend. No man, I think, can force another man's belief on these matters. Each man must in the end, by his own brain sweat and the repeated hammerings of his thoughts, forge his own convictions. But how far there is a general and so to speak, historical tendency towards broadening, is perhaps an opportune and helpful subject of discussion.

We do accomplish, I think, if we embrace a coherer point of view, a certain change of aspect towards theology. We should study, preferably, the church in ourselves rather than the church in the lesser days of the past, remembering how, in long tracts of time, much of Legalities-Dialysities may have been superceded in our life map, and somewhat of

additional added. In the old days Theology was viewed as bringing down Faith to men from Heaven. From some one mount of the law formerly sacred Theology came down from Heaven to dwell with the sons of men. A succession of Heaven-descended messengers brought down to man the messages Heaven-descended. The message Heaven-ascending as life itself in all men, and Heaven-ascending as the commingling of lives in all men passed unregarded, and in proof of its holy origin of descent, men acknowledged a certain impossible difference between the Faith, between, that is, these Heaven-descended messages and anything that the human Reason, upbuilding from earth, could cause to arise and carry with itself up to Heaven.

Is there this all impassible distinction and difference between the Faith so descending and Reason as so ascending? Is not human Reason a species of Faith, and the higher it builds the more evidently displaying itself as such; in its highest pronouncements most of all? Are not all the pronouncements in which it continually displays its growth and attests itself evolved, are not all these pronouncements such as to render possible its display of itself as Faith, as a Faith, as a species of Faith? Take the pronouncement that what must be thought must be true yet will it not remain true that

"what must be thought," as it cannot by any means beyond this approve itself, is a species of Faith and will approve itself Faith and make men recognise that it is but a Faith which they have in the shape of these convictions of theirs just as soon as they have to risk their lives on them for the sake of them. The man who chooses to be chloroformed for an operation may be the greatest scientific reasoner of the world, but if that operation is not genuinely necessary yet deadly with danger of death, in choosing it he will be promoting his Reason to the position of Faith; and this promotion is we think, the plain everyday course which everybody adopts. The higher the Reason attains the more we can see that in the heights it is a Faith, Faith that can never prove itself; but that feature should not disguise from us the fact that the same feature obtains of it in the lower flats of life.

It is from such a point of view that Reason can be seen at its point of highest development as some of the sciences—sheer Faith. It is here we can take note of it as it comes to formation, coming to formation of itself as Faith, so much so that, as I said before, if Science should embrace a coherer point of view, as it will puzzle Science to prove that point of view by its usual experiments so it will have to embrace it as at once Reason and Faith.

How beautiful upon the mountains were the feet of those in olden times who brought down the glad tidings of Faith to men. But how beautiful upon the mountain may also appear in modern times the feet of those who with continual labour of merit-appeal won from Heaven and caused to ascend in its growth in Heaven all this so exposed and won Reason which, the higher up the mountains it attains, attains as Heaven-ascending, earth-evolved. To see that Theology came not down from Heaven as a species of Reason alien to anything else but is a continual enlargement of earth into the air of Heaven, is in fact as the earth itself outbuilt as the continual production that merit-appeals obtain, that is the great change in the point of view towards Theology that we are called upon to make.

This is not, I consider, to degrade Theology, for the origin of Theology, is still the same. It is taken continually from Heaven on the course of merit-appeals, for it is God's own movement in Theology we participate in as He changes in His self-honourings with us to give us further better of his plan. It renders, however, more digne, more worthy, that is to say, the earth to receive what is as Faith the noblest production of the human intellect.

It is this digner earth that is broader. It is the Faith that makes the earth digner, in

making the earth digner broadens and dignifies itself. The more digne the earth and our view of it, or whatever upswallows it, depend upon it, the broader our Faith for a Faith as it broadens makes the earth digne.

The theologian of a certain school will certainly see in this an attack upon Inspiration. But he has to show me that this is an attack upon Inspiration and not merely an attack upon what have been his own particular views as to Inspiration. An attack upon the latter there must be if we are going to propose to reconcile Religion and Science. If Religion and Science, Theology and Science are to be reconciled, as they could not be reconciled on their old views, so we are forced to admit that to reconcile them we shall be forced to view Theology's Inspiration as of a kind that admits it to coincide with Sciences or *vice-versa*. To reconcile Science and Faith we must see that if Theology has an inspiration whatever that inspiration be it must be such as can coincide with Reason, or if it cannot lower itself to coincide with Reason, Reason must be aggraded into heightening so that it coincides with it, or where, as we say, the reconciliation? This will not lessen the Inspiration; it will not do away with it; it certainly will not do away with it, because, as we shall then have to think it coincides with

Science's it will only show that the Inspiration remaining what it is, it is then of such a kind in Reason and in Faith—in Reason as to the material and in Faith as to the religious elements in life—that, in Reason and in Faith it is one and uniform. We shall be forced to broaden and amend our conceptions if we are ever going to reconcile Religion and Faith Reason and Faith, because it is our divided conceptions that are holding us back. Some theologians when they see this will probably not want to be reconciled, because they fear it will do away with Inspiration. It cannot do away with the right Inspiration which is the only one we want. The reconciliation of Science, and Religion, Reason and Faith is therefore for those men who can acknowledge that in doing away with their conceptions of inspiration or in uniting their divided conceptions the reconciliation not necessarily does away with Inspiration; and that it is not in their Inspiration so to speak they are going to reconcile Science and Religion but in the altered points of their view as to it.

If Faith is really that which by some process, removing it from all congruity with the Reason, enters the field of consciousness and possesses itself there in evidence of an Inspiration that is of an absolutely alien class from Reason, then who hopes to reconcile Religion and Science,

Reason and Faith? What tool can we work with?

But the minute we admit that the Faith is congruous with Reason we do admit it to be Reason, and that that Inspiration that resides in it resides in it as Reason and must be trusted in it and obeyed in it precisely as it is coincidently the Faith and Reason—Reason as to the religious facts of life and not the material, which has no court of appeal beyond itself and so is Reason. Reason which has no method of approving to itself its own trustworthiness except that mustness of itself it feels as itself, and so is Faith, the more evidently Faith and the greater trust if it be true, (we do not know whether it can) that a man can totally deny his Faith and live, a mere animal, while if he did the same thing or could do it in his Reason of the left wing, as to the material he will cease to live. This does not lessen or gainsay in any way the inspiration in the Faith, it drives us to it as to a new trust, a new altar of God—even as it is.

There is an ugly ring in the mouth of a demagogue in such phrases as the "Age of Reason," for they often herald the carmag-nole; and Religion is apt to fear in them a "La Lanterne," for all the apparatus of religion in the world. It is for the clergy themselves to correct any such tendency to ugliness or

partiality by showing that they will and do retain every Inspiration which was theirs as Faith, every Faith that was theirs as Inspiration, because they retain this Faith and this Inspiration as Reason—Reason in its right wing absolutely on an equality and naturality with Reason in its left wing—unable to accept itself as Faith except by its “mustness” to itself as Reason, but far grander in its scope than the same equal and natural Reason in its left wing by how much in it man lives a life ennobled beyond the beasts of the field and the merely animal in himself.

Is every man then to trust himself. In the end he will have to. In the end he will have to trust that Reason which is his and that Inspiration which is in his Reason. That every man is his own theologian, however, and should be his own theologian is no recommendation that every man would be wise to consider himself the best theologian. The division of labour that enables always some to render themselves wiser than others in every department of human knowledge as well as the fact that no man in his communised Being can be in a position of solitary trust towards others is going for a long time to ensure churches a necessary place and position and work in human society, as places and occasions where actual life-gifts are exchanged.

It is worthy of note that in the reconciliation as we suggest it Theology maintains much for which it has striven ever since there has been a conflict between Science and itself, between, that is, Reason in its left wing and Reason in its right wing. It has done this, we must surely think, because the life-facts that inspire it and that give utterance to themselves in those its Reasons that are classed as Faith and of the spiritual world have had in themselves a greater durability and a more unchanged sameness—they have existed from the beginning with more of the Eternal Zeus in them than those phantasms of a more rapid change as the material in which Reason in its left wing changes so quickly its Faith, as now at one time conversion (the theory that is of conversion) and then again, as we suggest, coherence (the theory that is of coherence). The material aspect of the world and the material mundane environment, as with this age of invention, changes rapidly ; less rapidly, I think, the hearts and the consciences and the emotions that find conjunction therewith. If they do change as rapidly they do so less detectably. The will is the most same, the most unchangeable or undetectably changeable of all the elements in the field of consciousness. We practically know no life-changes in it, and after

the will come these others, I imagine, by means of which Faith prompts Theology and in which Faith continually promotes itself into Theology. These do seem in this sense to outwear the world. Then come, always rapid in change and detectably so those phantasms in respect of which Reason so frequently changes itself as Faith, now giving voice to itself as conversion (the doctrine of conversion—for it can never prove itself and so is in the position always of remaining Faith) and now as rapidly liable to change itself as coherence (the doctrine of coherence). It is by reason of this greater unchangeableness in the elements in which the Faith that continually enters into Theology bases itself that Faith and theology will always be, as I think, on the winning side, that is to say the more last side in any conflict that may arise between Reason in its right wing and Reason in its left wing. That the Faith does change in a slow and almost imperceptible manner is evidenced by the changes in that Theology that continually has with changes in itself bespoken some such broadening and deepening changes as well in Faith.

But if the Theology maintains its right in the reconciliation and in accepting the reconciliation—if it maintains its hugest of all rights—the right to a moral world—it cannot maintain itself in the reconciliation without broadening.

If it accepts Science or Reason in its left wing, as part of itself, it is evidently broadening. It may also deepen in itself. It is this process of deepening and broadening that will engage religious minds, not without some attendant troubles and trials.

It is good to be annoyed though we may not like it at the time. What have we in the reconciliation, on that which we call the more lasting side, which calls for a broadening and deepening. If it be within the last and best enunciation of Theology to believe that "in Him we live and move and have our Being" agreeably to Science and Religion then the agreement as I see it calls for nothing less, and in calling for this calls for that special providence at every point and change-moment of life for which the last and best enunciation of Theology also calls. If it be a corollary of this that there be anthro-pomorphism and that man effigy the Divine this in the agreement as I see it is also called for. If there be a question of the peculiar grace of woman there is in the agreement as I see it a decision as to the peculiar grace of woman the one half of the world which surely to half a world will not be unacceptable. All this more or less defined has been in the background of the Christian Faith. It is on a more vital spot the eyes of the Christian Faith will fix itself.

It is on the question of one Sinless having entered to the world the whole process of at once conviction to Sin and Forgiveness. It is on this point as to whether we should broaden or can deepen, or whether it is a broadening only that is asked there will be much controversy.

The only thing I can do is to state my own opinion, which is that the fact that this process may have attained to its perfect exposition in one man does not prevent that exposition from always having with less perfectness in all who have ever lived been always going on. There comes a time to every thinking man when he must put into the melting-pots of his thought such questions as that as to the possible dual control of the world. There is no use burking these questions or refusing to entertain them when they ask themselves in the mind. Unfortunately they can be burked in a way that questions of the material aspect of life cannot be, and Religion can so be left by reason of that neglect of duty to drag its slow length as superstition through the ages. And the temporal interests of Religion make for their burking. But they are there in the mind to be asked because in the end they can be answered. They are there perhaps now and for the moment as *impasses* to which we lead up and beyond which we it may be may not pass but

only as in those *impasses* as in all *impasses* intellectual or moral is going to be found that greater knowledge that shall exhibit itself by these very means. They ask themselves in the mind because they can be answered as with these *impasses* of a conversionary material universe, just as much as that question of the adequacy or inadequacy of Conversion asks itself because it can be answered; and as answered mean a higher stage of Reason attained. Nothing in the one element Reason asks itself but what can be answered. Nothing is there asking for an answer but what carries the opportunity, in the answer, of a higher Faith since a higher stage of Reason, for that is how Reason grows by asking these questions in itself and without they be asked and answered it cannot grow.

That evil as well as goodness lives in common existential walls, if the latter so lives, is undeniable, nor do we quite know to what heights badness here and hereafter may be permitted in the scheme of Providence, to rise. But if Evolution be true and the world has made any progress towards Betterment, it is impossible not to think as all Evolutionists I believe end by having to think that it is the continual intrusion of the better alone reduces the former better to this evil and worse; and that the opportunity of the better is thus only

produced as there is simultaneously manufactured in the less better that which is worse, this being the check that prevents the growth of unlimited evil. It is in the end I believe impossible to believe the world story capable of moving to Betterment in the scheme of Evolution on any other lines; and if so it is surely impossible not to think that this is one of those answers in a nobler Faith and a portion of that Faith. But though the background of the Christian Faith may thus in the past have been wrong in admitting a dual control in the Evolutionary scheme the actual turning of the key which has to accomplish the actual work in bettering may only be possible because the wards into which the key has to fit are in the main these: the fact, namely, that always the man of higher life, the man, that is, to whom is presented the opportunity of the better life, offers in the communised modes in which he is bespoken better and granted that merit appeal for further betterment the "turning of the key" to his brother among his own modes. The key will not be turned by calling it names; a mere name or the key will not turn it; mere names will not make the wards. Something inside the names has got to do the work, whether it wear a name as key, whether it wear a name as ward; and like the first Christians, this fact at first without

a name does not need a name to do its work ; nor does the name help or hinder in its work—only it denominates its value after it has exhibited what work it does. The names alone will not do the work.

Let us be wise then where we may, with the wisdom which is neither hypocrisy nor circumspection. Let us postpone calling one another names on this matter till we have done our best really to get down to the fact of the possibilities that seemed to be opened here. You who may arrive at the decision that Perfection at one time having been reached in this process, and the standard then raised having since been (as it would be) incapable of being lowered amongst those who have since gone on sharing in communised Being from life to life transmitted in the possibility of that Perfection and measuring the process in present men by means of it—you who decide that that standard lives to-day, yet do not, I beg of you, call me a latitudinarian if to this belief I add another : that all movement in the evolutionary scheme to Betterment, whether before that standard was raised or after, proceeding, as it does, in the outcalling on merit-appeals of the continually gradual bettering of God (in His Self-Honouring as Us-Honouring) in his life with us, approves itself at every stage of that progress, as within the limits of that possible perfection,

however inadequate we may now think it, which God at each successive stage thought fit in allowing to demand, and in giving Betterment thought fit to honour. What God thought fit enough to be, at each successive stage, a good enough merit-appeal, was a merit-appeal good enough, and without it had been so honoured of God there had been no such gradual Betterment, and no turning of that once better to now worse. The work was being efficiently done, whatever names as religions it outcalled upon itself. But calling me a latitudinarian will not help me to turn my key. For the name does not turn the key : the key turns the name. And as the wards grow better and broader, or it may be deeper only, the better and broader key, or the deeper, will have to do the work, changing itself in the name, maybe, and taking upon itself a better and a broader, and a deeper name.

This problem then let us commit to whom it is rightly to be entrusted, the solid and earnest theologian to whose decisions if I do not unquestioningly bow, I at least pay the respect and attention I do to the masters of Reason in its left wing Science.

Inspiration coincident as Faith, but Inspiration and Faith coincident as Reason itself is the mark we must set ourselves to attain and realize. I think, if we are to reconcile Reason

in its right wing and Reason in its left wing, and while the gravity of Theology will always remain, yet there is introduced into it, I think, in such a reconciliation, a calmer, quieter note. One hears a saying out West often repeated, "Cheer up! you will be a long time dead." To us it seems to be the other way about. We look like being a long time alive. If all this life we have now is produced to us now as we think on that system of merit-appeals which outcalls it in all its modes, we stand in such a life with no opportunity of death that we or life can invent, and there is no opportunity of death, but such as life in change from itself, as now to itself, as then carries with it, and if matter be indestructible there can be no misappropriation anywhere by anything of that matter anywhere stored in the universe after death by life in evidence of its workings. The humaner note that will introduce itself into Theology, I think, as we recognise is this: that while Theology has a right to consider the future life and the future in life as dependent upon this, it has no right to think this except as it considers that that future life is only to be attained as developed from this present. It has a right to see that perfect wisdom consists not in attempting an impossible translation beyond life, but a transference, a gradual development as alive. The wisdom

that is all sufficient, and is all that is required of us, consists not in an impossible duty to the hereafter, but in a duty in the present only to the hereafter, in the simple Faith that in doing the best we can for the present we are taking all the care we need take of the future. If we take care of the present and infuse it with our efforts for Bettering, the future, I believe, will take care of us all right. The trouble that is in the world springs from one point of view, from the introduction into the world, by means of many men of ideals that make for Betterment. This is not quite that desperate business as I think that Theology in the old times depicted, though it is and always must be concurrent with present happinesses and unhappinesses. The life of all men, into whom ideals enter, is one of a present unhappiness as long as others refuse those ideals, and do not with free consenting will maintain those states of life in which the ideals realise themselves unhindered and unhampered, and in which as the ideal is so realised, as men so with free consenting will maintain it, happiness is broadened and finds a stable base in the world. But the whole thing is nothing but a state of border warfare between so much happiness and the so much more continually intruding into the evolutionary scheme, and impinging on the less. Where the fathers thus

continually struggle in the tall timbers of difficulty—this difficulty we mean—that the life they would live, if they could live alone, they are prevented from living by the sheer fact of their life-modes being a communised wall into which a neighbour of another ideal intrudes, where the fathers thus struggle in “the gloomy vast and ruthless woods” of this difficulty the sons live securely in the graceful meadows, which, common ideals accepted, maintain clear. The stress and trial, the failures, and even the temporary falls in these ideals mean this: happiness set back for a time, and happiness suffering a set back for a time, but happiness not necessarily lost, though the greater happiness postponed, and all this rise in happiness with its occasional delays and set-backs, if we could see this process in the story of evolutionary Betterment (for it must be there) and if we could translate happiness into terms in morality and in the Theology that concerns itself with morality—this might depict to us the one concern, from such a point of view, with which Theology should concern itself, and this would certainly not warrant that dark and desperate outlook and point of view which in Theology in the old days was apt to intrude itself, both as to the present and as to the future, leading Theology, in the old days, to

refuse to see in the present anything as present worth striving for—something only to be killed—to the consequent neglect of that saner note which evolution has introduced, that in taking care of the present and in realising our ideals in the present and trying to do so, we are taking all the proper care that is needed of the future. There must be this state of border warfare as long as the more happiness intrudes upon and impinges against the less, and there must be Theology to take care of this warfare in its moral aspects, and in taking care of the warfare to take care of the happiness. Where the old Theology was wrong was that it took care of the warfare without caring to take care of the happiness. By giving proper attention to the realisation of present happiness, Theology will be induced less and less to revert to its old systems of carrying on that warfare by a bloody system of attempted forced transplantations to a further life and world. However the churches may have contended against it, the world has insisted on “humanising” them, and on making their methods savour less and less of these forced transplantations. Not to transplant, but now ever to educate, educate, educate is the note; not to send men into another and hoped better world unfit even for this, but to fit them in this in the hope and expectation of a better. Is

not this the saner, calmer belief and advocacy of modern times.

Perhaps then the time approaches when the Theologian in addition to handling the problems hitherto peculiarly his own will seek to possess himself more and more of that spirit of reasoning which has hitherto been deemed exclusively the possession of the Philosopher, and will also seek to share the spirit and the theories, if not the exact instances of Science. One wise head will then cover all, whether he regard himself as Theologian, or Philosopher, or Scientist. As a Philosopher I am content to resign the burden and to merge these consolations Philosophy has ever offered to its votaries into those which Theology and Science will equally acclaim. I will be content to lay down as a philosopher the burden of that spirit of Reasoning which has long been laid on the solitary individuals who have borne the name and carried the titles of Philosophers. The heart has to serve in the world but the head has to rule. I have both served and ruled in my small measure. I have borne my burden and brought it where I think it can be safely unloaded and unpacked in the Great Bazaar of thought and displayed for the use of those who see in it aught of desirableness. The bales of diamonds ye welcome in the Big Bazaar were brought, it may be, by a most unworthy ass. Sometimes on the

way that foolish beast spilled or tried to spill the packed wisdom off his back ; foolishly gnawed his bales perhaps and let some of the precious gems run out. But ye who sit in the Great Bazaar were it not wise of you to condone for the worth of wisdom carried the unworthiness of the carrier? I know what way you have come ! old surefoot of the big divides ! old surefoot of the deep canyons ! a trifle wild at times with heel and mouth, and a trifle scrawny now in the hide. Not one of the best carriers of wisdom, but a carrier !

A WORD OF ADVICE

THE ORDINARY COMES FIRST

There are some whose first use for a coherer theory will at once be the bizarre. I have my eye, of course as I write this on that great body of psychicists and spiritualists, including the Psychical Society who have long been engaged in probing for unknown phenomena in the world of mind. Of all this business I have no first hand knowledge, and anything I can say is therefore under this reserve. But I do think that a word of advice is to the point here. Some of the work done by a disinterested body like the Psychical Society may be to the point. It may be that they are the investigators who will raise in the end some confirmatory evidence of what as coherence, we believe, obtains throughout the entire fields of consciousness. But all their work, it seems to me, ranges beyond the ordinary; and we want the ordinary to come first, we want the theory as to coherence being the ordinary and normal state obtaining between each man's field of consciousness to

precede, and to be set up on its own merits, before we pass to what, as investigated by the Psychical Society is evidently an extension beyond the ordinary, for as I see the matter, it is an extension beyond the ordinary if any person's field of consciousness can by some suspension and as it seems, of will, be brought to be such as to make that person what is commonly called a medium. All this business of mediums ranges beyond the ordinary, and demands I think, facts and adumbrations of facts too subtle to be properly handled before we have thoroughly decided what may first obtain as to the ordinary and so far normal conditions of coherence. All suggestions of thought reading and all the manifestations claimed to be associated with mediums have no place in the ordinary facts of coherence as ordinary—for there are in the ordinary—as we have tried to suggest—an immense number of checks on people thinking alike in the customary work-a-day workings of their fields of consciousness in coherence.

Fifty authenticated ghosts (*Revenants*, of course, is their title between gentlemen) if ghosts ever can be authenticated (for it takes Reason to authenticate them) would prove nothing to me as to coherence being the method of either our or their life or of ours and theirs. Fifty ghosts, and authentic ones at that, could not settle for me this question as to coherence

being a possibility in our fields of consciousness. The only possible thing that can settle that is Reason itself in its self-communings as to the adequacy or inadequacy of conversion as a method of force in the fields of consciousness demanding, if conversion be conceived by it as inadequate, a more rational method as adequate, a consequently greater rationality as itself (Reason) when propounding that method. And the Reason which I accordingly embrace as adequate as settling this question (and as settling itself in settling that question) I cannot add to or detract from, not if fifty *revenants* are presented to me without a reason for their being present. That is the fix, it seems to me, the psychisists are in at present. Their ghosts are present to them without a reason; and if we could have Reason we should not want the ghosts. Because the only reason that can ever raise and that can ever support itself is just this bit of Reason that is asked in natural development of itself beyond the rational inadequacy of conversion. That is in truth the weakness of all the instances in the bizarre that the psychisists are teaching. They have no connection with Reason—no declared connection with Reason, that is to say, with Reason until Reason develops from a stage (conversion) where it does not concern itself with them to a further stage where it can concern itself with

them ; and when it is developed to such a pitch and stands, as we say, on being coherence, it is doubtful what use the bizarre in the shape of ghosts is going to be as supporting Reason. For the simple reason that Reason supports in the end itself and not even ghosts will support it. Personally, as I say, my faith in Reason as capable of developing beyond itself in the doctrine of conversion into the greater and strengthened degree of itself as the doctrine of coherence, my faith in that Reason for itself is such that fifty authenticated ghosts (they never can be authenticated save Reason itself can authenticate them) would make no difference to me. As regards the possibilities of that Reason, ghosts do not enter my calculations. All this business is bizarre and useless even to prove immortality, for Reason cannot even believe in them as evidence of immortality unless its belief as to itself be such as to render possible to itself its immortality as them, and the minute it rationalises itself to that degree why we are beginning to work Reason from the right end. The work has got to be done by Reason not by the ghosts. The burden has to be Reason itself not ghosts.

Fifty authenticated ghosts, could not prove to me I suppose that only the good continue to live hereafter, or that only those who have an interest in manifesting themselves to

us as *revenants* live or *vice-versa*, for what is to prevent a ghost lying. Then what can they prove if they prove not these things. But if Reason appeals to me with its own, never but by itself authenticated force to believe that all this life of ours is on the one flat rate of continual production on merit—appeals outcalled as apparently indestructible unappropriable matter to the culminating day we know from this side of it as Death—with Panzooism for my guide, I say we are beginning to work Reason from the right end, the only end we can work it from to be of any use in building up an expectation of immortality; and it is work on it from this end must come first. The trouble with all this bizarre business of the spiritualists is that they are not working Reason from the right end. Let them begin to work from the right end and then perhaps they may come to be of use. But they will only be of use as they develop Reason from the right end, and peculiar dangers of superstitious practices lie in this direction.

A theory of our being coherers may revolutionise our ways of thinking—if it be right to call that a revolution which is in truth a reformation only. But this reformation will not change in one jot or particle our active life in this world. Applied Science and all that we mean by it will remain exactly as it

is, untouched and uninterfered with by me—unsuperseded in any jot or tittle of its methods, its winning of Legality-Dialysity, its world-making and truth-compelling, as life and knowledge once gained by one man, gained at least for a time, for all in knowledge and by all in the communing of knowledge. It may even continue, as far as I am concerned, to work on a theory of conversion, if its work gauge itself best by such a standard, and be best exploited by that. Applied Theology will perhaps find an exacter way for itself of explaining its workings in the axioms of coherence. We may continue to cook our dinner on the former standard, and to eat the living meals of Theology on the latter; for the work of the world has got to be done—to Be is to Do—to Do is to Work, whether there be philosophers or whether there be not. The only good that I can conceive the theory of our being coherers doing immediately to the work-a-day world, is that eventual reflex action it will have on what we call the “Humanities,” those studies as they call the “Humanities,” if I remember rightly, at the universities which do not class as applied Science. It is in the broadening of these “Humanities,” and the re-instigating and reinforcing, perhaps, of some ideals, that this theory is going to do all the good it is capable of doing, and this instigating of ideals

is necessarily a long and a slow business. What the dreamers dream to-day the stones of our ultimate cities may one day proclaim. The broadening and sweetening, and the rendering saner of our outlook on life, and thus in the sequel the sweetening and the broadening, and the rendering saner of our lives, that is all the worth the dreamer and the dreams can be to us. Who looks for more looks in vain. The best of all reformations comes in with an imperceptible gradualness. The greatest of all reform is thought-reform, but it is also the slowest and the hardest.

Ninety-five years ago, on the slopes of Mont St. Jean (we call it Waterloo), the trumpets were ringing, "Veillons au salut de l'Empire." At dusk that empire was dissolved. The battered trumpet lay in the covered way of Ohain; the trumpeter dead or gone.

"Etait il possible que Napoleon gagnât cette bataille?" asks a great French author, discussing this encounter. "Nous répondrons non. Pourquoi? à cause de Wellington? à cause de Blucher? Non, à cause de Dieu."

"Napoleon, vainqueur à Waterloo ceci n'était plus dans la loi du dix-neuvième siècle. Une autre série de faits se préparait où Napoleon n'avait plus de place. La mauvaise volonté des événements s'était annoncée de longue date."

To us it seems a no less decisive battle is impending in the history of thought between the nineteenth and the twentieth century, and that the battle between the two centuries is forming on the question as to a more immediate intimacy than we have yet accredited between minds and minds. To forecast the centuries fates therein is not for us. Whoever loses, however, the soldier of Reason gains.

The trained philosopher will see that I have skimmed over parts of the problem of the greatest difficulty. As I have said, I have indicated an inquiry, and not conducted one. It will be a hard thing, dismissing conversion as a method of founding mind, to decide precisely on what terms Immediacy holds its place as mind, or has timeous sequence in the gradual evolution of the mind, or how far, again, under the scope of Ideation, real externality from the body (as a portion only at all times in the field of consciousness), is a possession of those minds as fields of consciousness. How these microcisms, as these fields of consciousness seem approximate to contain in themselves, or to render account of the Things-in-themselves; how one man sees his colour sensations varied from another; and what instrumentality, if any, be demanded in the mind as a field of consciousness, to enable

each to do so; what new meaning this may impart into the scheme we have hitherto carried as the scheme of Things-in-themselves—all these are points, the academic philosopher will know, will require a much further elaboration than they have received here. It will be for the scientist, too, to set forth upon a decision, as only he can, all the issues of conversion as a chemistry being adequate to yield Increase, debarred, as it seems to be, from doing so by that limitation of itself as a system of equiproportionates, and thus indirectly or directly to decide what chemistry, to the entity of Increase, and not the apparently only, is adequate; what chemistry, in fact, is adequate, if conversion be inadequate, to carry on itself with all those similitations of itself that make it look like conversion.

But while the battle has thus yet to be fought I think we are right in saying that we can see on what grounds it will be fought. It is the difficulty in connection with Equiproportioncy as a feature in a chemistry of Conversion preventing Increase that calls for some chemistry to correlate in itself the changes that have hitherto passed as conversionary. It is precisely because conversion thus shows signs of giving way to some more adequate and immediate chemistry that we may believe we are entitled to derive our fields of consciousness

from our Maker in a scheme as to their immediate founding which places on quite another footing the position and problem in them of what we have hitherto styled the Things-in-themselves. It is because of the reconstitution that we can perceive has to be made in this respect as to the Things-in-themselves that we are placed in a position to challenge and can challenge that in an immediate Panentheism with God as "in Him we live and move and have our Being." We receive in knowledge coincident as consciousness that which is in verity all the Things-in-themselves that we need as a rule in Knowledge ; and that Knowledge living in communised walls nay, further, living as them, is placed in that safeguarded position as to its neighbours which permits it not even to know itself, much less to be, unless it knows even the Things-in-themselves, its neighbours.

We began this Essay by saying that men could not live unless they lived in a consonance of Reason together, and that that consonance of Reason could not exist—there could be no consonance of Reason—unless similar sensations, similar emotions, similar ideas and wills similarly constituted in each man offered themselves to men as that very consonance of Reason. But we further saw that at least as regards the portions of those fields of con-

sciousness which are styled sensations, it was impossible to have action and to know that we had exerted action except as there was change of sensations in attestation of action. And to preserve the consonance of Reason it is required that the action of one man that changes his sensations should also change to similarity another's. Is it too much to think that we have adumbrated here some fact of a universal application which is nothing less than what we dimly suspect to be the fact of coherence between coherers and may style as such? Is it too much to think that the effect which one man gains in his own field of consciousness as the result of action is impossible unless it goes on to involve a similar effect in another's in proof of our minds being coherers and of our mind thus effecting another?

I ask you, reader, again "Is the mind a coherer?" If you reply again that you do not know, I can only say that you never will know till you think. Thinking in the end is knowing. To me it seems that the very commonness of this possibility, its universality of possibility, world-broad as the consonance of Reason, has resulted more than anything else in its eluding notice. In full day one has to go down a deep pit to find that the stars are shining. But they do shine, and all day long whether we take steps to see them or not. And

so here. There are a number of these stars shining and we know it not because we have never taken the proper steps to find out.

If the mind be a coherer many I daresay will think that at last we have attained a marvel. I value it not myself for the marvellous ; and I hope none will and there is nothing of the marvellous about it that I can see. This is only one of the stars that shine in the daytime and the star that shines in the daytime is not a marvel. If we are coherers there will supervene in our views of life an added sense of its beauty, its wonder, its dignity, but none the less in the common practice of life we shall see and talk and hear and think all the day long just as we are doing now. We shall not see any further, or hear any better or worse than we do now only the method in which we see and hear and think we shall know to be different.

RESUME

Science has coupled together the disappearance of so much matter at one point and under one form and the appearance of so much other matter at the same point or elsewhere as Conversion; and has given Chemical expression to these appearances and disappearances together in her Chemistry of Equi-preportioned Convertibles.

So much matter, says Science, disappears in one form, only if so much appears in another, and the quantity of what appears must be equal—not more and not less—with the quantity that disappeared. Matter cannot be created or destroyed, only changed, in changes of which Science has composed a Chemistry of Conversion. Matter is indestructible but can change. No increase or diminution of the material is possible.

A	B	C	D	E	F
G	H	J	K	L	M
N	O	P	R	S	T

There are in fact two ways—the first one Science—of reading the map of matter's-appearances and disappearances.

So much matter in one form A disappears in one form and so much matter in another form B appears either at A or B or elsewhere. Science has coupled the appearances and the disappearances together as Conversions—and is aware of no other Chemistry.

Science has coupled together only appearance—disappearance—appearance—disappearance—appearance to infinity.

But there is another movement possible, on a wider scale, within which this narrower movement as known to Science can be inset and in which it could be obtained as only a partial effect.

So much matter at A and at C proceeding in similarity of change—appearances together, and preserving similarity of change together, with so much matter say at H and at T (and so on) disappearing together after coursing in similarities of change together—might equally admit in this wider field of a Chemistry not now conversionary of these manifestations as of appearances and disappearances together, which Science has deemed conversionary and the only true kind of matter-Chemistry. Then Science's reading of conversion into the map would be but a partial grasping in a

chemistry deemed by it conversionary of a wider chemistry which is not conversionary at all.

In that case Science has linked together appearances and disappearances while in point of fact what is linking itself there is appearance and appearance and disappearance and disappearance, in a system where inconvertible coherers are on matter-display of themselves so, and only as there is on a wide scale amongst them appearance together and disappearance together is there that secondary effect in the map as of appearance and disappearance.

And the difference between the two systems is very wide. We may be the Matter-makers of this system.

To proceed to the next point.

Every different aspect of mind uses itself with, and is accompanied by, a state of the body different from that which accompanies any other state of the mind. It is as though we had in consciousness what we may call spectra-bars, different at one end by Mind as by the other as Body.

Every such spectrum-bar is depicted as Mind at one end (different from any other state of mind) as it is different as Body (B. the other end) from any other state of body.

And as we have pointed out in the body of our Essay it is frequently impossible for these spectra-bars to be in one man's field of consciousness without the spectra-bars in another man's field of consciousness by Mind as by Body being in a similar state and it is frequently impossible to change (never but in entirety—by Body as by Mind) the spectrum-bar in one man's field of consciousness without instituting in similar change the similar spectrum-bar in another.

Can you wonder that we find ourselves pondering the possibility of our fields of consciousness being expository of our workings together as coherers, while in some way from us proceeds the production of the entire manifestation Body and Mind.

The Body and the Mind as thus given expression to in these spectra-bars certainly suggest the negative and the positive element in what we call electricity.

In electricity there is a positive current and a negative current but neither alone constitutes electricity nor does the work of it. The working of electricity is exhibited only as there is usage of the positive and negative in currency, the same usage we would suggest that avails itself in the fields of consciousness of a mind different as there is a body of difference co-stated therewith. Neither the mind alone nor

the body alone constitutes a field of consciousness or does the work of one, but in the field of consciousness by Mind as by Body is done that work of producing similar states of consciousness in different men which is done in electricity only when the positive and negative are in an alliance that admits of such result.

Science perhaps will never ponder this problem of our fields of consciousness being expository of our position towards one another being those of coherers, without wanting to satisfy itself of what would here however be only a half-truth, the half-truth as to how far the "body can be considered an electrical instrument." If the whole body were proved to be an electrical instrument it would be only a half-truth, the half-truth that such an instrument so qualified would be qualified to be the negative element in the full fact of a coherer-established field of consciousness, wherein Mind may be the positive element.

But it may be interesting to note how far Science does consider the body an electrical establishment.

I quote from Silvanus P. Thompson's "Elementary Lessons in Electricity and Magnetism."

"Nobili, Matteucci and others have shown that nerve excitations and muscular contractions of human beings also *give rise to feeble discharges of electricity.*

“Ritter discovered that a feeble current transmitted through the eyeball, produced the sensation as of a bright flash of light by its sudden stimulation of the optic nerve. A stronger current, transmitted by means of moistened conductors attached to the battery terminals, gave a sensation of blue and green colours in flowing between the forehead and the hand. Von Helmholtz, repeating this experiment, observed only a wild rush of colour. Dr. Hunter saw flashes of light when a piece of metal placed under the tongue was touched against another which touched the moist tissues of the eye. Volta and Ritter heard musical sounds when a current was passed through the ears, and Rumboldt found a sensation to be produced in the organs of smell when a current was passed from the nostril to the soft palate. *Each of the specialised senses can be stimulated into activity by the current.*

“*Man possesses no specialised sense for the perception of electrical forces* (because, as we suggest, he needs none, being already everywhere electrically accessible), as he does for light and for sound. But there is no reason for denying the possibility that some of the lower creatures may be endowed (wanting, as we suggest, in this more general accessibility of man), with a special electrical sense, animal electricity. Although in his later writings, at

least, Galvani admitted that the electricity thus operating arose from the metals employed, *he insisted on the existence of an animal electricity resident in the muscular and nervous structures.* He showed that contractions could be produced without using any metals at all, by merely touching a nerve at two different points along its length with a morsel of muscle cut from a living frog, and that a conductor of one metal, when joining a nerve to a muscle, also sufficed to cause contraction in the latter. Galvani, and Aldini regarded these facts as a disproof of Volta's contact theory. Volta regarded them as proving that the contact between nerve and muscle itself produced (as in the case of two dissimilar metals), opposite electrical conditions.

Nobili later showed that when the nerve and muscle of the frog are respectively connected by a water contact with the terminals of a delicate galvanometer, a current is produced which lasts several hours. He even arranged a number of frogs' legs in series like the cells of a battery, and thus increased the current. Matteucci showed that through the muscle alone there may be an electro motive force. Du Bois Reymond has shown that if the end of a muscle be cut across the ends of the muscular fibres of the transverse section are negative, and the sides of the muscular fibres are positive, and that this difference of

potential will produce a current, even while the muscle is at rest. To demonstrate this, he employed a fine astatic galvanometer with 20,000 turns of wire in its coils, and to obviate errors arising from the contact of the ends of the wires with the tissues, impolarizable electrodes were used, made by plunging terminal zinc points into a saturated solution of sulphide of zinc, contained in a fine glass tube, the end of which was stopped with a porous plug of moistened china clay. Normal muscle at rest shows no current whatever between its parts. Injured muscle at rest shows a current from the injured towards the uninjured parts (returning towards the injured part through the galvanometer). Normal muscle when active shows a current from the active part towards the resting part. Du Bois Reymond obtained currents from his own muscles by dipping the tips of his forefingers into two cups of salt water communicating with the galvanometer terminals. A sudden contraction of the muscles of either arm produced a current from the contracted towards the uncontracted muscles. Dewar has shown that when a light falls upon the retina of the eye, an electric current is set up in the optic nerve. In the skin, and especially in the skin of the common eel, there is an electric motive force from without inwards.

“Little is however yet known of the con-

ditions of conductivity of the matter of the nerves. *They conduce better than muscular tissue*, cartilages or bone, but of all substances in the body the blood conducts best."

This may not seem to carry very far the establishment of the Body as an electrical generator, a generator we mean as distinct from its wide established conductivity. But this widely established conductivity of the Body does make us believe that to whatever generation of electricity there may be in the Body all bodies are accessible and responsive.

In a word, two systems of Chemistry have come to a conflict for the mastery. One can never yield increase of matter. In the other life itself may involve the production of matter and this productive quality in life may yield us that real increase of the material in similitated appearance and disappearance together upon different lives out of whose appearances and disappearances it is possible to construct, though erroneously, a chemistry of the material such as we call conversion itself incapable of yielding increase. In this latter world nobody and nothing can appropriate that matter which once was ours. It is sacred for all time to the life that produced it. It is and must be sacred, through whatever changes to the life that produced it.

Sargent

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